Asean
Australia and the Pacific islands: a loss of focus or a loss of direction?
Author: Sandra Tarte, USP Recent claims in the media that Australia’s foreign minister has ‘ignored’, ‘neglected’ and ‘taken his eyes off’ the Pacific islands have underscored a number of policy dilemmas facing Australian diplomacy in the region. These have been evident for some time and centre primarily around the approach to Fiji’s post-coup government , led by Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama. Like other western democracies, Australia imposed diplomatic, military and political sanctions on the military-led government after the December 2006 coup. Australia also sought to utilise the Pacific Islands Forum to coordinate a regional approach to Fiji – initially based on engagement and dialogue to encourage an early return to elected government. When this approach failed, the Forum adopted more punitive measures, including suspending Fiji’s Forum membership in May 2009 and excluding it from aid programs provided through the Forum. The dilemmas facing Australian diplomacy and foreign policy in the region include the obvious ones that have been highlighted in the media debate. Most prominent is the fact that Australia’s efforts to isolate the Fiji government have encouraged Fiji to actively seek new partnerships , including most notably with China. This has led to the growing influence of China, and what seems to be a commensurate loss of influence by Australia. Another obvious dilemma is that Fiji’s suspension from the Forum has only served to undermine what was once the region’s premier regional organisation and shifted the political focus to other regional and international groupings. Fiji has made it clear it does not seek an early return to the Forum’s fold but is cultivating new alignments – the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific Small Islands Developing States group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Association of South East Asian Nations (where it has sought observer status). There are other policy dilemmas for Australia, which have perhaps been less obvious. The suspension of Fiji from regional policy mechanisms – including security dialogues, intelligence sharing, and maritime surveillance – has not only weakened Fiji’s capacity to manage its external security environment, but created additional security problems for the region, including for Australia and New Zealand. Intelligence and capability gaps in Fiji’s security apparatus have been created since the coup that cannot necessarily be filled by China, Indonesia or other new partners. This problem – which is also a regional problem – has been compounded by the loss of experienced military officers from the senior ranks of Fiji’s Military Forces, since the December 2006 coup. This has created what some have called a leadership vacuum in the armed forces and is due in large part to the exodus of senior professional officers into civil service positions in the Fiji government. Junior officers filling these vacated positions in the military no longer have the benefit of staff college training in Australia or other western countries, due to military bans. As Australian policymakers no doubt grapple with these dilemmas there is inevitably a need to come to terms with a new regional ‘ball-game’. Shifting international alignments and patterns of influence perhaps mean that the ‘old regional order’ – led by Australia and New Zealand – will no longer be tenable. There are new dynamics in train, which may mean more economic opportunities and more political options for some (though not all) Pacific island states. This is not necessarily a bad thing for either Australia or the region. There is now more talk – if not action – in favor of South-South cooperation. Changing circumstances require a more flexible policy approach in order to harness the possible openings this more fluid landscape provides and adapt to new realities. For Australia this does not necessarily mean abandoning principles in its approach to Fiji, but of mapping a new direction. Fiji’s so-called ‘Look North Policy’ has never purported to be a substitute for traditional partnerships, such as with Australia and New Zealand. Thus the door to dialogue and engagement has never been entirely shut. The challenge, however, is to ensure that both Australia and Fiji recognise the need to keep this door open – especially in the lead-up to Fiji’s anticipated elections in 2014. Dr Sandra Tarte is Director, Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji. Preventing Fiji from becoming the pariah state of the Pacific Fiji’s search for new friends Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor
Author: Sandra Tarte, USP
Recent claims in the media that Australia’s foreign minister has ‘ignored’, ‘neglected’ and ‘taken his eyes off’ the Pacific islands have underscored a number of policy dilemmas facing Australian diplomacy in the region. These have been evident for some time and centre primarily around the approach to Fiji’s post-coup government, led by Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama.
Like other western democracies, Australia imposed diplomatic, military and political sanctions on the military-led government after the December 2006 coup. Australia also sought to utilise the Pacific Islands Forum to coordinate a regional approach to Fiji – initially based on engagement and dialogue to encourage an early return to elected government. When this approach failed, the Forum adopted more punitive measures, including suspending Fiji’s Forum membership in May 2009 and excluding it from aid programs provided through the Forum.
The dilemmas facing Australian diplomacy and foreign policy in the region include the obvious ones that have been highlighted in the media debate.
Most prominent is the fact that Australia’s efforts to isolate the Fiji government have encouraged Fiji to actively seek new partnerships, including most notably with China. This has led to the growing influence of China, and what seems to be a commensurate loss of influence by Australia. Another obvious dilemma is that Fiji’s suspension from the Forum has only served to undermine what was once the region’s premier regional organisation and shifted the political focus to other regional and international groupings. Fiji has made it clear it does not seek an early return to the Forum’s fold but is cultivating new alignments – the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific Small Islands Developing States group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Association of South East Asian Nations (where it has sought observer status).
There are other policy dilemmas for Australia, which have perhaps been less obvious. The suspension of Fiji from regional policy mechanisms – including security dialogues, intelligence sharing, and maritime surveillance – has not only weakened Fiji’s capacity to manage its external security environment, but created additional security problems for the region, including for Australia and New Zealand.
Intelligence and capability gaps in Fiji’s security apparatus have been created since the coup that cannot necessarily be filled by China, Indonesia or other new partners.
