China
Should the U.S. Sell More F-16s to Taiwan?
Sam Yeh/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images An armed US-made F-16 fighter takes off from the highway in Tainan, southern Taiwan, during the Han Kuang drill on April 12, 2011. More In Taiwan ‘Lying Through His Teeth’: Taiwan Scoffs at China ‘No Missile’ Claim Doomsday Fever Strikes Taiwan Taiwan’s Demographic ‘Time Bomb’ Taiwan’s Diminishing Media Freedom Bad Tidings in Election for China-Taiwan Ties? At a time when some in Washington’s foreign policy firmament are suggesting the U.S. reconsider its commitment to defend Taiwan, nearly half of the U.S. Senate joined in sending a letter Thursday to President Barack Obama urging the government expedite the sale of new F-16 C/Ds and upgrades to Taiwan’s existing 145 F-16 A/Bs. “Without new fighter aircraft and upgrades to its existing fleet of F-16s, Taiwan will be dangerously exposed to Chinese military threats, aggression and provocation, which pose significant national security implications for the United States,” said the letter, which was signed by 45 senators representing both sides of the aisle. In January 2010 Mr. Obama authorized the sale of $6.4 billion in arms, including missile systems and utility helicopters, but critics say those arms were part of a package agreed upon during the previous Bush administration and point out that Mr. Obama has yet to decide on new Taiwanese requests, which include new F-16s as well as upgrades. In addition to arguing that the sale of the fighters would be consistent with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the U.S. to sell Taiwan weapons necessary for its defense, the letter also pointed to the economic benefits that new sales would bring. It warned that delays in sales could result in the closure of the F-16 production line. Analysts have argued that sales to Taiwan could bring a strong economic windfall to the U.S. defense contractors, and could help Lockheed Martin retain 11,000 jobs associated with F-16 production. Lockheed faced an additional setback to the production of the F-16 in April when India eliminated it from the running for a new $10 billion fighter order. Weapons sales to Taiwan have long been a contentious issue. China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, has vociferously protested the sales and cut military ties with the U.S. following the sale in 2010. The Pentagon since has attempted to thaw chilly relations, inviting People’s Liberation Army Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde to the U.S. last week for meetings with Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Chen’s attempt to downplay the threat China poses to Taiwan during his U.S. visit drew angry responses from many on the island. In the interest of improving Sino-U.S. ties and eliminating a potential Asian flash point, several influential figures have recently called for the U.S. to re-examine its commitments to defending Taiwan. Most recent on that list is former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Charles Freeman, who at a conference on China’s naval strategy held by the U.S. Naval War College earlier this month questioned the “effort to retard the speeding tilt of the cross-Strait military balance against Taiwan” by continuing with arms sales. “Given the huge stakes for the United States in our strategic interaction with China, this choice might well strike someone looking afresh at the situation as oddly misguided,” he said. Mr. Freeman added that the U.S. should take seriously the idea of a “symbolic” unification between Taiwan and China that would exclude a political or military tie-up. “This offer cannot be dismissed as incredible. China’s willingness to tolerate amazingly different politico-economic orders on what is nominally its territory has been amply demonstrated in both Hong Kong and Macau. Its proposal to Taipei offers far greater autonomy than either of these city-states enjoy. Is it worth a war with China to prevent such an outcome? If not, why are we behaving as if it were?” In March, a group of U.S. business executives, scholars, and current and former government officials – including a handful of retired military officers – offered a similar assessment , suggesting the U.S. “reevaluate its long-standing policy toward Taiwan” as part of a package of concessions aimed at improving ties with Beijing. Despite all the war and weapon talk, chances of a military conflict between China and Taiwan seem as distant now as they have at any time since Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang fled to the island more than 60 years ago. Regular flights connect the two, tourism is growing and business cooperation on the back of a landmark trade deal has increased. Further steps in the direction of political or military cooperation are highly contentious, however, and experts have warned difficulties in the relationship may crop up sooner than expected. All of this suggests the debate in the U.S. might soon move beyond the politesse of letter writing into a more pitched political forum. – Paul Mozur. Follow him on Twitter @paulmozur
- Sam Yeh/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
- An armed US-made F-16 fighter takes off from the highway in Tainan, southern Taiwan, during the Han Kuang drill on April 12, 2011.
