China
Reimagining Chinese Indonesians in democratic Indonesia
Author: Ray Hervandi, East-West Center Indonesia’s initiation of democratic reforms in May 1998 did not portend well for Chinese Indonesians. Constituting less than 5 percent of Indonesia’s 240 million people and concentrated in urban areas, Chinese Indonesians were, at that point, still reeling from the anti-Chinese riots that had occurred just before Suharto’s fall. Scarred by years of repression and forced assimilation under Suharto, many Chinese Indonesians were uncertain — once again — about what the ‘new’ Indonesia had in store for them. Yet, the transition to an open Indonesia has also resulted in greater space to be Chinese Indonesian. Laws and regulations discriminating against Chinese Indonesians have been repealed. Chinese culture has grown visible in Indonesia. Mandarin Chinese, rarely the language of this minority in the past, evolved into a novel emblem of Chinese Indonesians’ public identity. Notwithstanding the considerably expanded toleration post-Suharto Indonesia has shown Chinese Indonesians, their delicate integration into Indonesian society is a work in progress. Failure to foster full integration would condemn Chinese Indonesians to a continued precarious existence in Indonesia and leave them vulnerable to violence at the next treacherous point in Indonesian politics. This undermines Indonesia’s ideals that celebrate all its citizens. Moreover, Chinese Indonesians’ journey of integration would remain incomplete, unless Indonesians — Chinese Indonesians included — restart a civil conversation that examines how this minority fits in Indonesia’s ongoing state- and nation-building project. In the process, this conversation will have to reconsider Chinese Indonesians’ locus in the nation. Once Chinese, Now Indonesian In the social structure of the Dutch East Indies, sojourners, and later migrants, from China occupied the middleman position that served as a buffer between the few Dutch colonials and the many indigenous peoples of the East Indies. However, political adherence of East Indies Chinese was arrayed along a wide spectrum: from devotion to Chinese nationalism in its Nationalist or Communist variants, to encouraging the preservation of the colonial status quo, to unambiguous support for the Indonesian nationalists. Indonesia’s botched coup of 1965 and the ensuing anti-Communist purges left Indonesian Chinese in an increasingly untenable position. Alleged links between China, Indonesian Communists, and ethnic Chinese communities behind the failed coup emphasized the paranoia that Indonesian Chinese are unchangingly committed to China and thus disloyal to Indonesia. The Suharto-era obsession with the so-called ‘triangular threats’ laid the foundation for anti-Chinese discrimination because, as an Indonesian expression has it, ‘once Chinese, always Chinese’. But a funny thing happened on the way to Reformasi . While the ethnic Chinese had always been under the process of acculturation in the East Indies and later Indonesia, Suharto’s policy of forced assimilation — for better or worse — decisively sped up the process that transformed Indonesian Chinese into Chinese Indonesians. Generations of young ethnic Chinese in Indonesia grew up with no real or imagined bonds with China. They spoke Indonesian or the local regional language. They embraced one of the five officially sanctioned religions of Indonesia, most likely Christianity or Buddhism. (Reform-era Indonesia eventually recognised the sixth official religion, Confucianism, in 2000.) From Olympian badminton player Susi Susanti to singer Agnes Monica, they shared in Indonesia’s national life. They came to identify Indonesia as their homeland and themselves as Indonesians. Reconstructing the Chinese Indonesian’s image Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians are not that different. Their dysfunctions are Indonesian, their challenges parallel, and their histories tightly intertwined. Consider, for example, the charge that Chinese Indonesians encourage corruption in Indonesia. In an echo of the old colonial structure, the Suharto years were infamous for the corrupt Ali-Baba partnership, which describes a nexus between the crooked indigenous official, Ali, and his greedy Chinese businessman, Baba. The ill effects of these inequitable partnerships were, however, blamed rarely on Ali, who brought political cover to the partnership, but always on Baba, who faced the heat. Or take the accusation that Chinese Indonesians arrogantly refuse to integrate into local society. In fact, palpable animosity and anti-Chinese prejudice are what leads many Chinese Indonesians to keep to themselves. As