China
Could a Web Rumor Spoil the Communist Party’s Birthday?
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Russell Leigh Moses There is something operatic about the way the Chinese Communist Party has been celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding. Many leaders want to connect with the common people through culture, singing arias to the achievements of the Party— nostalgic songs being one of the better-known efforts. But there are others. As in days of old, many Chinese leaders are attending artistic performances, exalting contemporary figures whose fealty to the Party and the nation are seen as models for the modern China. There are red songs and red slogans in the streets, red in the website banners of new sites–and now, some red faces, showing how the smallest tale—true or not—can undermine all the best-laid plans of self-congratulation. A few days ago, a blogger using the name of “Baby Guo Meimei” used her Sina Weibo account to post photos of fashion accessories, luxury vehicles and the mansion where she purportedly lived, displaying the sort of wealth that many Chinese people associate with government connections and pilfered public funds. She claimed to be a manager at a company called Red Cross Commerce, which she claimed handles advertising on vehicles belonging to the Red Cross Society of China. Unsubstantiated rumors online linked her with a high-ranking official at the Red Cross Society of China. Even when flaws in her tale surfaced and spirited denials were issued by all parties, the outrage on the Internet found favor with many here that see the affair as another nasty echo of the very corruption that the original Communist Party was meant to combat. And as is so often the case, government media was left scrambling to keep up with the often louder and, less discriminating, choir of the social media here. These episodes—where the Party and the society sing from different sheet music—are becoming more common here. They echo the many problems of modern governance in China, and show how shallow the reservoir of political support for elites can often be. China’s massive economic development has tried to jump-start a happy middle class. But it’s also carved a canyon separating the rich from the poor, the politically connected and the propertied from everyone else. The same screaming self-interest that helped stoke the Chinese economic engine at takeoff is fast morphing into its own melodrama, from wealth being paraded about to fire safety up for sale . But in China, outrage does not automatically inspire rebellion. Success has its critics, yet it also has plenty of fans. Observers looking for dissidents to storm the political stage are watching the wrong play. Activists have been shown the exit, or told to sit down and just watch . Some of the disenchanted still fail to accept that all current performances are directed by and for the Party, no matter how much some might think they can upstage the government. And so on the 90th anniversary, the Party is faced with an age-old question: How might cadres better connect with the public? Officials might grant far more social freedom than in decades past, but political alternatives remain out of bounds for public discussion. Many cadres recognize that apart from the odd NGO doing good works, civil space is largely empty, lacking excitement or purpose. While there are smatterings of applause for the accomplishments that the Party has produced in recent years, many in the audience here simply sit on their hands and remain spectators. That’s not good when the authorities start asking for sacrifices or assistance. But it would be wrong to see the current celebrations as just so much theater, colorful costumes without content or promise. As ever in Chinese politics, the real action is backstage. In the wings are cadres who want to have more of a say in changing the current lyrics of governance. They recognize that the Party is faced with a populace largely unmoved by nostalgic spectacle and want that to stop. These players may not be ready for prime time, but they do have ideas and they like to experiment [zh]. For them, the anniversary a further opportunity to try to make themselves heard above the usual din. And it is not the last opportunity. As the transition develops further, they will push all the harder for someone to step forward who is not a re-centralizer, or a reformer pointed in a conservative direction as Hu Jintao ever was. Those officials who think that accountability and public supervision are not show-stoppers would not mind someone new—a leader who just may be interested in reworking some of the current political script, building the sort of government that parts of a renovated Chinese society are starting to demand. Collapse is not a scenario for the Chinese Communist Party, so long as its leaders make sure that new voices are not stifled. What high drama it would be if those about to step off the stage were to use the 90th anniversary to put political reform back on the playbill. That would certainly be worth celebrating in society—maybe even singing about.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
- Russell Leigh Moses
There is something operatic about the way the Chinese Communist Party has been celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding. Many leaders want to connect with the common people through culture, singing arias to the achievements of the Party—nostalgic songs being one of the better-known efforts. But there are others. As in days of old, many Chinese leaders are attending artistic performances, exalting contemporary figures whose fealty to the Party and the nation are seen as models for the modern China.