At a time when some in Washington’s foreign policy firmament are suggesting the U.S. reconsider its commitment to defend Taiwan, nearly half of the U.S. Senate joined in sending a letter Thursday to President Barack Obama urging the government expedite the sale of new F-16 C/Ds and upgrades to Taiwan’s existing 145 F-16 A/Bs.
“Without new fighter aircraft and upgrades to its existing fleet of F-16s, Taiwan will be dangerously exposed to Chinese military threats, aggression and provocation, which pose significant national security implications for the United States,” said the letter, which was signed by 45 senators representing both sides of the aisle.
In January 2010 Mr. Obama authorized the sale of $6.4 billion in arms, including missile systems and utility helicopters, but critics say those arms were part of a package agreed upon during the previous Bush administration and point out that Mr. Obama has yet to decide on new Taiwanese requests, which include new F-16s as well as upgrades.
In addition to arguing that the sale of the fighters would be consistent with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the U.S. to sell Taiwan weapons necessary for its defense, the letter also pointed to the economic benefits that new sales would bring. It warned that delays in sales could result in the closure of the F-16 production line.
Analysts have argued that sales to Taiwan could bring a strong economic windfall to the U.S. defense contractors, and could help Lockheed Martin retain 11,000 jobs associated with F-16 production. Lockheed faced an additional setback to the production of the F-16 in April when India eliminated it from the running for a new $10 billion fighter order.
Weapons sales to Taiwan have long been a contentious issue. China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, has vociferously protested the sales and cut military ties with the U.S. following the sale in 2010. The Pentagon since has attempted to thaw chilly relations, inviting People’s Liberation Army Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde to the U.S. last week for meetings with Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Chen’s attempt to downplay the threat China poses to Taiwan during his U.S. visit drew angry responses from many on the island.
In the interest of improving Sino-U.S. ties and eliminating a potential Asian flash point, several influential figures have recently called for the U.S. to re-examine its commitments to defending Taiwan.
Most recent on that list is former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Charles Freeman, who at a conference on China’s naval strategy held by the U.S. Naval War College earlier this month questioned the “effort to retard the speeding tilt of the cross-Strait military balance against Taiwan” by continuing with arms sales.
“Given the huge stakes for the United States in our strategic interaction with China, this choice might well strike someone looking afresh at the situation as oddly misguided,” he said.
Mr. Freeman added that the U.S. should take seriously the idea of a “symbolic” unification between Taiwan and China that would exclude a political or military tie-up.
“This offer cannot be dismissed as incredible. China’s willingness to tolerate amazingly different politico-economic orders on what is nominally its territory has been amply demonstrated in both Hong Kong and Macau. Its proposal to Taipei offers far greater autonomy than either of these city-states enjoy. Is it worth a war with China to prevent such an outcome? If not, why are we behaving as if it were?”
In March, a group of U.S. business executives, scholars, and current and former government officials – including a handful of retired military officers – offered a similar assessment, suggesting the U.S. “reevaluate its long-standing policy toward Taiwan” as part of a package of concessions aimed at improving ties with Beijing.
Despite all the war and weapon talk, chances of a military conflict between China and Taiwan seem as distant now as they have at any time since Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang fled to the island more than 60 years ago. Regular flights connect the two, tourism is growing and business cooperation on the back of a landmark trade deal has increased. Further steps in the direction of political or military cooperation are highly contentious, however, and experts have warned difficulties in the relationship may crop up sooner than expected.
All of this suggests the debate in the U.S. might soon move beyond the politesse of letter writing into a more pitched political forum.
– Paul Mozur. Follow him on Twitter @paulmozur
Cumulative appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar since the end of the dollar peg was more than 20% by late 2008, but the exchange rate has remained virtually pegged since the onset of the global financial crisis.
In 2009, China announced that by 2020 it would reduce carbon intensity 40% from 2005 levels.
The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second largest economy after the United States by both nominal GDP ($5 trillion in 2009) and by purchasing power parity ($8.77 trillion in 2009).
Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.
The two sectors have differed in many respects.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
The growth in both outbound investment from, and inbound investment to, China reflects the nation’s rising economic power and attractiveness as an investment destination.
“The growth rate (for ODI) in the next few years will be much higher than previous years,” Shen said, without elaborating.
China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.