illustrated in the cases of the Javanese in Aceh, the Madurese in Central Borneo, or the Buginese on Tarakan — all cases of severe social conflict between newly arrived and local indigenous Indonesians — the perils of failed social integration confront all Indonesians. In addition, Chinese Indonesians are not, and should not be, a substantive issue in Sino-Indonesian relations. This is underlined in China’s muted and belated response to Indonesian’s anti-Chinese riots in 1998, and the relative lack of its mention during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Indonesia in April. After all, the existence of ethnic kin across international borders has aroused little suspicion of disloyalty toward, say, Malay Indonesians, despite the long and continuing history of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia. Most importantly, Chinese Indonesians’ greatest contribution to the Indonesian nation-building project might have lain in their unwitting role as Indonesia’s internal Other. Constructing a common national identity would have been much more challenging without an Other. Indonesia’s external Other clearly exists beyond the national borders. Chinese Indonesians’ role as the internal Other is, nevertheless, evident in their ascribed standing as the perennially ‘foreign’ group against whom ‘real’ indigenous Indonesians could coalesce and be contrasted. Starting the conversation Indonesia has moved on from the Suharto-era preoccupation with Communism and ethnic Chinese links to Communist China, and Chinese Indonesians continue to converge with the Indonesian mainstream. Furthermore, the issue of economic inequality in Indonesia is evolving from one that carries a stigma for Chinese Indonesians to one that all Indonesians must face, as more and more indigenous Indonesians steadily enter the middle classes. Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians have much more in common than they realize. It is now time to restart the conversation. Ray Hervandi is Project Assistant at the East-West Center in Washington and works on Southeast Asian affairs. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center. The piece first appeared here , in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin , on May 10, 2011. Indonesia, the region and the world The taming of ethnic conflict in Indonesia Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the right model?
Author: Ray Hervandi, East-West Center
Indonesia’s initiation of democratic reforms in May 1998 did not portend well for Chinese Indonesians.
Constituting less than 5 percent of Indonesia’s 240 million people and concentrated in urban areas, Chinese Indonesians were, at that point, still reeling from the anti-Chinese riots that had occurred just before Suharto’s fall. Scarred by years of repression and forced assimilation under Suharto, many Chinese Indonesians were uncertain — once again — about what the ‘new’ Indonesia had in store for them.
Yet, the transition to an open Indonesia has also resulted in greater space to be Chinese Indonesian. Laws and regulations discriminating against Chinese Indonesians have been repealed. Chinese culture has grown visible in Indonesia. Mandarin Chinese, rarely the language of this minority in the past, evolved into a novel emblem of Chinese Indonesians’ public identity.
Notwithstanding the considerably expanded toleration post-Suharto Indonesia has shown Chinese Indonesians, their delicate integration into Indonesian society is a work in progress. Failure to foster full integration would condemn Chinese Indonesians to a continued precarious existence in Indonesia and leave them vulnerable to violence at the next treacherous point in Indonesian politics. This undermines Indonesia’s ideals that celebrate all its citizens.
Moreover, Chinese Indonesians’ journey of integration would remain incomplete, unless Indonesians — Chinese Indonesians included — restart a civil conversation that examines how this minority fits in Indonesia’s ongoing state- and nation-building project. In the process, this conversation will have to reconsider Chinese Indonesians’ locus in the nation.
Once Chinese, Now Indonesian
In the social structure of the Dutch East Indies, sojourners, and later migrants, from China occupied the middleman position that served as a buffer between the few Dutch colonials and the many indigenous peoples of the East Indies. However, political adherence of East Indies Chinese was arrayed along a wide spectrum: from devotion to Chinese nationalism in its Nationalist or Communist variants, to encouraging the preservation of the colonial status quo, to unambiguous support for the Indonesian nationalists.
