China
Deepening Shadows Over Chinese Law
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, teaches at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999). Chinese president Hu Jintao addressed a “study session” of leaders last week and called for new measures and policies of “social management.” His message foretells a tightening of controls over China’s population and over social protest. Although the speech may have been provoked by recent events in Tunisia and Egypt, brutal treatment of dissidents was already ongoing. It has become more intense and it will continue. A prominent civil rights lawyer, Mo Shaoping, recently spoke at a conference in Beijing on the status of lawyers at which he said that “our current system and government is not one that relies on rule of law, rather it relies on the law of the party.” The Wall Street Journal earlier this month pointed to the beating of blind legal activist Cheng Guancheng, who is currently being held prisoner in his home illegally after serving a prison sentence (four years and six months) for ”damaging public property and obstructing traffic.” Chen managed to smuggle from his house a video in which he described the severe conditions of his house arrest and criticized the government’s repression. After the video was released he and his wife were beaten, and reporters trying to reach his village were threatened. Some days later, police beat and arrested human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong and his wife after they met with others to discuss how they might help Mr. Chen. The Journal pointed out that the case was “not isolated,” and is part of a pattern of using violence on activists such as Ai Weiwei and other dissidents, especially when they use technology to mobilize support. Tang Jitian, another human rights lawyer, was abducted from his home on February 16th after attending the same meeting. Five other lawyers were seized last month and their whereabouts were unknown, according to an online report from China Human Rights Defenders. Another report told of the expansion of “extended home confinement, abductions and in some cases assault or torture against a broadening array of perceived enemies.” One notable example of this is lawyer Ni Yulan, who helped Beijing residents fight forced demolitions occurring before the 2008 Olympics. She was disbarred, her own house was destroyed, and she was arrested and beaten so badly that she is permanently crippled. She was recently visited by US. Ambassador Jon Huntsman in her temporary quarters in a hotel. Hu Jintao’s recent speech shows that the events in the Middle East have deepened the leadership’s concerns about popular unrest, especially because the empowerment of the crowds in Tunis and Cairo was massively strengthened by social media. Against this background, the likely significance of President Hu’s speech has to be considered for the consequences it signals. He invoked, in Party-speak, “factors conducive to harmony,” meaning heightened repression of activists and a general tightening of control. Presumably, too, this is what he meant by emphasizing the need to “build a socialist social management system with Chinese characteristics, aiming to safeguard people’s rights and interests, promote social justice, and sustain sound social order.” The precise organizational implications of the improvement in “social management” that Hu called for will be spelled out in the days to come, but Hu said that it is necessary for the CCP and the government to “play the leading role” in a “mechanism for safeguarding the rights of the people.” The Xinhua report stated that Hu emphasized “the importance of information network management” and urged “improved management of the ‘virtual society’ and a better guidance of public opinions on the Internet.” To be sure, Hu also mentioned the need to “improve social service capacity at grass-roots level” and included the need to improve food, drug and work safety as well as “social order.” But soon after his speech on February19th, the party-state demonstrated the depths of its concern about Cairo-style activism and social stability. After an anonymous online call for people to initiate a “Jasmine Revolution” on Sunday, February 20th was circulated on Boxun.com and Twitter in China, police deleted most of it, blocked searches for the word “Jasmine,’ and temporarily disabled text-messaging services. On that Sunday in Beijing there were apparently no obvious demonstrators on Wangfujing in the small crowd that appeared, but there were many policemen and journalists. Over the weekend, the police detained “ dozens of activists .” The speed with which the police acted reflected government fears of the power of social media. Government action also demonstrated the range of actions it could take to block protest, not only jailing dissidents and placing some under house arrest, but acting, as the Journal put it , “to control the flow of information without shutting it down completely.” The power to compel internet companies to remove “politically sensitive content” was amply demonstrated, as was the government’s determination to control the flow of information as well as the protest that it might somehow ignite. The focus on controlling the media, including social networks and microblogs, should not obscure the unceasing government concern about the possibility that the “rights defense” ( weiquan ) lawyers might somehow ignite widening popular protest. The current anxieties about unrest have already been manifested in the repression of activist lawyers, and will undoubtedly continue. Lawyers and citizens who pursue rights formally granted to Chinese citizens could conceivably be deemed to veer close to the paranoid notion of “inciting subversion.” If so, those who assert legal rights could become targets of regime suppression, and the rule of law will suffer even more than it has in the past. CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post misidentified one of the Chinese lawyers reported abducted this month. It should be Tang Jitian, non Jiang Jitian as earlier written. Thanks to a reader for pointing out the error.
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, teaches at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999).
Chinese president Hu Jintao addressed a “study session” of leaders last week and called for new measures and policies of “social management.” His message foretells a tightening of controls over China’s population and over social protest. Although the speech may have been provoked by recent events in Tunisia and Egypt, brutal treatment of dissidents was already ongoing. It has become more intense and it will continue. A prominent civil rights lawyer, Mo Shaoping, recently spoke at a conference in Beijing on the status of lawyers at which he said that “our current system and government is not one that relies on rule of law, rather it relies on the law of the party.”
The Wall Street Journal earlier this month pointed to the beating of blind legal activist Cheng Guancheng, who is currently being held prisoner in his home illegally after serving a prison sentence (four years and six months) for ”damaging public property and obstructing traffic.” Chen managed to smuggle from his house a video in which he described the severe conditions of his house arrest and criticized the government’s repression. After the video was released he and his wife were beaten, and reporters trying to reach his village were threatened.
