China
China Gets a Toehold, and Bitter Memories, in U.S. Iron-Ore Deal
The big news in the iron-ore business this month may be the ouster of Roger Agnelli as chief executive of Brazilian giant Vale—just ahead of the BRIC summit that brings top Brazilian officials to China—but Chinese analysts are all over another item: the deal by U.S. miner Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. to acquire Canada’s Consolidated Thompson Iron Mines Ltd. The ink was barely dry before they were hailing it as a potential trump card in Beijing’s ceaseless quest to break the global oligopoly in iron ore. After all, or so the experts say, Wuhan Iron & Steel Group, China’s third-largest steelmaker, is Consolidated Thompson’s largest shareholder, with 19% of outstanding shares. To the China experts, for Wuhan to have a piece of this enlarged Cliffs delivers “a blow to the position dominated by the world’s top three iron-ore giants, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Vale,” making the country “less dependent on the three giants.” (The Big Three miners, which control 75% of the global seaborne iron ore trade, are a “blatant tyranny,” the Xinhua story declares.) Vince Du/Reuters Australia iron ore at a port in Tianjin, China But as measured by production, the enlarged Cliffs resembles not so much the three supremos as it does Fortescue Metals Group, the Australian miner once cast by the Chinese in the same savior role in which some now see Cliffs. A bit of history: China, the world’s largest buyer of iron, fell out with the Big Three over pricing in a series of public rows that started in late 2008 and reached its apogee when China arrested four Rio Tinto employees in July 2009, alleging bribery in the price negotiations. That was back in the days when Chinese steelmakers engaged in secretive yearly talks with the Big Three to hammer out a single iron-ore import price that then became the global benchmark. As the benchmark system, which had lasted for about three decades, came apart in 2009 amid accusations and recriminations, Chinese steelmakers quietly struck deals with the Big Three to import iron ore based on “provisional prices.” Desperate to snatch a victory from the dragged-out battle, the Chinese steel government lobby turned to Fortescue in August 2009 and won a deal for marginally cheaper ore (about 3 cents less per dry metric ton than the Rio Tinto-BHP price). The Big Three reacted with indifference. “We do not see this pricing agreement as relevant to our pricing for fiscal 2009,” a Rio Tinto spokesman said at the time. They had a point: Fortescue put out 40 million tons of ore a year (less than what China imports in a single month), and even its plans to raise that to 155 million tons by 2014 didn’t make the deal a game-changer. Now the Chinese are looking to the enlarged Cliffs, which can produce 48 million tons annually and hopes to double that by 2013. But the world has changed. The Big Three last year discarded the benchmark system in favor of rolling spot-based prices — some set quarterly, some monthly — struck in separate agreements with individual steelmakers rather than a single set of talks with government-sponsored lobbies. The new system now rules the iron-ore world. The room for Beijing to exert political influence in iron ore pricing—never very wide—has narrowed even more. Even Wuhan’s presence as a substantial shareholder in a North American mining business—a company spokesman said Wednesday it supports the Cliffs-Thompson deal—may yield less clout than hoped for. It isn’t the first Chinese company to have a big piece of a global iron-ore mining company: Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Group is Fortescue’s second-largest shareholder, with a 17.3% stake. And of course, the Aluminum Corp. of China, or Chinalco, has been Rio Tinto’s largest shareholder since 2007, with a 9% stake. While the Chinese strategy of aggressively diversifying iron ore supply sources—sending emissaries across Latin America, Southeast Asia, Australia and Africa to secure a series of stakes—plays well for its longer-term resource security, it’s still not quite about to throw the Big Three’s pricing power down Cliffs. — Chuin-Wei Yap
The big news in the iron-ore business this month may be the ouster of Roger Agnelli as chief executive of Brazilian giant Vale—just ahead of the BRIC summit that brings top Brazilian officials to China—but Chinese analysts are all over another item: the deal by U.S. miner Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. to acquire Canada’s Consolidated Thompson Iron Mines Ltd. The ink was barely dry before they were hailing it as a potential trump card in Beijing’s ceaseless quest to break the global oligopoly in iron ore.
