China
Beijing Goes on the Hunt for Hidden Lending
2010 was a tough year for China’s financial regulators. While on the face of it banks sharply reduced their lending, in line with Beijing’s decision to call an end to economic stimulus spending, the reality was banks lent just as much as the year before but hid a lot of it off-balance-sheet. Though the China Banking Regulatory Commission has been trying to bring wayward lending back onto the books, the genie is out of the bottle. And in a country where new loan data is one of the key determinants of monetary policy, that’s a real problem. Now moves are being made to do something about it. In an essay posted on its Web site Thursday, the People’s Bank of China proposed a radical overhaul of how monetary policy wonks look at the economy. “New yuan loan data no longer actually reflects the extent of financing in the real economy,” said the essay ( in Chinese ), authored by Sheng Songcheng, director of the PBOC’s Survey and Statistics Department. Sheng proposes a new formula that includes more than just loan data. “That will help avoid overly focusing on the size of loans and needing to play whack-a-mole, where one problem pops up while you’re dealing with another, such as banks using off-balance sheet lending to avoid credit limits,” Sheng wrote. While banks formally lent 7.95 trillion yuan, or roughly $1.2 trillion, in loans last year, according to the essay, the use of entrustment loans (where-by banks match-make lenders and borrowers and take a fee for their pains) and bank acceptance bills (a type of bank guarantee) meant off-balance-sheet lending inflated banks’ credit creation by a further 3.47 trillion yuan. An Fitch Ratings report issued in December estimated “credit leakage” from the banking sector at more than 3 trillion yuan . The new formula to calculate what the PBOC has termed “social financing” adds yuan loans to foreign currency loans, entrustment loans, trust loans, bank acceptance bills, corporate bonds, funds raised by share sales of non-financial companies, insurance payouts, insurance companies’ investment properties and “others,” and leaves open the option of including private equity and hedge funds in the future as those sectors mature. According to the essay, focusing on new loan data once made sense in an economy where the banks were by and large the only source of financing, but the development of China’s capital markets over the last nine years now means at the end of last year loans accounted for less than 60% of all financing. Despite the fairly holistic attempt to paint a snapshot of actual fundraising in the economy, there’s still one notable emission from the formula: China’s informal lending sector. China’s banks have long neglected lending to entrepreneurs and small firms. Beijing has been trying to redress the problem in recent years by launching a raft of small-scale financial institutions to plug the gap and by encouraging the major commercial banks to set up SME funding units. Still, there is a major unregulated cottage industry for loans, the relative size of which varies from year to year: According to some estimates informal lending was about a third of the size of total new banks loans in 2007, a year when monetary conditions were significantly tighter than the last couple of years. With the banks sloshing money around over the last couple of years, the informal lending networks, loans between family and friends, and underground banks have been relatively less important. And Beijing may now feel that its efforts to encourage formal institutions to extend credit to smaller firms is also reducing the overall importance of informal lending. But if monetary policy does start to tighten meaningfully this year, it Beijing might find its new indicator comes up short. –Dinny McMahon
2010 was a tough year for China’s financial regulators. While on the face of it banks sharply reduced their lending, in line with Beijing’s decision to call an end to economic stimulus spending, the reality was banks lent just as much as the year before but hid a lot of it off-balance-sheet. Though the China Banking Regulatory Commission has been trying to bring wayward lending back onto the books, the genie is out of the bottle. And in a country where new loan data is one of the key determinants of monetary policy, that’s a real problem. Now moves are being made to do something about it. In an essay posted on its Web site Thursday, the People’s Bank of China proposed a radical overhaul of how monetary policy wonks look at the economy. “New yuan loan data no longer actually reflects the extent of financing in the real economy,” said the essay ( in Chinese ), authored by Sheng Songcheng, director of the PBOC’s Survey and Statistics Department. Sheng proposes a new formula that includes more than just loan data. “That will help avoid overly focusing on the size of loans and needing to play whack-a-mole, where one problem pops up while you’re dealing with another, such as banks using off-balance sheet lending to avoid credit limits,” Sheng wrote. While banks formally lent 7.95 trillion yuan, or roughly $1.2 trillion, in loans last year, according to the essay, the use of entrustment loans (where-by banks match-make lenders and borrowers and take a fee for their pains) and bank acceptance bills (a type of bank guarantee) meant off-balance-sheet lending inflated banks’ credit creation by a further 3.47 trillion yuan. An Fitch Ratings report issued in December estimated “credit leakage” from the banking sector at more than 3 trillion yuan . The new formula to calculate what the PBOC has termed “social financing” adds yuan loans to foreign currency loans, entrustment loans, trust loans, bank acceptance bills, corporate bonds, funds raised by share sales of non-financial companies, insurance payouts, insurance companies’ investment properties and “others,” and leaves open the option of including private equity and hedge funds in the future as those sectors mature. According to the essay, focusing on new loan data once made sense in an economy where the banks were by and large the only source of financing, but the development of China’s capital markets over the last nine years now means at the end of last year loans accounted for less than 60% of all financing. Despite the fairly holistic attempt to paint a snapshot of actual fundraising in the economy, there’s still one notable emission from the formula: China’s informal lending sector. China’s banks have long neglected lending to entrepreneurs and small firms. Beijing has been trying to redress the problem in recent years by launching a raft of small-scale financial institutions to plug the gap and by encouraging the major commercial banks to set up SME funding units. Still, there is a major unregulated cottage industry for loans, the relative size of which varies from year to year: According to some estimates informal lending was about a third of the size of total new banks loans in 2007, a year when monetary conditions were significantly tighter than the last couple of years. With the banks sloshing money around over the last couple of years, the informal lending networks, loans between family and friends, and underground banks have been relatively less important. And Beijing may now feel that its efforts to encourage formal institutions to extend credit to smaller firms is also reducing the overall importance of informal lending. But if monetary policy does start to tighten meaningfully this year, it Beijing might find its new indicator comes up short. –Dinny McMahon
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Beijing Goes on the Hunt for Hidden Lending
Business
Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24
Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.
Southern Sun Earnings Surge
Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.
China’s Property Market Recovery
In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.
Broader Economic Implications
The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.
Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24
China
Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle
Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.
Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy
Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Recent Developments and Implications
Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.
Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization
Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.
Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China
China
2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China
China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.
China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.
The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.
According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.
China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.
Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).
In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.
Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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