China
Could a Web Rumor Spoil the Communist Party’s Birthday?
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Russell Leigh Moses There is something operatic about the way the Chinese Communist Party has been celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding. Many leaders want to connect with the common people through culture, singing arias to the achievements of the Party— nostalgic songs being one of the better-known efforts. But there are others. As in days of old, many Chinese leaders are attending artistic performances, exalting contemporary figures whose fealty to the Party and the nation are seen as models for the modern China. There are red songs and red slogans in the streets, red in the website banners of new sites–and now, some red faces, showing how the smallest tale—true or not—can undermine all the best-laid plans of self-congratulation. A few days ago, a blogger using the name of “Baby Guo Meimei” used her Sina Weibo account to post photos of fashion accessories, luxury vehicles and the mansion where she purportedly lived, displaying the sort of wealth that many Chinese people associate with government connections and pilfered public funds. She claimed to be a manager at a company called Red Cross Commerce, which she claimed handles advertising on vehicles belonging to the Red Cross Society of China. Unsubstantiated rumors online linked her with a high-ranking official at the Red Cross Society of China. Even when flaws in her tale surfaced and spirited denials were issued by all parties, the outrage on the Internet found favor with many here that see the affair as another nasty echo of the very corruption that the original Communist Party was meant to combat. And as is so often the case, government media was left scrambling to keep up with the often louder and, less discriminating, choir of the social media here. These episodes—where the Party and the society sing from different sheet music—are becoming more common here. They echo the many problems of modern governance in China, and show how shallow the reservoir of political support for elites can often be. China’s massive economic development has tried to jump-start a happy middle class. But it’s also carved a canyon separating the rich from the poor, the politically connected and the propertied from everyone else. The same screaming self-interest that helped stoke the Chinese economic engine at takeoff is fast morphing into its own melodrama, from wealth being paraded about to fire safety up for sale . But in China, outrage does not automatically inspire rebellion. Success has its critics, yet it also has plenty of fans. Observers looking for dissidents to storm the political stage are watching the wrong play. Activists have been shown the exit, or told to sit down and just watch . Some of the disenchanted still fail to accept that all current performances are directed by and for the Party, no matter how much some might think they can upstage the government. And so on the 90th anniversary, the Party is faced with an age-old question: How might cadres better connect with the public? Officials might grant far more social freedom than in decades past, but political alternatives remain out of bounds for public discussion. Many cadres recognize that apart from the odd NGO doing good works, civil space is largely empty, lacking excitement or purpose. While there are smatterings of applause for the accomplishments that the Party has produced in recent years, many in the audience here simply sit on their hands and remain spectators. That’s not good when the authorities start asking for sacrifices or assistance. But it would be wrong to see the current celebrations as just so much theater, colorful costumes without content or promise. As ever in Chinese politics, the real action is backstage. In the wings are cadres who want to have more of a say in changing the current lyrics of governance. They recognize that the Party is faced with a populace largely unmoved by nostalgic spectacle and want that to stop. These players may not be ready for prime time, but they do have ideas and they like to experiment [zh]. For them, the anniversary a further opportunity to try to make themselves heard above the usual din. And it is not the last opportunity. As the transition develops further, they will push all the harder for someone to step forward who is not a re-centralizer, or a reformer pointed in a conservative direction as Hu Jintao ever was. Those officials who think that accountability and public supervision are not show-stoppers would not mind someone new—a leader who just may be interested in reworking some of the current political script, building the sort of government that parts of a renovated Chinese society are starting to demand. Collapse is not a scenario for the Chinese Communist Party, so long as its leaders make sure that new voices are not stifled. What high drama it would be if those about to step off the stage were to use the 90th anniversary to put political reform back on the playbill. That would certainly be worth celebrating in society—maybe even singing about.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
- Russell Leigh Moses
There is something operatic about the way the Chinese Communist Party has been celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding. Many leaders want to connect with the common people through culture, singing arias to the achievements of the Party—nostalgic songs being one of the better-known efforts. But there are others. As in days of old, many Chinese leaders are attending artistic performances, exalting contemporary figures whose fealty to the Party and the nation are seen as models for the modern China.
There are red songs and red slogans in the streets, red in the website banners of new sites–and now, some red faces, showing how the smallest tale—true or not—can undermine all the best-laid plans of self-congratulation.
