China
Chinese Property: The Most Important Sector in the World
Reuters A man talks on a mobile phone as he walks past a construction site near residential buildings in central Beijing. Mark another milestone for China’s ever-rising economic profile: UBS emerging-markets economist Jonathan Anderson has declared China’s property industry “the single most important sector in the entire global economy.” In a research note Wednesday, Mr. Anderson, a longtime China watcher, says that “real-estate and housing construction pervade the entire [China] growth model. They are the most important determinant of commodity demand, a very big marginal driver of China’s external surpluses, and indeed a crucial key to real understanding of household balance sheets, saving and investment behavior and the debate around Chinese rebalancing.” In other words, he says, “from a macroeconomic perspective if you don’t understand Chinese property, you probably don’t understand China.” Many global investors won’t find the declaration all that surprising, having seen shares in many companies buffeted over the past year by Beijing’s efforts to wrestle with soaring house prices while trying to avoid undercutting the construction industry. But it is remarkable sign of the times nevertheless. As Mr. Anderson notes, “until very recently” the proper response to the question of which sector is most important “would almost certainly have been U.S. financials and/or U.S. housing.” The numbers tell much of the story. China is the world’s largest consumer of steel, and Mr. Anderson notes that real estate directly accounts for 40% of Chinese steel usage. Add home appliances and automobiles—which he notes tend to directly follow new housing purchases in China–the share is more than 50%. Similar logic applies to other products like cement, iron ore, coal, and construction equipment. Property construction—75% of which in China is housing–accounted for more than 13% of China’s gross domestic product last year, UBS estimates—more than double the average of 6% in the 1990s. Mr. Anderson says that explains why investment overall accounts for such a large share of China’s economy—an estimated 47% to 48% of GDP last year, which “is an absolute record for any economy of significant size in the post-war era, and almost single-handedly explains China’s explosive real growth over the same period.” So is China’s property sector a bubble? And how long can the boom continue? Mr. Anderson temporarily punts on those all-important questions, saying colleague Wang Tao, UBS’s China economist, will weigh in next week. –Jason Dean
- Reuters
- A man talks on a mobile phone as he walks past a construction site near residential buildings in central Beijing.
Mark another milestone for China’s ever-rising economic profile: UBS emerging-markets economist Jonathan Anderson has declared China’s property industry “the single most important sector in the entire global economy.”
In a research note Wednesday, Mr. Anderson, a longtime China watcher, says that “real-estate and housing construction pervade the entire [China] growth model. They are the most important determinant of commodity demand, a very big marginal driver of China’s external surpluses, and indeed a crucial key to real understanding of household balance sheets, saving and investment behavior and the debate around Chinese rebalancing.” In other words, he says, “from a macroeconomic perspective if you don’t understand Chinese property, you probably don’t understand China.”
Many global investors won’t find the declaration all that surprising, having seen shares in many companies buffeted over the past year by Beijing’s efforts to wrestle with soaring house prices while trying to avoid undercutting the construction industry. But it is remarkable sign of the times nevertheless. As Mr. Anderson notes, “until very recently” the proper response to the question of which sector is most important “would almost certainly have been U.S. financials and/or U.S. housing.”
The numbers tell much of the story. China is the world’s largest consumer of steel, and Mr. Anderson notes that real estate directly accounts for 40% of Chinese steel usage. Add home appliances and automobiles—which he notes tend to directly follow new housing purchases in China–the share is more than 50%. Similar logic applies to other products like cement, iron ore, coal, and construction equipment.
Property construction—75% of which in China is housing–accounted for more than 13% of China’s gross domestic product last year, UBS estimates—more than double the average of 6% in the 1990s. Mr. Anderson says that explains why investment overall accounts for such a large share of China’s economy—an estimated 47% to 48% of GDP last year, which “is an absolute record for any economy of significant size in the post-war era, and almost single-handedly explains China’s explosive real growth over the same period.”
So is China’s property sector a bubble? And how long can the boom continue? Mr. Anderson temporarily punts on those all-important questions, saying colleague Wang Tao, UBS’s China economist, will weigh in next week.
–Jason Dean
The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978.
China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic development.
The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.
The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978.
Its mineral resources are probably among the richest in the world but are only partially developed.
A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
Both forums will start on Tuesday.
In this period the average annual growth rate stood at more than 50 percent.
China is expected to have 200 million cars on the road by 2020, increasing pressure on energy security and the environment, government officials said yesterday.
Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.
Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.
China is the world’s largest producer of rice and wheat and a major producer of sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.
China ranks first in world production of red meat (including beef, veal, mutton, lamb, and pork).
Oil fields discovered in the 1960s and after made China a net exporter, and by the early 1990s, China was the world’s fifth-ranked oil producer.
China’s leading export minerals are tungsten, antimony, tin, magnesium, molybdenum, mercury, manganese, barite, and salt.
China’s exploitation of its high-sulfur coal resources has resulted in massive pollution.
After the 1960s, the emphasis was on regional self-sufficiency, and many factories sprang up in rural areas.
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Chinese Property: The Most Important Sector in the World
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
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- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
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