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Asean

Women, gender and ‘voice’ at the Pacific Islands Forum

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Author: Nicole George, UQ

As the 2012 Pacific Islands Forum got underway in the Cook Islands, regional media commentary focused on the high political profile of the women who would attend and their efforts to focus intergovernmental attention on the issue of gender disadvantage.

The fact that issues pertinent to the status of women in the region were under debate generated profound interest, and many anticipated important announcements on the push for women’s advancement across the region. They were not disappointed. The Forum Secretary General, Neroni Slade, set the tone with an opening speech that made specific mention of the need for a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to gender violence. The Australian government used the event to announce a new $AU 320 million, 10-year regional aid program designed to empower women by targeting their political representation, economic participation and physical security.  Although there has been heavy criticism of political power plays within the Forum in recent years, and mounting allegations that its legitimacy is disintegrating, it remains — for the moment — the pre-eminent site of regional intergovernmental negotiation. The fact that the Forum is today willing to deliberate on these questions is, therefore, an important breakthrough for gender politics. But premature celebrations should be tempered with some concern about the voices that could be heard in this debate as the meeting progressed.

This is not the first time that a regional meeting of Pacific state leaders has addressed the topic of gender disadvantage. Only a few in the region will remember the South Pacific Commission (SPC) meeting convened in the early 1980s in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, to deliberate on similar issues. There are important differences worth nothing between these two events, as well as important continuities. Differences lie in the fact that the 2012 meeting will include the presence of women with a high standing in international politics, such as the former Chilean president, now Executive Director of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Continuities lie in the fact that, aside from these high-profile attendees, Pacific Islands women will be as hard to detect in the formal deliberations as they were in the SPC meeting. Back then, the discussion was a male-dominated affair, interrupted only when local YWCA members stormed the meeting during a tea-break, protesting the fact that women had been prevented from speaking for themselves about their needs, interests and perspectives.

In 2012, the only female Forum head of state in attendance was the Australian prime minister, Julia Gillard. Gillard’s government has dedicated a significant amount of its aid budget to programs aimed at alleviating gender disadvantage in the region and the Forum announcement demonstrates this will continue.  It is also clear that Australian efforts have been behind the push to introduce discussion on the status of Pacific women at this Forum meeting.  But efforts to convince the region’s male political elite that questions of gender disadvantage deserve their increased attention would surely have also benefitted from some local female political representation. Without this, the ‘gender agenda’ may look very much like yet another Australian effort to hijack Forum deliberations for its own ends.

If received in these terms, this will be a lost regional opportunity. The focus on issues such as women’s economic and political standing, or their exposure to extreme levels of gender violence reflect concerns deeply held by Pacific women. These are not imposed agendas driven by Australian interests, but home-grown concerns that Pacific Islands women have worked hard to promote in both national and regional political contexts. The reason why these issues are today under debate within the Forum is to be found in the work conducted by the civil society networks of Pacific women, who have brought these questions into the public domain and captured the attention of regional aid-providers.

It seems highly ironic, therefore, that only a handful of representatives from Pacific women’s organisations were able to attend the meeting in Rarotonga. Generally there is a feeling that women have been sidelined from these events, just as they were some 30 years ago in Port Moresby. While the Forum deliberations are always a ‘closed shop’, in past years important side events have provided civil society actors generally, and women’s groups in particular, the ability to make their presence felt. This year, no such events appear to have been organised. Women’s organisations have complained that they could not afford the expense of travelling to the Cook Islands and were offered no support to do so by the donor community or the Forum Secretariat. With such high-profile supporters of women’s advancement in attendance and the Forum agenda specifically focused on questions of gender, the inattention to the need for Pacific women’s participation appears to be a gross oversight. But as history shows, it is largely consistent with the way regional intergovernmental deliberation has functioned in the past on these questions.

With a little more forethought, the 2012 Forum might have been prepared in a way that opened up opportunities for Pacific women to speak for themselves before a significant gathering of policy makers. This would have allowed them to defend the regional authenticity of the issues under debate, and hold off the inevitable criticism that the topic is being imposed by outsiders. It also would have offered gender advocates long-overdue recognition of the contributions they have made to regional political debate. Instead, Pacific women and regional gender advocates have been denied these opportunities. They watch, as they did in the 1980s, from the sidelines while others speak on their behalf.

Dr Nicole George is a Lecturer at the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland.

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Women, gender and ‘voice’ at the Pacific Islands Forum

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

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