Asean
Anti-Mubarak protests in Malaysia: How Arab issues travel
Author: Farish A. Noor, RSIS The repercussions from the wave of unrest that has spread across Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen have been felt in other countries with large Muslim populations. The effects have been felt as far as Southeast Asia with Islamists and pro-democracy activists in Malaysia taking the opportunity to join in the chorus of dissent to express their support for the protesters in Egypt. In the process, what began as an Arab concern has taken on a local meaning in the Malaysian context. On February 4, 2011, a large demonstration took place in Kuala Lumpur, where over 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets after performing their Friday prayers at two mosques close to the United States Embassy. After the prayers the crowds marched towards the embassy, which is a prominent landmark on Jalan Tun Razak — conspicuous by virtue of its size and the heavy security presence there. A memorandum was handed to American Embassy officials, calling on the United States to stop supporting Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and to allow for the transition to democracy in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. Since the pro-Taliban rallies of 2002, the American Embassy has been the focal point of many anti-Western demonstrations in Malaysia, and the pattern of the demonstrations has been largely similar. In the latest incident, the anti-Mubarak demonstration led to the arrest of a small number of protesters and the use of water canons by the police to disperse the crowd. Several salient observations can be made about the 4 February demonstration in KL, which serves as an indicator of US-Malaysian relations at the moment and the level of anti-Americanism that may or may not be prevalent among Malaysians today. Firstly, many of the organisers of the demonstration came from the opposition parties of Malaysia, notably the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian Socialist Party (PSM). A small representation of Anwar Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) was also at the scene. Notwithstanding the visible support of the PSM Socialists and the secular NGOs, an overwhelming majority of those who took part were Malay-Muslims. Many of the spokesmen and leaders of the demonstration were also leaders of PAS, with its leaders, Muhammad Sabu, Ridhuan Mohd Nor and Salahudin Ayub, the most prominent. Secondly, it is interesting to note that while a PKR divisional chief, Badrul Hisham Shaharin, was present, there were no major PKR figures at the demonstration. Local media reports remained silent over the question of whether members and leaders of the other opposition party, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), were present. Thirdly, there were relatively few arrests and no reports of extreme violence during or after the demonstration. Many of the slogans and banners used Arabic terms and phrases such as ‘ Yahya al-Sha’ab ’ (Long Live the People) and expressed solidarity with the Arabs of Egypt. As the Egyptian crisis escalated, Malaysian authorities seemed more concerned about the need to evacuate an estimated 11,000 Malaysian students studying there, most of whom had been sent to Egypt by the Malaysian government to pursue religious studies. This indicates the extent of contact between the two countries, and may account for how and why Malaysians seemed well-informed of developments in Egypt. The reaction of the Malaysian government has thus far been muted, with Prime Minister Najib Razak noting that it was and remains the right of the Egyptian people to determine their future and choose their respective leaders. The pro-government Malay press has taken a rather dim view of the developments across the Arab world, with the two most prominent pro-UMNO newspapers, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian , describing the demonstrations as ‘anti-government activities’ that jeopardise the security and stability of Egypt. The Malaysian opposition — notably the Islamists of PAS — have naturally taken the opposite view and have shown their support for the Egyptian protesters, particularly their compatriots in the Egyptian Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). Prominent Malaysian religious leaders like the former Mufti of Perlis, Dr Asri Zainal Abidin, have also waded into the fray, condemning pro-government Egyptian ulama who have been supporting the beleaguered Egyptian leader. At this stage it is unlikely that the anti-Mubarak and anti-American protests in Malaysia will escalate any further (barring an escalation of violence in Cairo or elsewhere). But they serve as a convenient means to rally the opposition and to unite anti-government forces in a concerted effort to single out common opponents; in this case the US and its allies in the Arab world. But this does not necessarily suggest a heightened mood of anti-Americanism in Malaysia. Malaysian Islamists’ perception of the US has remained negative since 2001 and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan the following year. Prime Minister Najib has stated that Kuala Lumpur ‘would not allow anything [similar] to happen here.’ Significantly, the ruling coalition — as well as the mainstream media — has refrained from showing any unconditional support to the demonstrators in the Arab world. Farish A. Noor is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article was originally published here , as RSIS Commentary 13/2011. Can Mubarak follow South Korea’s path? Malaysia: the political tide runs out Malaysia’s Hulu Salangor by-election and harbingers of reform
Author: Farish A. Noor, RSIS
The repercussions from the wave of unrest that has spread across Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen have been felt in other countries with large Muslim populations.