After all, or so the experts say, Wuhan Iron & Steel Group, China’s third-largest steelmaker, is Consolidated Thompson’s largest shareholder, with 19% of outstanding shares. To the China experts, for Wuhan to have a piece of this enlarged Cliffs delivers “a blow to the position dominated by the world’s top three iron-ore giants, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Vale,” making the country “less dependent on the three giants.” (The Big Three miners, which control 75% of the global seaborne iron ore trade, are a “blatant tyranny,” the Xinhua story declares.)
- Vince Du/Reuters
- Australia iron ore at a port in Tianjin, China
But as measured by production, the enlarged Cliffs resembles not so much the three supremos as it does Fortescue Metals Group, the Australian miner once cast by the Chinese in the same savior role in which some now see Cliffs.
A bit of history: China, the world’s largest buyer of iron, fell out with the Big Three over pricing in a series of public rows that started in late 2008 and reached its apogee when China arrested four Rio Tinto employees in July 2009, alleging bribery in the price negotiations. That was back in the days when Chinese steelmakers engaged in secretive yearly talks with the Big Three to hammer out a single iron-ore import price that then became the global benchmark.
As the benchmark system, which had lasted for about three decades, came apart in 2009 amid accusations and recriminations, Chinese steelmakers quietly struck deals with the Big Three to import iron ore based on “provisional prices.” Desperate to snatch a victory from the dragged-out battle, the Chinese steel government lobby turned to Fortescue in August 2009 and won a deal for marginally cheaper ore (about 3 cents less per dry metric ton than the Rio Tinto-BHP price).
The Big Three reacted with indifference. “We do not see this pricing agreement as relevant to our pricing for fiscal 2009,” a Rio Tinto spokesman said at the time. They had a point: Fortescue put out 40 million tons of ore a year (less than what China imports in a single month), and even its plans to raise that to 155 million tons by 2014 didn’t make the deal a game-changer. Now the Chinese are looking to the enlarged Cliffs, which can produce 48 million tons annually and hopes to double that by 2013.
But the world has changed. The Big Three last year discarded the benchmark system in favor of rolling spot-based prices — some set quarterly, some monthly — struck in separate agreements with individual steelmakers rather than a single set of talks with government-sponsored lobbies. The new system now rules the iron-ore world. The room for Beijing to exert political influence in iron ore pricing—never very wide—has narrowed even more.
Even Wuhan’s presence as a substantial shareholder in a North American mining business—a company spokesman said Wednesday it supports the Cliffs-Thompson deal—may yield less clout than hoped for. It isn’t the first Chinese company to have a big piece of a global iron-ore mining company: Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Group is Fortescue’s second-largest shareholder, with a 17.3% stake. And of course, the Aluminum Corp. of China, or Chinalco, has been Rio Tinto’s largest shareholder since 2007, with a 9% stake.
While the Chinese strategy of aggressively diversifying iron ore supply sources—sending emissaries across Latin America, Southeast Asia, Australia and Africa to secure a series of stakes—plays well for its longer-term resource security, it’s still not quite about to throw the Big Three’s pricing power down Cliffs.
—Chuin-Wei Yap
The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978.
In 2009, China announced that by 2020 it would reduce carbon intensity 40% from 2005 levels.
China has emphasized raising personal income and consumption and introducing new management systems to help increase productivity.
Some economists believe that Chinese economic growth has been in fact understated during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, failing to fully factor in the growth driven by the private sector and that the extent at which China is dependent on exports is exaggerated.
The two sectors have differed in many respects.
A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.
From January to June, the ODI in financial sectors was up by 44 percent to $17.9 billion, and in July alone, the ODI recorded $8.91 billion, the highest this year.
China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Despite initial gains in farmers’ incomes in the early 1980s, taxes and fees have increasingly made farming an unprofitable occupation, and because the state owns all land farmers have at times been easily evicted when croplands are sought by developers.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
China ranks first in world production of red meat (including beef, veal, mutton, lamb, and pork).
Coal is the most abundant mineral (China ranks first in coal production); high-quality, easily mined coal is found throughout the country, but especially in the north and northeast.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.
Before 1945, heavy industry was concentrated in the northeast (Manchuria), but important centers were subsequently established in other parts of the country, notably in Shanghai and Wuhan.
Continued here:
China Gets a Toehold, and Bitter Memories, in U.S. Iron-Ore Deal
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
- EFIS Maroc and China Eastern Airlines Set to Launch Service Between Morocco and China
- China Considers Selling TikTok US Operations to Musk as a Viable Option – Bloomberg
