Asean
Calls for a Sino-Mongolia strategic partnership
Author: Mendee Jargalsaikhan, UBC The Chinese Foreign Minister’s brief visit to Mongolia on 24 February, like the Chinese Premier’s visit last June, did not trigger any negative public debate or protests in the streets of Ulaanbaatar. Rather, an op-ed by well-known columnist Baabar on the repression and marginalization of Chinese ethnic minorities during the communist era received wide attention. During this visit, Mongolian leaders called for a Sino-Mongolian Strategic Partnership — an unthinkable prospect a decade ago. Mongolia’s political leaders and people are changing their attitudes toward the Chinese. And although they make for great headlines abroad, sporadic incidents of xenophobia and racism against Chinese are not indicative of the wider public sentiment. Even after centuries of distrust, China was a normal neighbour of Mongolia in the 1950s; bilateral trade and all types of exchanges flourished, characterized by a process of learning. This learning came to a 30-year standstill when China became a ‘declared enemy’ of Mongolia. Another phase of cooperation and learning started in 1989, when Mongolia–China relations were normalized. At this time, Mongolians became increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure and the Chinese market . While Russia imposed visa requirements on Mongolians, and the safety of passengers and goods going through Russia was problematic, China granted visa waivers for Mongolian travellers and made its air, rail and sea ports accessible. Some might argue that this was Chinese soft power in play, but, above all else, these policies were based on economic practicality. By the Mongolian Embassy’s account, 350,000–370,000 Mongolians travel to China annually. This includes travel to Inner Mongolia or Beijing for medical diagnosis and treatment, as Seoul and Tokyo are costly. The number of Mongolian students in China is also on the rise, and Chinese language schools and training programs are abundant back home. And while China desires to increase its border trading posts with Mongolia, Moscow wants to close its posts. All these factors contribute to the learning between Mongolia and China, and a growth in bilateral trade and Chinese investment. This learning process for Mongolians has two palpable implications. It impels Mongolian political leaders to realize the ‘China factor’ in developing its economy and integrating with East Asia — thus calls for a strategic partnership. It assuages Mongolian misperceptions of China as a threat, something constructed by the Soviets in the 1960s. How much are the Chinese learning about Mongolia, one might ask? Is the Chinese government simply trying to make Mongolia a showcase of China’s benevolence and respect for the sovereignty of its smaller neighbours? This was highlighted when China concluded a border treaty with Mongolia while fighting against India in 1964. It was reiterated by Hu Jintao at the beginning of his first foreign visit to Ulaanbaatar. Whichever way, there is a change in the quality of Mongolia’s relations with China. Mendee Jargalsaikhan is a graduate student at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia. Chinese investment in Mongolia: A sequel Chinese investment in Mongolia: An uneasy courtship between Goliath and David Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ policy and its impact on foreign investment
Author: Mendee Jargalsaikhan, UBC
The Chinese Foreign Minister’s brief visit to Mongolia on 24 February, like the Chinese Premier’s visit last June, did not trigger any negative public debate or protests in the streets of Ulaanbaatar.
Rather, an op-ed by well-known columnist Baabar on the repression and marginalization of Chinese ethnic minorities during the communist era received wide attention. During this visit, Mongolian leaders called for a Sino-Mongolian Strategic Partnership — an unthinkable prospect a decade ago.
Mongolia’s political leaders and people are changing their attitudes toward the Chinese. And although they make for great headlines abroad, sporadic incidents of xenophobia and racism against Chinese are not indicative of the wider public sentiment.
Even after centuries of distrust, China was a normal neighbour of Mongolia in the 1950s; bilateral trade and all types of exchanges flourished, characterized by a process of learning. This learning came to a 30-year standstill when China became a ‘declared enemy’ of Mongolia.
Another phase of cooperation and learning started in 1989, when Mongolia–China relations were normalized. At this time, Mongolians became increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure and the Chinese market.
While Russia imposed visa requirements on Mongolians, and the safety of passengers and goods going through Russia was problematic, China granted visa waivers for Mongolian travellers and made its air, rail and sea ports accessible. Some might argue that this was Chinese soft power in play, but, above all else, these policies were based on economic practicality.
By the Mongolian Embassy’s account, 350,000–370,000 Mongolians travel to China annually. This includes travel to Inner Mongolia or Beijing for medical diagnosis and treatment, as Seoul and Tokyo are costly. The number of Mongolian students in China is also on the rise, and Chinese language schools and training programs are abundant back home. And while China desires to increase its border trading posts with Mongolia, Moscow wants to close its posts. All these factors contribute to the learning between Mongolia and China, and a growth in bilateral trade and Chinese investment.
This learning process for Mongolians has two palpable implications.
It impels Mongolian political leaders to realize the ‘China factor’ in developing its economy and integrating with East Asia — thus calls for a strategic partnership.
It assuages Mongolian misperceptions of China as a threat, something constructed by the Soviets in the 1960s.
How much are the Chinese learning about Mongolia, one might ask? Is the Chinese government simply trying to make Mongolia a showcase of China’s benevolence and respect for the sovereignty of its smaller neighbours? This was highlighted when China concluded a border treaty with Mongolia while fighting against India in 1964. It was reiterated by Hu Jintao at the beginning of his first foreign visit to Ulaanbaatar. Whichever way, there is a change in the quality of Mongolia’s relations with China.
Mendee Jargalsaikhan is a graduate student at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.
- Chinese investment in Mongolia: A sequel
- Chinese investment in Mongolia: An uneasy courtship between Goliath and David
- Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ policy and its impact on foreign investment
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Calls for a Sino-Mongolia strategic partnership
Asean
Deadly Floods and Landslides Strike Indonesia and Thailand – Vietnam Plus
At least seven people were killed, two others were injured and some were likely to be missing after flash floods and landslides hit the Indonesian eastern province of Maluku on the morning of August 25, according to the locality’s disaster management and mitigation office.
Heavy rainfall, which began on August 24, has triggered the disasters in Ternate city. Many local residents are in urgent need of support, authorities said.
Soldiers, police, local search and rescue personnel, disaster management staff, and volunteers are all involved in the ongoing rescue efforts, which include evacuating those trapped by the landslides and recovering materials from homes swept away by the floods.
Meanwhile in Thailand, local authorities reported that the death toll from a landslide in the popular resort province of Phuket on August 23 has risen to 13, including a Russian couple.
Source : Floods, landslides kill many in Indonesia, Thailand – Vietnam Plus
Asean
Tug of War in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN-China Dialogue Shift the Scales Toward Peace? – An Analysis
The ASEAN-China dialogue is vital for regional stability, addressing economic cooperation and security challenges, particularly in the South China Sea, amidst significant geopolitical complexities and ongoing territorial disputes.
ASEAN-China Dialogue: A Path Towards Cooperation
The ASEAN-China dialogue plays a pivotal role in Southeast Asia’s diplomacy, fostering economic collaboration while addressing security challenges. Despite advances, particularly in managing tensions in the South China Sea, significant barriers remain to achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. ASEAN’s capacity to maintain its unity and centrality is crucial amidst complex power dynamics involving China and other global players.
Navigating Tensions and Economic Relations
A pressing concern within this dialogue is the South China Sea territorial disputes, which involve multiple ASEAN states and China. The militarization of the area raises alarm among regional stakeholders, necessitating urgent negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) to manage conflicts. Additionally, the growing economic interdependence fostered by initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) strengthens ASEAN-China ties, yet it also raises concerns about potential political leverage influencing member states’ autonomy.
The Challenge of Regional Stability
While the ASEAN-China dialogue offers a framework for promoting peace, its effectiveness is conditioned by broader geopolitical contexts, including China’s rivalry with the United States. The success of this dialogue rests on sustaining a commitment to multilateralism and peaceful dispute resolution. As ASEAN adapts to these complex dynamics, it must reinforce its unity and cooperative strategies, ensuring the region’s stability amid evolving challenges.
Source : Tug Of War In Southeast Asia: Will ASEAN-China Dialogue Tip The Balance Towards Peace? – Analysis
Asean
Cambodia Invites Business Leaders to Join the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning
Cambodia invites businesspeople to the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning, promoting trade and investment with incentives like hotel coupons and networking opportunities in various sectors.
Cambodia Invites Participation in CAEXPO 2024
Cambodia is actively encouraging business leaders, investors, and service providers to participate in the upcoming 21st China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO), set to take place from September 24-28 in Nanning, China. According to a Ministry of Commerce announcement, CAEXPO serves as a vital platform for trade and investment collaborations between ASEAN nations and China.
To facilitate Cambodian participation, the Ministry invites interested individuals to apply as Trade Visitors by August 31, 2024. Participants will benefit from hotel coupons, dining vouchers, and shuttle services to the expo venue. Furthermore, attendees can engage in business matchmaking in sectors such as food processing, digital technology, and renewable energy products.
Kin Phea, from the Royal Academy of Cambodia, emphasized the advancements in China-ASEAN relations, particularly concerning economic cooperation, tourism, and cultural exchanges. He noted that both sides have become each other’s largest trading partners, enhancing collaboration through the Belt and Road initiative, focusing on infrastructure and sustainable development.
Source : Cambodia encourages businesspeople to partake in 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning
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