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China

Does US-China strategic cooperation have to be so hard?

Author: Evan A Feigenbaum, CFR Can the United States and China cooperate to forestall threats to stability? A new CFR report, Managing Instability on China’s Periphery , asks this question in the context of fragile states and regions that share borders with China — specifically North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Central Asia. I participated in the project, which included workshops with Chinese specialists assembled by Peking University. I also wrote the report’s chapter on Central Asia. The project is interesting because the US and China actually have a long history of cooperating in places along China’s border. Just take recent tensions over Afghanistan, for example. These strains belie the degree to which Beijing and Washington worked jointly to defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Washington encouraged Chinese support for the Afghan mujahideen , and the two countries cooperated in other unprecedented ways during the conflict. But that was then. Today, the US and China are often at loggerheads in such places. US officials have argued that Chinese policies help to bolster Myanmar’s ruling junta. Many in Washington argue, too, that Chinese policies have shielded North Korea from the effects of international sanctions that Beijing itself has repeatedly voted for. For their part, Chinese officials often view US policies in these countries as naïve at best, destabilising at worst. Many in Beijing hold the view that US and South Korean ‘failures’ have cornered North Korea and thus urge deepened policies of engagement. In Central Asia, meanwhile, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the region in 2006 and 2007, I heard Chinese officials argue ad infinitum that US actions to promote political reform could, ultimately, destabilise these countries. What’s going on? Does cooperation really have to be so hard? For that matter, is coordination so hard because the US and China lack common interests? I think not. In fact, asserting so is a too-easy cop out because, in most cases, it would be awfully hard to demonstrate empirically that China actually ‘wants’ an unstable Pakistan or would just ‘love’ a North Korea with nuclear weapons. In the countries at the heart of this CFR study, why wouldn’t China share America’s interest in stability, security, development and prosperity? No, I suspect the problem usually isn’t a lack of common interests. It’s that shared interests are very general in nature. Turning (abstract) common interests into (concrete) complementary policies requires that Beijing and Washington overcome two very high hurdles: First, Beijing almost never seems to share American threat assessments anymore. Countries like Iran and North Korea don’t threaten China directly, so Beijing can probably afford to be more relaxed and many Chinese analysts argue that Washington overstates the scope and urgency of such threats. Second, even when Beijing shares America’s sense of threat, countervailing interests still obstruct cooperation. In Afghanistan, for example, China certainly shares America’s core interest: a stable Afghan state that does not harbour, nurture or export terrorism. But Chinese decision-makers have become uncomfortable when told that the path to victory may require a long-term NATO presence on China’s western border, US bases and access agreements in Central Asia, and enhanced US and NATO strategic coordination with neighbours that have had difficult relations with China. So, what’s to be done? More dialogue, perhaps? I’m sceptical. Dialogue, in itself, is not a policy, not least because dialogue for its own sake has not, in the recent past, proved especially useful. The US and China have held routine dialogue on Central Asia since at least 2006. An institutionalised Central Asia sub-dialogue  was established in December 2005  in the wake of a meeting of the US-China Senior Dialogue in Washington. But the quality of the conversations has been mixed and few, if any, coordinated actions have emerged from it. Here, then, are a few bottom lines: First, since coordination has been weak, the US and China should aim at complementary, but not necessarily joint, projects and actions. Of course the US and China need, in the first instance, to establish more transparency and a better mutual understanding of each other’s strategic intentions. But both countries are active, for example, with capacity-building programs and projects . So it is important to remember that complementary projects and actions need not be conducted jointly. One example is counter-narcotics work, where Washington and Beijing could coordinate their areas of focus, direct their respective financial assistance packages at similar drugs-related goals, and build complementary capacity while maintaining separate efforts. Second, of course the two countries should aim to improve coordination, but they shouldn’t expect to do real joint contingency planning. Not anytime soon, in any case. US-China coordination will continue to be difficult for the various reasons noted above: China does not often share American threat assessments; China does not support the US approach to political or economic reform in, say, Central Asia or Pakistan; and finally, countervailing interests, clashing security concepts, and mutual suspicions will remain an obstacle for some time. That means contingency discussions of, for example, donor principles and modalities in a prospective food crisis — in Central Asia or North Korea, for example — could build a better platform for US-China coordination than, say, aiming high at the big security issues. Third, to use an American football metaphor: the two countries don’t always have to ‘throw long’. Working now on peripheral issues may well give both countries a better chance to work over time toward core strategic issues. My bet is that coordinating economic policies will prove easier than coordinating security policies. And coordinating with ad hoc groups — for instance, with the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program — will provide China with some ‘cover’, and thus prove easier than coordinating bilaterally. At the end of the day, the US and China badly need to create a track record of concrete successes. And this is especially true in the places where shared strategic interests exist but remain awfully abstract. Evan A Feigenbaum is Adjunct Senior Fellow for East, Central and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. A version of this article was first published here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  North Korea: Why is Seoul and Tokyo Cooperation Necessary? North Korea: strategic thinking, strategic response China-Pakistan space technology cooperation