There are red songs and red slogans in the streets, red in the website banners of new sites–and now, some red faces, showing how the smallest tale—true or not—can undermine all the best-laid plans of self-congratulation.
A few days ago, a blogger using the name of “Baby Guo Meimei” used her Sina Weibo account to post photos of fashion accessories, luxury vehicles and the mansion where she purportedly lived, displaying the sort of wealth that many Chinese people associate with government connections and pilfered public funds. She claimed to be a manager at a company called Red Cross Commerce, which she claimed handles advertising on vehicles belonging to the Red Cross Society of China. Unsubstantiated rumors online linked her with a high-ranking official at the Red Cross Society of China. Even when flaws in her tale surfaced and spirited denials were issued by all parties, the outrage on the Internet found favor with many here that see the affair as another nasty echo of the very corruption that the original Communist Party was meant to combat.
And as is so often the case, government media was left scrambling to keep up with the often louder and, less discriminating, choir of the social media here.
These episodes—where the Party and the society sing from different sheet music—are becoming more common here. They echo the many problems of modern governance in China, and show how shallow the reservoir of political support for elites can often be. China’s massive economic development has tried to jump-start a happy middle class. But it’s also carved a canyon separating the rich from the poor, the politically connected and the propertied from everyone else. The same screaming self-interest that helped stoke the Chinese economic engine at takeoff is fast morphing into its own melodrama, from wealth being paraded about to fire safety up for sale.
But in China, outrage does not automatically inspire rebellion. Success has its critics, yet it also has plenty of fans. Observers looking for dissidents to storm the political stage are watching the wrong play. Activists have been shown the exit, or told to sit down and just watch. Some of the disenchanted still fail to accept that all current performances are directed by and for the Party, no matter how much some might think they can upstage the government.
And so on the 90th anniversary, the Party is faced with an age-old question: How might cadres better connect with the public? Officials might grant far more social freedom than in decades past, but political alternatives remain out of bounds for public discussion. Many cadres recognize that apart from the odd NGO doing good works, civil space is largely empty, lacking excitement or purpose. While there are smatterings of applause for the accomplishments that the Party has produced in recent years, many in the audience here simply sit on their hands and remain spectators. That’s not good when the authorities start asking for sacrifices or assistance.
But it would be wrong to see the current celebrations as just so much theater, colorful costumes without content or promise.
As ever in Chinese politics, the real action is backstage. In the wings are cadres who want to have more of a say in changing the current lyrics of governance. They recognize that the Party is faced with a populace largely unmoved by nostalgic spectacle and want that to stop. These players may not be ready for prime time, but they do have ideas and they like to experiment [zh]. For them, the anniversary a further opportunity to try to make themselves heard above the usual din.
And it is not the last opportunity. As the transition develops further, they will push all the harder for someone to step forward who is not a re-centralizer, or a reformer pointed in a conservative direction as Hu Jintao ever was. Those officials who think that accountability and public supervision are not show-stoppers would not mind someone new—a leader who just may be interested in reworking some of the current political script, building the sort of government that parts of a renovated Chinese society are starting to demand.
Collapse is not a scenario for the Chinese Communist Party, so long as its leaders make sure that new voices are not stifled. What high drama it would be if those about to step off the stage were to use the 90th anniversary to put political reform back on the playbill. That would certainly be worth celebrating in society—maybe even singing about.
Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2009 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income.
Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.
The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.
Nevertheless, key bottlenecks continue to constrain growth.
The two most important sectors of the economy have traditionally been agriculture and industry, which together employ more than 70 percent of the labor force and produce more than 60 percent of GDP.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.
On top of this, foreign direct investment (FDI) this year was set to “surpass $100 billion”, compared to $90 billion last year, ministry officials predicted.
In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.
China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Since the late 1970s, China has decollectivized agriculture, yielding tremendous gains in production.
China is the world’s largest producer of rice and wheat and a major producer of sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.
Livestock raising on a large scale is confined to the border regions and provinces in the north and west; it is mainly of the nomadic pastoral type.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.
Although a British crown colony until its return to Chinese control in 1997, Hong Kong has long been a major maritime outlet of S China.
Rivers and canals (notably the Grand Canal, which connects the Huang He and the Chang rivers) remain important transportation arteries.
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Could a Web Rumor Spoil the Communist Party’s Birthday?
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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