The effects have been felt as far as Southeast Asia with Islamists and pro-democracy activists in Malaysia taking the opportunity to join in the chorus of dissent to express their support for the protesters in Egypt. In the process, what began as an Arab concern has taken on a local meaning in the Malaysian context.
On February 4, 2011, a large demonstration took place in Kuala Lumpur, where over 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets after performing their Friday prayers at two mosques close to the United States Embassy.
After the prayers the crowds marched towards the embassy, which is a prominent landmark on Jalan Tun Razak — conspicuous by virtue of its size and the heavy security presence there. A memorandum was handed to American Embassy officials, calling on the United States to stop supporting Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and to allow for the transition to democracy in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.
Since the pro-Taliban rallies of 2002, the American Embassy has been the focal point of many anti-Western demonstrations in Malaysia, and the pattern of the demonstrations has been largely similar. In the latest incident, the anti-Mubarak demonstration led to the arrest of a small number of protesters and the use of water canons by the police to disperse the crowd.
Several salient observations can be made about the 4 February demonstration in KL, which serves as an indicator of US-Malaysian relations at the moment and the level of anti-Americanism that may or may not be prevalent among Malaysians today.
Firstly, many of the organisers of the demonstration came from the opposition parties of Malaysia, notably the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian Socialist Party (PSM). A small representation of Anwar Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) was also at the scene. Notwithstanding the visible support of the PSM Socialists and the secular NGOs, an overwhelming majority of those who took part were Malay-Muslims. Many of the spokesmen and leaders of the demonstration were also leaders of PAS, with its leaders, Muhammad Sabu, Ridhuan Mohd Nor and Salahudin Ayub, the most prominent.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that while a PKR divisional chief, Badrul Hisham Shaharin, was present, there were no major PKR figures at the demonstration. Local media reports remained silent over the question of whether members and leaders of the other opposition party, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), were present.
Thirdly, there were relatively few arrests and no reports of extreme violence during or after the demonstration. Many of the slogans and banners used Arabic terms and phrases such as ‘Yahya al-Sha’ab’ (Long Live the People) and expressed solidarity with the Arabs of Egypt. As the Egyptian crisis escalated, Malaysian authorities seemed more concerned about the need to evacuate an estimated 11,000 Malaysian students studying there, most of whom had been sent to Egypt by the Malaysian government to pursue religious studies. This indicates the extent of contact between the two countries, and may account for how and why Malaysians seemed well-informed of developments in Egypt.
The reaction of the Malaysian government has thus far been muted, with Prime Minister Najib Razak noting that it was and remains the right of the Egyptian people to determine their future and choose their respective leaders. The pro-government Malay press has taken a rather dim view of the developments across the Arab world, with the two most prominent pro-UMNO newspapers, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian, describing the demonstrations as ‘anti-government activities’ that jeopardise the security and stability of Egypt.
The Malaysian opposition — notably the Islamists of PAS — have naturally taken the opposite view and have shown their support for the Egyptian protesters, particularly their compatriots in the Egyptian Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). Prominent Malaysian religious leaders like the former Mufti of Perlis, Dr Asri Zainal Abidin, have also waded into the fray, condemning pro-government Egyptian ulama who have been supporting the beleaguered Egyptian leader.
At this stage it is unlikely that the anti-Mubarak and anti-American protests in Malaysia will escalate any further (barring an escalation of violence in Cairo or elsewhere). But they serve as a convenient means to rally the opposition and to unite anti-government forces in a concerted effort to single out common opponents; in this case the US and its allies in the Arab world.
But this does not necessarily suggest a heightened mood of anti-Americanism in Malaysia. Malaysian Islamists’ perception of the US has remained negative since 2001 and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan the following year.