Some days later, police beat and arrested human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong and his wife after they met with others to discuss how they might help Mr. Chen. The Journal pointed out that the case was “not isolated,” and is part of a pattern of using violence on activists such as Ai Weiwei and other dissidents, especially when they use technology to mobilize support. Tang Jitian, another human rights lawyer, was abducted from his home on February 16th after attending the same meeting. Five other lawyers were seized last month and their whereabouts were unknown, according to an online report from China Human Rights Defenders.
Another report told of the expansion of “extended home confinement, abductions and in some cases assault or torture against a broadening array of perceived enemies.” One notable example of this is lawyer Ni Yulan, who helped Beijing residents fight forced demolitions occurring before the 2008 Olympics. She was disbarred, her own house was destroyed, and she was arrested and beaten so badly that she is permanently crippled. She was recently visited by US. Ambassador Jon Huntsman in her temporary quarters in a hotel.
Hu Jintao’s recent speech shows that the events in the Middle East have deepened the leadership’s concerns about popular unrest, especially because the empowerment of the crowds in Tunis and Cairo was massively strengthened by social media. Against this background, the likely significance of President Hu’s speech has to be considered for the consequences it signals. He invoked, in Party-speak, “factors conducive to harmony,” meaning heightened repression of activists and a general tightening of control. Presumably, too, this is what he meant by emphasizing the need to “build a socialist social management system with Chinese characteristics, aiming to safeguard people’s rights and interests, promote social justice, and sustain sound social order.”
The precise organizational implications of the improvement in “social management” that Hu called for will be spelled out in the days to come, but Hu said that it is necessary for the CCP and the government to “play the leading role” in a “mechanism for safeguarding the rights of the people.” The Xinhua report stated that Hu emphasized “the importance of information network management” and urged “improved management of the ‘virtual society’ and a better guidance of public opinions on the Internet.” To be sure, Hu also mentioned the need to “improve social service capacity at grass-roots level” and included the need to improve food, drug and work safety as well as “social order.” But soon after his speech on February19th, the party-state demonstrated the depths of its concern about Cairo-style activism and social stability.
After an anonymous online call for people to initiate a “Jasmine Revolution” on Sunday, February 20th was circulated on Boxun.com and Twitter in China, police deleted most of it, blocked searches for the word “Jasmine,’ and temporarily disabled text-messaging services. On that Sunday in Beijing there were apparently no obvious demonstrators on Wangfujing in the small crowd that appeared, but there were many policemen and journalists. Over the weekend, the police detained “dozens of activists.”
The speed with which the police acted reflected government fears of the power of social media. Government action also demonstrated the range of actions it could take to block protest, not only jailing dissidents and placing some under house arrest, but acting, as the Journal put it, “to control the flow of information without shutting it down completely.” The power to compel internet companies to remove “politically sensitive content” was amply demonstrated, as was the government’s determination to control the flow of information as well as the protest that it might somehow ignite.
The focus on controlling the media, including social networks and microblogs, should not obscure the unceasing government concern about the possibility that the “rights defense” (weiquan) lawyers might somehow ignite widening popular protest. The current anxieties about unrest have already been manifested in the repression of activist lawyers, and will undoubtedly continue. Lawyers and citizens who pursue rights formally granted to Chinese citizens could conceivably be deemed to veer close to the paranoid notion of “inciting subversion.” If so, those who assert legal rights could become targets of regime suppression, and the rule of law will suffer even more than it has in the past.
CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post misidentified one of the Chinese lawyers reported abducted this month. It should be Tang Jitian, non Jiang Jitian as earlier written. Thanks to a reader for pointing out the error.
China has generally implemented reforms in a gradualist or piecemeal fashion.
China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic development.
The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second largest economy after the United States by both nominal GDP ($5 trillion in 2009) and by purchasing power parity ($8.77 trillion in 2009).
The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978.
Technology, labor productivity, and incomes have advanced much more rapidly in industry than in agriculture.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
Both forums will start on Tuesday.
In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.
China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.
Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.
Despite initial gains in farmers’ incomes in the early 1980s, taxes and fees have increasingly made farming an unprofitable occupation, and because the state owns all land farmers have at times been easily evicted when croplands are sought by developers.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
Alumina is found in many parts of the country; China is one of world’s largest producers of aluminum.
In the 1990s a program of share-holding and greater market orientation went into effect; however, state enterprises continue to dominate many key industries in China’s socialist market economy.
Brick, tile, cement, and food-processing plants are found in almost every province.
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Deepening Shadows Over Chinese Law
Business
HSBC Chairman to Head Key UK Business Delegation to China
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker will lead a UK business delegation to China next month to boost trade and investment, amid concerns over national security and improving UK-China relations.
HSBC Chairman Leads UK Delegation to China
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker will lead a pivotal British business delegation to China next month, marking the first significant visit since 2018. The trip aims to enhance Chinese investment in the UK, guided by Chancellor Rachel Reeves. Tucker, a seasoned financier with extensive Asia experience, is regarded as essential in resetting UK-China relations.
Reviving Economic Dialogue
Tucker will accompany senior bankers in seeking to rejuvenate trade, specifically focusing on financial services. Although there are apprehensions among some UK lawmakers regarding national security threats posed by closer ties to Beijing, the UK Treasury spokesperson confirmed Chancellor Reeves’ upcoming discussions on economic cooperation in Beijing.
A Shift in UK-China Relations
Since suspending most dialogues following China’s imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong, UK-China relations have soured. Nevertheless, the Labour government is prioritizing improved ties with China, emphasizing investment opportunities. Reeves asserts the necessity of a pragmatic approach to benefitting national interests amid ongoing concerns voiced by some lawmakers about security risks.
Source : HSBC Chairman to lead pivotal UK business delegation to China
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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