This problem – which is also a regional problem – has been compounded by the loss of experienced military officers from the senior ranks of Fiji’s Military Forces, since the December 2006 coup. This has created what some have called a leadership vacuum in the armed forces and is due in large part to the exodus of senior professional officers into civil service positions in the Fiji government. Junior officers filling these vacated positions in the military no longer have the benefit of staff college training in Australia or other western countries, due to military bans.
As Australian policymakers no doubt grapple with these dilemmas there is inevitably a need to come to terms with a new regional ‘ball-game’. Shifting international alignments and patterns of influence perhaps mean that the ‘old regional order’ – led by Australia and New Zealand – will no longer be tenable. There are new dynamics in train, which may mean more economic opportunities and more political options for some (though not all) Pacific island states. This is not necessarily a bad thing for either Australia or the region. There is now more talk – if not action – in favor of South-South cooperation.
Changing circumstances require a more flexible policy approach in order to harness the possible openings this more fluid landscape provides and adapt to new realities. For Australia this does not necessarily mean abandoning principles in its approach to Fiji, but of mapping a new direction. Fiji’s so-called ‘Look North Policy’ has never purported to be a substitute for traditional partnerships, such as with Australia and New Zealand. Thus the door to dialogue and engagement has never been entirely shut. The challenge, however, is to ensure that both Australia and Fiji recognise the need to keep this door open – especially in the lead-up to Fiji’s anticipated elections in 2014.
Dr Sandra Tarte is Director, Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji.
- Preventing Fiji from becoming the pariah state of the Pacific
- Fiji’s search for new friends
- Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor
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Australia and the Pacific islands: a loss of focus or a loss of direction?
Asean
Deadly Floods and Landslides Strike Indonesia and Thailand – Vietnam Plus
At least seven people were killed, two others were injured and some were likely to be missing after flash floods and landslides hit the Indonesian eastern province of Maluku on the morning of August 25, according to the locality’s disaster management and mitigation office.
Heavy rainfall, which began on August 24, has triggered the disasters in Ternate city. Many local residents are in urgent need of support, authorities said.
Soldiers, police, local search and rescue personnel, disaster management staff, and volunteers are all involved in the ongoing rescue efforts, which include evacuating those trapped by the landslides and recovering materials from homes swept away by the floods.
Meanwhile in Thailand, local authorities reported that the death toll from a landslide in the popular resort province of Phuket on August 23 has risen to 13, including a Russian couple.
Source : Floods, landslides kill many in Indonesia, Thailand – Vietnam Plus
Asean
Tug of War in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN-China Dialogue Shift the Scales Toward Peace? – An Analysis
The ASEAN-China dialogue is vital for regional stability, addressing economic cooperation and security challenges, particularly in the South China Sea, amidst significant geopolitical complexities and ongoing territorial disputes.
ASEAN-China Dialogue: A Path Towards Cooperation
The ASEAN-China dialogue plays a pivotal role in Southeast Asia’s diplomacy, fostering economic collaboration while addressing security challenges. Despite advances, particularly in managing tensions in the South China Sea, significant barriers remain to achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. ASEAN’s capacity to maintain its unity and centrality is crucial amidst complex power dynamics involving China and other global players.
Navigating Tensions and Economic Relations
A pressing concern within this dialogue is the South China Sea territorial disputes, which involve multiple ASEAN states and China. The militarization of the area raises alarm among regional stakeholders, necessitating urgent negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) to manage conflicts. Additionally, the growing economic interdependence fostered by initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) strengthens ASEAN-China ties, yet it also raises concerns about potential political leverage influencing member states’ autonomy.
The Challenge of Regional Stability
While the ASEAN-China dialogue offers a framework for promoting peace, its effectiveness is conditioned by broader geopolitical contexts, including China’s rivalry with the United States. The success of this dialogue rests on sustaining a commitment to multilateralism and peaceful dispute resolution. As ASEAN adapts to these complex dynamics, it must reinforce its unity and cooperative strategies, ensuring the region’s stability amid evolving challenges.
Source : Tug Of War In Southeast Asia: Will ASEAN-China Dialogue Tip The Balance Towards Peace? – Analysis
Asean
Cambodia Invites Business Leaders to Join the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning
Cambodia invites businesspeople to the 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning, promoting trade and investment with incentives like hotel coupons and networking opportunities in various sectors.
Cambodia Invites Participation in CAEXPO 2024
Cambodia is actively encouraging business leaders, investors, and service providers to participate in the upcoming 21st China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO), set to take place from September 24-28 in Nanning, China. According to a Ministry of Commerce announcement, CAEXPO serves as a vital platform for trade and investment collaborations between ASEAN nations and China.
To facilitate Cambodian participation, the Ministry invites interested individuals to apply as Trade Visitors by August 31, 2024. Participants will benefit from hotel coupons, dining vouchers, and shuttle services to the expo venue. Furthermore, attendees can engage in business matchmaking in sectors such as food processing, digital technology, and renewable energy products.
Kin Phea, from the Royal Academy of Cambodia, emphasized the advancements in China-ASEAN relations, particularly concerning economic cooperation, tourism, and cultural exchanges. He noted that both sides have become each other’s largest trading partners, enhancing collaboration through the Belt and Road initiative, focusing on infrastructure and sustainable development.
Source : Cambodia encourages businesspeople to partake in 21st China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning