China
Higher Interest Rates Might Push Up Property Prices
The latest rise in China’s inflation rate immediately spurred predictions of tighter credit by the People’s Bank of China. Yet, higher rates might not have the kind of dampening impact they would elsewhere, in particular on the frothy property sector. EPA Consumers check out housing models at a real estate fair in Qingdao. Shortly before China said Friday that its consumer price index rose a higher-than-expected 5.4% in March, Premier Wen Jiabao said food, labor and housing costs mean “we are still under great pressure.” In carrying the premier’s pledge to remain vigilant, the state-run Xinhua news agency termed home prices as “runaway.” Though a small component of the consumer price index, home prices are among the primary causes and risks of soaring inflation in China. Unaffordable housing is also a threat to social stability. Economics theory dictates that higher rates would damp prices by signaling to prospective home buyers that they will face higher mortgage payments and should stick to the sidelines . Now, a study quantifies how that’s not the way it works in China, where tighter credit may actually spur higher prices. Each credit-tightening move by the People’s Bank of China between June 2005 and September 2010 has been accompanied by a 5% rise in annual home prices, according to a study published by the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute . In other words, for every 0.5-percentage-point rate increase, property prices were 5% higher a year later. “Instead of running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shares whenever tightening monetary actions are taken,” write the study’s authors, professors Yao Shujie, Luo Dan and Loh Lixia. Chinese real estate trends carry world-wide implications. In a mid-March report, UBS economist Jonathan Anderson described Chinese property as “the single most important sector in the entire global economy,” “pervading” the country’s economy and driving factors like the price of copper . A few days later, Wang Tao, a Beijing-based colleague of Mr. Anderson’s at UBS, said in a separate report that risks are “very high” China could experience a property bubble in coming years. To gauge it, Ms. Wang said, “Most importantly, given the poor quality of the price-related data, we should watch closely construction activity and credit expansion.” It’s well known that interest rates have a limited impact on China’s credit, primarily because the financial system lacks market mechanisms to ensure higher borrowing costs actually crimp credit growth. Indeed, China’s monetary policy itself isn’t solely an economic consideration . These facts help explain why Beijing often backs up monetary policy changes with rhetoric, such as tough talk from Mr. Wen. “The message from the central government is very clear. The government is trying to control speculation and investor demand,” J.P. Morgan’s China Chairman Jing Ulrich told the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai this week. But, like the Nottingham study notes, Ms. Ulrich highlighted how housing prices have risen even as bank credit has tightened. At 20%, the prevailing “reserve ratio” means big banks need to park 20 cents of every dollar they have on deposit, she said. That represents a significant choke on their scope to lend—but still home prices soar. Central parts of Beijing’s plan to control housing prices, she noted, aren’t rate-related: taxes , targets , plus plans to build 36 million “affordable” apartments in the just-adopted five-year plan. The authors of the Nottingham paper use the word “irrational” 11 times in 34 pages to describe how the investment psychology of Chinese citizens frustrates the workings of monetary policy. Yet, the paper also explains roots of the behavior: “Rapid urbanization, attitude towards home ownership, lack of investment channel and imperfect market competition are some of the key factors responsible for large stock market and housing bubbles,” it says. “Apart from acting early and more aggressively, the Chinese government should try to create more investment channels, to promote a fairer and better free-market system, to shift its economic structure, which will depend less on investment and more on effective domestic consumption,” it says. China’s monetary policy mechanisms might be imperfect, but they are needed to tackle the problem. –James T. Areddy. Follow him on Twitter @jamestareddy
The latest rise in China’s inflation rate immediately spurred predictions of tighter credit by the People’s Bank of China. Yet, higher rates might not have the kind of dampening impact they would elsewhere, in particular on the frothy property sector.
- EPA
- Consumers check out housing models at a real estate fair in Qingdao.
Shortly before China said Friday that its consumer price index rose a higher-than-expected 5.4% in March, Premier Wen Jiabao said food, labor and housing costs mean “we are still under great pressure.” In carrying the premier’s pledge to remain vigilant, the state-run Xinhua news agency termed home prices as “runaway.”
Though a small component of the consumer price index, home prices are among the primary causes and risks of soaring inflation in China. Unaffordable housing is also a threat to social stability.
Now, a study quantifies how that’s not the way it works in China, where tighter credit may actually spur higher prices.
Each credit-tightening move by the People’s Bank of China between June 2005 and September 2010 has been accompanied by a 5% rise in annual home prices, according to a study published by the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute. In other words, for every 0.5-percentage-point rate increase, property prices were 5% higher a year later.
“Instead of running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shares whenever tightening monetary actions are taken,” write the study’s authors, professors Yao Shujie, Luo Dan and Loh Lixia.
Chinese real estate trends carry world-wide implications.
In a mid-March report, UBS economist Jonathan Anderson described Chinese property as “the single most important sector in the entire global economy,” “pervading” the country’s economy and driving factors like the price of copper.
A few days later, Wang Tao, a Beijing-based colleague of Mr. Anderson’s at UBS, said in a separate report that risks are “very high” China could experience a property bubble in coming years. To gauge it, Ms. Wang said, “Most importantly, given the poor quality of the price-related data, we should watch closely construction activity and credit expansion.”
It’s well known that interest rates have a limited impact on China’s credit, primarily because the financial system lacks market mechanisms to ensure higher borrowing costs actually crimp credit growth. Indeed, China’s monetary policy itself isn’t solely an economic consideration.
These facts help explain why Beijing often backs up monetary policy changes with rhetoric, such as tough talk from Mr. Wen.
“The message from the central government is very clear. The government is trying to control speculation and investor demand,” J.P. Morgan’s China Chairman Jing Ulrich told the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai this week.
But, like the Nottingham study notes, Ms. Ulrich highlighted how housing prices have risen even as bank credit has tightened. At 20%, the prevailing “reserve ratio” means big banks need to park 20 cents of every dollar they have on deposit, she said. That represents a significant choke on their scope to lend—but still home prices soar.
Central parts of Beijing’s plan to control housing prices, she noted, aren’t rate-related: taxes, targets, plus plans to build 36 million “affordable” apartments in the just-adopted five-year plan.
The authors of the Nottingham paper use the word “irrational” 11 times in 34 pages to describe how the investment psychology of Chinese citizens frustrates the workings of monetary policy.
Yet, the paper also explains roots of the behavior: “Rapid urbanization, attitude towards home ownership, lack of investment channel and imperfect market competition are some of the key factors responsible for large stock market and housing bubbles,” it says.
“Apart from acting early and more aggressively, the Chinese government should try to create more investment channels, to promote a fairer and better free-market system, to shift its economic structure, which will depend less on investment and more on effective domestic consumption,” it says.
China’s monetary policy mechanisms might be imperfect, but they are needed to tackle the problem.
–James T. Areddy. Follow him on Twitter @jamestareddy
Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2009 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income.
The government vowed to continue reforming the economy and emphasized the need to increase domestic consumption in order to make China less dependent on foreign exports for GDP growth in the future.
The government has also focused on foreign trade as a major vehicle for economic growth.
Some economists believe that Chinese economic growth has been in fact understated during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, failing to fully factor in the growth driven by the private sector and that the extent at which China is dependent on exports is exaggerated.
China is the world’s largest producer of rice and is among the principal sources of wheat, corn (maize), tobacco, soybeans, peanuts (groundnuts), and cotton.
China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through trade and also has built a number of advanced engineering plants capable of manufacturing an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, including nuclear weapons and satellites, but most of its industrial output still comes from relatively ill-equipped factories.
China’s ongoing economic transformation has had a profound impact not only on China but on the world.
China now ranks as the fifth largest global investor in outbound direct investment (ODI) with a total volume of $56.5 billion, compared to a ranking of 12th in 2008, the Ministry of Commerce said on Sunday.
“China is now the fifth largest investing nation worldwide, and the largest among the developing nations,” said Shen Danyang, vice-director of the ministry’s press department.
It also aims to sell more than 15 million of the most fuel-efficient vehicles in the world each year by then.
China’s challenge in the early 21st century will be to balance its highly centralized political system with an increasingly decentralized economic system.
Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
In the 1990s a program of share-holding and greater market orientation went into effect; however, state enterprises continue to dominate many key industries in China’s socialist market economy.
Other leading ports are rail termini, such as Lüshun (formerly Port Arthur, the port of Dalian), on the South Manchuria RR; and Qingdao, on the line from Jinan.
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Higher Interest Rates Might Push Up Property Prices
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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