Growing domestic demand beginning in the mid-1990s, however, has forced the nation to import increasing quantities of petroleum.
Alumina is found in many parts of the country; China is one of world’s largest producers of aluminum.
China also has extensive hydroelectric energy potential, notably in Yunnan, W Sichuan, and E Tibet, although hydroelectric power accounts for only 5% of the country’s total energy production.
Shanghai and Guangzhou are the traditionally great textile centers, but many new mills have been built, concentrated mostly in the cotton-growing provinces of N China and along the Chang (Yangtze) River.
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Should the U.S. Sell More F-16s to Taiwan?
Business
Democrat Claims Musk is Undermining Spending Bill Due to China Restrictions – The Hill
A Democrat claims Elon Musk influenced the reduction of a spending bill due to its restrictions on China, suggesting his actions impacted the legislation’s progress and funding allocation.
Allegations Against Musk
A prominent Democrat has accused Elon Musk of deliberately sabotaging a significant spending bill in response to China-related restrictions. This accusation comes amid ongoing tensions between the U.S. and China, particularly regarding technology and trade policies. The claims suggest that Musk’s influence is affecting critical legislative processes, raising concerns among lawmakers about foreign influence in American politics.
Implications for Legislation
The potential ramifications of Musk’s alleged actions could be significant. As a major player in the tech industry, his decisions can sway public opinion and impact the economy. Lawmakers fear that if influential figures like Musk oppose necessary legislation, it might hinder efforts to address vital issues such as national security and economic stability.
Political Reactions
The controversy has sparked debates among both Democrats and Republicans, highlighting the intersection of technology and politics. Many are demanding greater transparency and accountability from tech giants. As the situation unfolds, lawmakers may need to reassess their strategies to ensure that essential legislation moves forward uninterrupted.
Source : Democrat accuses Musk of tanking spending bill over China restrictions – The Hill
China
Dissolving a Company in China: A Comparison of General Deregistration and Simplified Deregistration
China promotes simplified deregistration to enhance its business environment, offering a faster process requiring fewer documents than general deregistration. Companies must meet eligibility criteria, resolve issues, and can choose procedures based on their situation, ensuring compliance for both options.
In addition to the general deregistration procedures, China has been promoting simplified deregistration as one of the key measures to enhance its business environment. This article highlights the differences between the general and simplified procedures, explains the eligibility criteria, and clarifies common misunderstandings about these processes.
Foreign investors may decide to close their business for multiple reasons. To legally wind up a business, investors must complete a series of procedures involving multiple government agencies, such as market regulatory bureaus, foreign exchange administrations, customs, tax authorities, banking regulators, and others. In this article, we outline the company deregistration process overseen by the local Administration for Market Regulation (AMR), comparing the general and simplified procedures.
Before 2016, companies could only deregister through the general procedure. However, on December 26, 2016, the Guidance on Fully Promoting the Reform of Simplified Company Deregistration Procedures was released. Effective March 1, 2017, simplified deregistration procedures were implemented nationwide. Since then, there have been two options: general procedures and simplified procedures.
Companies must follow the general deregistration process if any of the following conditions apply (hereinafter referred to as “existing issues”):
Companies not facing the above issues may choose either the general or simplified deregistration process.
In summary, simplified deregistration is a faster process and requires fewer documents compared to general deregistration. Companies that meet the criteria typically would typically opt for simplified deregistration. Those that do not meet the criteria may choose this route after resolving outstanding issues. For companies with unresolved issues but seeking urgent closure, they can first publish a deregistration announcement. Once the announcement period ends and all issues are addressed, they can proceed with general deregistration. Some companies may question the legitimacy and compliance of simplified deregistration. This is a misconception. “Simplified” does not mean non-compliant, just as “general” does not imply greater legitimacy. Both processes are lawful and compliant. The AMR provides these options to enable companies ready for closure to complete the process efficiently while granting those with unsolved issues the necessary time to address them after publishing the deregistration announcement. Companies can select the most suitable process based on their specific circumstances.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
China’s influence grows at COP29 climate talks as US leadership fades
The 2024 U.N. climate talks in Baku yielded mixed results, agreeing to increase funding for developing nations. However, challenges remained in addressing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving sustainable progress.
The 2024 U.N. climate talks ended in Baku, Azerbaijan, on Nov. 24 after two weeks of arguments, agreements and side deals involving 106 heads of states and over 50,000 business leaders, activists and government representatives of almost every country.
Few say the conference was a resounding success. But neither was it a failure.
The central task of the conference, known as COP29, was to come up with funding to help developing countries become more resilient to the effects of climate change and to transition to more sustainable economic growth.
The biggest challenge was agreeing on who should pay, and the results say a lot about the shifting international dynamics and offer some insight into China’s role. As a political science professor who has worked on clean tech policy involving Asia, I followed the talks with interest.
Slow global progress
Over three decades of global climate talks, the world’s countries have agreed to cut their emissions, phase out fossil fuels, end inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies and stop deforestation, among many other landmark deals.
They have acknowledged since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, when they agreed to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, that greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels, would harm the climate and ecosystems, and that the governments of the world must work together to solve the crisis.
But progress has been slow.
Greenhouse gas emissions were at record highs in 2024. Governments are still subsidizing fossil fuels, encouraging their use. And the world is failing to keep warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial times – a target established under the 2015 Paris Agreement to avoid the worst effects of climate change.
Extreme weather, from lethal heat waves to devastating tropical cyclones and floods, has become more intense as temperatures have risen. And the poorest countries have faced some of the worst damage from climate change, while doing the least cause it.
Money for the poorest countries
Developing countries argue that they need US$1.3 trillion a year in financial support and investment by 2035 from the wealthiest nations – historically the largest greenhouse gas emitters – to adapt to climate change and develop sustainably as they grow.
That matters to countries everywhere because how these fast-growing populations build out energy systems and transportation in the coming decades will affect the future for the entire planet.
Negotiators at the COP29 climate talks. Less developed countries were unhappy with the outcome.
Kiara Worth/UN Climate Change via Flickr
At the Baku conference, member nations agreed to triple their existing pledge of $100 billion a year to at least $300 billion a year by 2035 to help developing countries. But that was far short of what economists have estimated those countries will need to develop clean energy economies.
The money can also come from a variety of sources. Developing countries wanted grants, rather than loans that would increase what for many is already crushing debt. Under the new agreement, countries can count funding that comes from private investments and loans from the World Bank and other development banks, as well as public funds.
Groups have proposed raising some of those funds with additional taxes on international shipping and aviation. A U.N. study projects that if levies were set somewhere between $150 and $300 for each ton of carbon pollution, the fund could generate as much as $127 billion per year. Other proposals have included taxing fossil fuels, cryptocurrencies and plastics, which all contribute to climate change, as well as financial transactions and carbon trading.
China’s expanding role
How much of a leadership role China takes in global climate efforts is an important question going forward, particularly with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump expected to throttle back U.S. support for climate policies and international funding.
China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the second-largest economy.
China also stands to gain as provider of the market majority of green technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles.
Whether or not China should be expected to contribute funding at a level comparable to the other major emitters was so hotly contested at COP29 that it almost shut down the entire conference.
Previously, only those countries listed by the U.N. as “developed countries” – a list that doesn’t include China – were expected to provide funds. The COP29 agreement expands that by calling on “all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing.”
In the end, a compromise was reached. The final agreement “encourages developing countries to make contributions on a voluntary basis,” excluding China from the heavier expectations placed on richer nations.
Side deals offer signs of progress
In a conference fraught with deep division and threatened with collapse, some bright spots of climate progress emerged from the side events.
In one declaration, 25 nations plus the European Union agreed to no new coal power developments. There were also agreements on ocean protection and deforestation. Other declarations marked efforts to reenergize hydrogen energy production and expanded ambitious plans to reduce methane emissions.
Future of UN climate talks
However, after two weeks of bickering and a final resolution that doesn’t go far enough, the U.N. climate talks process itself is in question.
In a letter on Nov. 15, 2024, former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and a group of global climate leaders called for “a fundamental overhaul to the COP” and a “shift from negotiation to implementation.”
After back-to-back climate conferences hosted by oil-producing states, where fossil-fuel companies used the gathering to make deals for more fossil fuels on the side, the letter also calls for strict eligibility requirements for conference hosts “to exclude countries who do not support the phase out/transition away from fossil energy.”
With Trump promising to again withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, it is possible the climate leadership will fall to China, which may bring a new style of climate solutions to the table.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.