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Author: Evan A Feigenbaum, CFR

Can the United States and China cooperate to forestall threats to stability?

A new CFR report, Managing Instability on China’s Periphery, asks this question in the context of fragile states and regions that share borders with China — specifically North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Central Asia. I participated in the project, which included workshops with Chinese specialists assembled by Peking University. I also wrote the report’s chapter on Central Asia.

The project is interesting because the US and China actually have a long history of cooperating in places along China’s border. Just take recent tensions over Afghanistan, for example. These strains belie the degree to which Beijing and Washington worked jointly to defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Washington encouraged Chinese support for the Afghan mujahideen, and the two countries cooperated in other unprecedented ways during the conflict.

But that was then.

Today, the US and China are often at loggerheads in such places. US officials have argued that Chinese policies help to bolster Myanmar’s ruling junta. Many in Washington argue, too, that Chinese policies have shielded North Korea from the effects of international sanctions that Beijing itself has repeatedly voted for.

For their part, Chinese officials often view US policies in these countries as naïve at best, destabilising at worst. Many in Beijing hold the view that US and South Korean ‘failures’ have cornered North Korea and thus urge deepened policies of engagement. In Central Asia, meanwhile, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the region in 2006 and 2007, I heard Chinese officials argue ad infinitum that US actions to promote political reform could, ultimately, destabilise these countries.

What’s going on? Does cooperation really have to be so hard? For that matter, is coordination so hard because the US and China lack common interests?

I think not. In fact, asserting so is a too-easy cop out because, in most cases, it would be awfully hard to demonstrate empirically that China actually ‘wants’ an unstable Pakistan or would just ‘love’ a North Korea with nuclear weapons. In the countries at the heart of this CFR study, why wouldn’t China share America’s interest in stability, security, development and prosperity?

No, I suspect the problem usually isn’t a lack of common interests. It’s that shared interests are very general in nature. Turning (abstract) common interests into (concrete) complementary policies requires that Beijing and Washington overcome two very high hurdles:

First, Beijing almost never seems to share American threat assessments anymore. Countries like Iran and North Korea don’t threaten China directly, so Beijing can probably afford to be more relaxed and many Chinese analysts argue that Washington overstates the scope and urgency of such threats.

Second, even when Beijing shares America’s sense of threat, countervailing interests still obstruct cooperation. In Afghanistan, for example, China certainly shares America’s core interest: a stable Afghan state that does not harbour, nurture or export terrorism. But Chinese decision-makers have become uncomfortable when told that the path to victory may require a long-term NATO presence on China’s western border, US bases and access agreements in Central Asia, and enhanced US and NATO strategic coordination with neighbours that have had difficult relations with China.

So, what’s to be done? More dialogue, perhaps? I’m sceptical.

Dialogue, in itself, is not a policy, not least because dialogue for its own sake has not, in the recent past, proved especially useful. The US and China have held routine dialogue on Central Asia since at least 2006. An institutionalised Central Asia sub-dialogue was established in December 2005 in the wake of a meeting of the US-China Senior Dialogue in Washington. But the quality of the conversations has been mixed and few, if any, coordinated actions have emerged from it.

Here, then, are a few bottom lines:

First, since coordination has been weak, the US and China should aim at complementary, but not necessarily joint, projects and actions. Of course the US and China need, in the first instance, to establish more transparency and a better mutual understanding of each other’s strategic intentions. But both countries are active, for example, with capacity-building programs and projects. So it is important to remember that complementary projects and actions need not be conducted jointly.

One example is counter-narcotics work, where Washington and Beijing could coordinate their areas of focus, direct their respective financial assistance packages at similar drugs-related goals, and build complementary capacity while maintaining separate efforts.

Second, of course the two countries should aim to improve coordination, but they shouldn’t expect to do real joint contingency planning. Not anytime soon, in any case. US-China coordination will continue to be difficult for the various reasons noted above: China does not often share American threat assessments; China does not support the US approach to political or economic reform in, say, Central Asia or Pakistan; and finally, countervailing interests, clashing security concepts, and mutual suspicions will remain an obstacle for some time.

That means contingency discussions of, for example, donor principles and modalities in a prospective food crisis — in Central Asia or North Korea, for example — could build a better platform for US-China coordination than, say, aiming high at the big security issues.

Third, to use an American football metaphor: the two countries don’t always have to ‘throw long’. Working now on peripheral issues may well give both countries a better chance to work over time toward core strategic issues. My bet is that coordinating economic policies will prove easier than coordinating security policies. And coordinating with ad hoc groups — for instance, with the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program — will provide China with some ‘cover’, and thus prove easier than coordinating bilaterally.

At the end of the day, the US and China badly need to create a track record of concrete successes. And this is especially true in the places where shared strategic interests exist but remain awfully abstract.

Evan A Feigenbaum is Adjunct Senior Fellow for East, Central and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. A version of this article was first published here at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

  1. North Korea: Why is Seoul and Tokyo Cooperation Necessary?
  2. North Korea: strategic thinking, strategic response
  3. China-Pakistan space technology cooperation

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Does US-China strategic cooperation have to be so hard?

China

Overview of China’s New Guidelines for Enhanced Payment Services for Foreigners

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The People’s Bank of China has released guidelines on payment services for foreign visitors and businesses in China, offering information on mobile payments, bank cards, and cash usage. The aim is to improve inclusivity, address barriers, and promote acceptance of various payment methods to enhance the experience for international users.


Following continuous efforts for optimized payment services for foreign visitors and businesses in China, the People’s Bank of China has recently released a set of guidelines detailing the array of payment methods currently accessible to foreign nationals across the mainland. Spanning from mobile payments to bank cards, and cash, these guidelines also offer clear instructions on utilizing each method.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has recently released a comprehensive set of illustrated guidelines titled “Guide to Payment Service in China”, (hereinafter the Guidelines) available in both Chinese and English.

These Guidelines represent the latest step in China’s ongoing effort to optimize payment services for foreign visitors, underscoring policymakers’ dedication to addressing difficulties international users face on the mainland.

Recognizing the importance of inclusivity in payment services, the Guidelines aim to address these barriers by advocating for broader accessibility to cater to diverse consumers’ needs. To successfully achieve this goal, a concerted effort among authorities is crucial to promote the acceptance of foreign bank cards, ensure the use of cash, improve mobile payment convenience, further protect consumers’ rights to choose payment methods and optimize account services.

In this article, the key directives outlined in the Guidelines will be presented, along with their implications on foreigners’ payment experience.

In recent years, China has witnessed a radical change in payment habits. Mobile payments, in particular, registered a significant surge in popularity among locals, with 86 percent of consumers embracing digital wallets such as Alipay and WeChat Pay as their preferred payment method, as these were considered more efficient and convenient.

Amid this digital transformation, traditional payment methods, meaning bank cards and cash, declined in popularity. Many establishments, accustomed to the efficiency of digital transactions, have been reported to even refuse to accept RMB cash, while also not accommodating international cards. These conditions already set a great barrier for international visitors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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