Indonesia’s botched coup of 1965 and the ensuing anti-Communist purges left Indonesian Chinese in an increasingly untenable position. Alleged links between China, Indonesian Communists, and ethnic Chinese communities behind the failed coup emphasized the paranoia that Indonesian Chinese are unchangingly committed to China and thus disloyal to Indonesia. The Suharto-era obsession with the so-called ‘triangular threats’ laid the foundation for anti-Chinese discrimination because, as an Indonesian expression has it, ‘once Chinese, always Chinese’.
But a funny thing happened on the way to Reformasi. While the ethnic Chinese had always been under the process of acculturation in the East Indies and later Indonesia, Suharto’s policy of forced assimilation — for better or worse — decisively sped up the process that transformed Indonesian Chinese into Chinese Indonesians. Generations of young ethnic Chinese in Indonesia grew up with no real or imagined bonds with China. They spoke Indonesian or the local regional language. They embraced one of the five officially sanctioned religions of Indonesia, most likely Christianity or Buddhism. (Reform-era Indonesia eventually recognised the sixth official religion, Confucianism, in 2000.) From Olympian badminton player Susi Susanti to singer Agnes Monica, they shared in Indonesia’s national life. They came to identify Indonesia as their homeland and themselves as Indonesians.
Reconstructing the Chinese Indonesian’s image
Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians are not that different. Their dysfunctions are Indonesian, their challenges parallel, and their histories tightly intertwined. Consider, for example, the charge that Chinese Indonesians encourage corruption in Indonesia. In an echo of the old colonial structure, the Suharto years were infamous for the corrupt Ali-Baba partnership, which describes a nexus between the crooked indigenous official, Ali, and his greedy Chinese businessman, Baba. The ill effects of these inequitable partnerships were, however, blamed rarely on Ali, who brought political cover to the partnership, but always on Baba, who faced the heat.
Or take the accusation that Chinese Indonesians arrogantly refuse to integrate into local society. In fact, palpable animosity and anti-Chinese prejudice are what leads many Chinese Indonesians to keep to themselves. As illustrated in the cases of the Javanese in Aceh, the Madurese in Central Borneo, or the Buginese on Tarakan — all cases of severe social conflict between newly arrived and local indigenous Indonesians — the perils of failed social integration confront all Indonesians.
In addition, Chinese Indonesians are not, and should not be, a substantive issue in Sino-Indonesian relations. This is underlined in China’s muted and belated response to Indonesian’s anti-Chinese riots in 1998, and the relative lack of its mention during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Indonesia in April. After all, the existence of ethnic kin across international borders has aroused little suspicion of disloyalty toward, say, Malay Indonesians, despite the long and continuing history of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.
Most importantly, Chinese Indonesians’ greatest contribution to the Indonesian nation-building project might have lain in their unwitting role as Indonesia’s internal Other. Constructing a common national identity would have been much more challenging without an Other. Indonesia’s external Other clearly exists beyond the national borders. Chinese Indonesians’ role as the internal Other is, nevertheless, evident in their ascribed standing as the perennially ‘foreign’ group against whom ‘real’ indigenous Indonesians could coalesce and be contrasted.
Starting the conversation
Indonesia has moved on from the Suharto-era preoccupation with Communism and ethnic Chinese links to Communist China, and Chinese Indonesians continue to converge with the Indonesian mainstream. Furthermore, the issue of economic inequality in Indonesia is evolving from one that carries a stigma for Chinese Indonesians to one that all Indonesians must face, as more and more indigenous Indonesians steadily enter the middle classes. Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians have much more in common than they realize. It is now time to restart the conversation.
Ray Hervandi is Project Assistant at the East-West Center in Washington and works on Southeast Asian affairs. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center.
The piece first appeared here, in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin, on May 10, 2011.
- Indonesia, the region and the world
- The taming of ethnic conflict in Indonesia
- Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the right model?
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Reimagining Chinese Indonesians in democratic Indonesia
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.
Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position
A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.
President Prabowo’s State Visit
During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Economic Incentives at Play
China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.
Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
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