Prime Minister Najib has stated that Kuala Lumpur ‘would not allow anything [similar] to happen here.’ Significantly, the ruling coalition — as well as the mainstream media — has refrained from showing any unconditional support to the demonstrators in the Arab world.
Farish A. Noor is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
This article was originally published here, as RSIS Commentary 13/2011.
- Can Mubarak follow South Korea’s path?
- Malaysia: the political tide runs out
- Malaysia’s Hulu Salangor by-election and harbingers of reform
View original post here:
Anti-Mubarak protests in Malaysia: How Arab issues travel
Asean
Deadly Floods and Landslides Strike Indonesia and Thailand – Vietnam Plus
At least seven people were killed, two others were injured and some were likely to be missing after flash floods and landslides hit the Indonesian eastern province of Maluku on the morning of August 25, according to the locality’s disaster management and mitigation office.
Heavy rainfall, which began on August 24, has triggered the disasters in Ternate city. Many local residents are in urgent need of support, authorities said.
Soldiers, police, local search and rescue personnel, disaster management staff, and volunteers are all involved in the ongoing rescue efforts, which include evacuating those trapped by the landslides and recovering materials from homes swept away by the floods.
Meanwhile in Thailand, local authorities reported that the death toll from a landslide in the popular resort province of Phuket on August 23 has risen to 13, including a Russian couple.
Source : Floods, landslides kill many in Indonesia, Thailand – Vietnam Plus
Asean
Tug of War in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN-China Dialogue Shift the Scales Toward Peace? – An Analysis
The ASEAN-China dialogue is vital for regional stability, addressing economic cooperation and security challenges, particularly in the South China Sea, amidst significant geopolitical complexities and ongoing territorial disputes.
ASEAN-China Dialogue: A Path Towards Cooperation
The ASEAN-China dialogue plays a pivotal role in Southeast Asia’s diplomacy, fostering economic collaboration while addressing security challenges. Despite advances, particularly in managing tensions in the South China Sea, significant barriers remain to achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. ASEAN’s capacity to maintain its unity and centrality is crucial amidst complex power dynamics involving China and other global players.
Navigating Tensions and Economic Relations
A pressing concern within this dialogue is the South China Sea territorial disputes, which involve multiple ASEAN states and China. The militarization of the area raises alarm among regional stakeholders, necessitating urgent negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) to manage conflicts. Additionally, the growing economic interdependence fostered by initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) strengthens ASEAN-China ties, yet it also raises concerns about potential political leverage influencing member states’ autonomy.
The Challenge of Regional Stability
While the ASEAN-China dialogue offers a framework for promoting peace, its effectiveness is conditioned by broader geopolitical contexts, including China’s rivalry with the United States. The success of this dialogue rests on sustaining a commitment to multilateralism and peaceful dispute resolution. As ASEAN adapts to these complex dynamics, it must reinforce its unity and cooperative strategies, ensuring the region’s stability amid evolving challenges.
Source : Tug Of War In Southeast Asia: Will ASEAN-China Dialogue Tip The Balance Towards Peace? – Analysis
Asean
Cambodia Invites Business Leaders to Join the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning
Cambodia invites businesspeople to the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning, promoting trade and investment with incentives like hotel coupons and networking opportunities in various sectors.
Cambodia Invites Participation in CAEXPO 2024
Cambodia is actively encouraging business leaders, investors, and service providers to participate in the upcoming 21st China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO), set to take place from September 24-28 in Nanning, China. According to a Ministry of Commerce announcement, CAEXPO serves as a vital platform for trade and investment collaborations between ASEAN nations and China.
To facilitate Cambodian participation, the Ministry invites interested individuals to apply as Trade Visitors by August 31, 2024. Participants will benefit from hotel coupons, dining vouchers, and shuttle services to the expo venue. Furthermore, attendees can engage in business matchmaking in sectors such as food processing, digital technology, and renewable energy products.
Kin Phea, from the Royal Academy of Cambodia, emphasized the advancements in China-ASEAN relations, particularly concerning economic cooperation, tourism, and cultural exchanges. He noted that both sides have become each other’s largest trading partners, enhancing collaboration through the Belt and Road initiative, focusing on infrastructure and sustainable development.
Source : Cambodia encourages businesspeople to partake in 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning