Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.

There is something operatic about the way the Chinese Communist Party has been celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding. Many leaders want to connect with the common people through culture, singing arias to the achievements of the Party—nostalgic songs being one of the better-known efforts. But there are others. As in days of old, many Chinese leaders are attending artistic performances, exalting contemporary figures whose fealty to the Party and the nation are seen as models for the modern China.

There are red songs and red slogans in the streets, red in the website banners of new sites–and now, some red faces, showing how the smallest tale—true or not—can undermine all the best-laid plans of self-congratulation.

A few days ago, a blogger using the name of “Baby Guo Meimei” used her Sina Weibo account to post photos of fashion accessories, luxury vehicles and the mansion where she purportedly lived, displaying the sort of wealth that many Chinese people associate with government connections and pilfered public funds. She claimed to be a manager at a company called Red Cross Commerce, which she claimed handles advertising on vehicles belonging to the Red Cross Society of China. Unsubstantiated rumors online linked her with a high-ranking official at the Red Cross Society of China. Even when flaws in her tale surfaced and spirited denials were issued by all parties, the outrage on the Internet found favor with many here that see the affair as another nasty echo of the very corruption that the original Communist Party was meant to combat.

And as is so often the case, government media was left scrambling to keep up with the often louder and, less discriminating, choir of the social media here.

These episodes—where the Party and the society sing from different sheet music—are becoming more common here. They echo the many problems of modern governance in China, and show how shallow the reservoir of political support for elites can often be. China’s massive economic development has tried to jump-start a happy middle class. But it’s also carved a canyon separating the rich from the poor, the politically connected and the propertied from everyone else. The same screaming self-interest that helped stoke the Chinese economic engine at takeoff is fast morphing into its own melodrama, from wealth being paraded about to fire safety up for sale.

But in China, outrage does not automatically inspire rebellion. Success has its critics, yet it also has plenty of fans. Observers looking for dissidents to storm the political stage are watching the wrong play. Activists have been shown the exit, or told to sit down and just watch. Some of the disenchanted still fail to accept that all current performances are directed by and for the Party, no matter how much some might think they can upstage the government.

And so on the 90th anniversary, the Party is faced with an age-old question: How might cadres better connect with the public? Officials might grant far more social freedom than in decades past, but political alternatives remain out of bounds for public discussion. Many cadres recognize that apart from the odd NGO doing good works, civil space is largely empty, lacking excitement or purpose. While there are smatterings of applause for the accomplishments that the Party has produced in recent years, many in the audience here simply sit on their hands and remain spectators. That’s not good when the authorities start asking for sacrifices or assistance.

But it would be wrong to see the current celebrations as just so much theater, colorful costumes without content or promise.

As ever in Chinese politics, the real action is backstage. In the wings are cadres who want to have more of a say in changing the current lyrics of governance. They recognize that the Party is faced with a populace largely unmoved by nostalgic spectacle and want that to stop. These players may not be ready for prime time, but they do have ideas and they like to experiment [zh]. For them, the anniversary a further opportunity to try to make themselves heard above the usual din.

And it is not the last opportunity. As the transition develops further, they will push all the harder for someone to step forward who is not a re-centralizer, or a reformer pointed in a conservative direction as Hu Jintao ever was. Those officials who think that accountability and public supervision are not show-stoppers would not mind someone new—a leader who just may be interested in reworking some of the current political script, building the sort of government that parts of a renovated Chinese society are starting to demand.

Collapse is not a scenario for the Chinese Communist Party, so long as its leaders make sure that new voices are not stifled. What high drama it would be if those about to step off the stage were to use the 90th anniversary to put political reform back on the playbill. That would certainly be worth celebrating in society—maybe even singing about.

Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2009 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income.

Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.

The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.

Nevertheless, key bottlenecks continue to constrain growth.

The two most important sectors of the economy have traditionally been agriculture and industry, which together employ more than 70 percent of the labor force and produce more than 60 percent of GDP.

The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.

China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.

On top of this, foreign direct investment (FDI) this year was set to “surpass $100 billion”, compared to $90 billion last year, ministry officials predicted.

In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.

China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.

In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.

Since the late 1970s, China has decollectivized agriculture, yielding tremendous gains in production.

China is the world’s largest producer of rice and wheat and a major producer of sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.

Livestock raising on a large scale is confined to the border regions and provinces in the north and west; it is mainly of the nomadic pastoral type.

China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.

There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.

Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.

Although a British crown colony until its return to Chinese control in 1997, Hong Kong has long been a major maritime outlet of S China.
Rivers and canals (notably the Grand Canal, which connects the Huang He and the Chang rivers) remain important transportation arteries.

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