A few days ago, a blogger using the name of “Baby Guo Meimei” used her Sina Weibo account to post photos of fashion accessories, luxury vehicles and the mansion where she purportedly lived, displaying the sort of wealth that many Chinese people associate with government connections and pilfered public funds. She claimed to be a manager at a company called Red Cross Commerce, which she claimed handles advertising on vehicles belonging to the Red Cross Society of China. Unsubstantiated rumors online linked her with a high-ranking official at the Red Cross Society of China. Even when flaws in her tale surfaced and spirited denials were issued by all parties, the outrage on the Internet found favor with many here that see the affair as another nasty echo of the very corruption that the original Communist Party was meant to combat.
And as is so often the case, government media was left scrambling to keep up with the often louder and, less discriminating, choir of the social media here.
These episodes—where the Party and the society sing from different sheet music—are becoming more common here. They echo the many problems of modern governance in China, and show how shallow the reservoir of political support for elites can often be. China’s massive economic development has tried to jump-start a happy middle class. But it’s also carved a canyon separating the rich from the poor, the politically connected and the propertied from everyone else. The same screaming self-interest that helped stoke the Chinese economic engine at takeoff is fast morphing into its own melodrama, from wealth being paraded about to fire safety up for sale.
But in China, outrage does not automatically inspire rebellion. Success has its critics, yet it also has plenty of fans. Observers looking for dissidents to storm the political stage are watching the wrong play. Activists have been shown the exit, or told to sit down and just watch. Some of the disenchanted still fail to accept that all current performances are directed by and for the Party, no matter how much some might think they can upstage the government.
And so on the 90th anniversary, the Party is faced with an age-old question: How might cadres better connect with the public? Officials might grant far more social freedom than in decades past, but political alternatives remain out of bounds for public discussion. Many cadres recognize that apart from the odd NGO doing good works, civil space is largely empty, lacking excitement or purpose. While there are smatterings of applause for the accomplishments that the Party has produced in recent years, many in the audience here simply sit on their hands and remain spectators. That’s not good when the authorities start asking for sacrifices or assistance.
But it would be wrong to see the current celebrations as just so much theater, colorful costumes without content or promise.
As ever in Chinese politics, the real action is backstage. In the wings are cadres who want to have more of a say in changing the current lyrics of governance. They recognize that the Party is faced with a populace largely unmoved by nostalgic spectacle and want that to stop. These players may not be ready for prime time, but they do have ideas and they like to experiment [zh]. For them, the anniversary a further opportunity to try to make themselves heard above the usual din.
And it is not the last opportunity. As the transition develops further, they will push all the harder for someone to step forward who is not a re-centralizer, or a reformer pointed in a conservative direction as Hu Jintao ever was. Those officials who think that accountability and public supervision are not show-stoppers would not mind someone new—a leader who just may be interested in reworking some of the current political script, building the sort of government that parts of a renovated Chinese society are starting to demand.
Collapse is not a scenario for the Chinese Communist Party, so long as its leaders make sure that new voices are not stifled. What high drama it would be if those about to step off the stage were to use the 90th anniversary to put political reform back on the playbill. That would certainly be worth celebrating in society—maybe even singing about.
Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2009 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income.
Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.
The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.
Nevertheless, key bottlenecks continue to constrain growth.
The two most important sectors of the economy have traditionally been agriculture and industry, which together employ more than 70 percent of the labor force and produce more than 60 percent of GDP.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.
On top of this, foreign direct investment (FDI) this year was set to “surpass $100 billion”, compared to $90 billion last year, ministry officials predicted.
In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.
China is aiming to be the world’s largest new energy vehicle market by 2020 with 5 million cars.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Since the late 1970s, China has decollectivized agriculture, yielding tremendous gains in production.
China is the world’s largest producer of rice and wheat and a major producer of sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.
Livestock raising on a large scale is confined to the border regions and provinces in the north and west; it is mainly of the nomadic pastoral type.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
Coal is the single most important energy source in China; coal-fired thermal electric generators provide over 70% of the country’s electric power.
Although a British crown colony until its return to Chinese control in 1997, Hong Kong has long been a major maritime outlet of S China.
Rivers and canals (notably the Grand Canal, which connects the Huang He and the Chang rivers) remain important transportation arteries.
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Could a Web Rumor Spoil the Communist Party’s Birthday?
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
- Gordonstoun Severs Connections with Business Led by Individual Accused of Espionage for China
- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
- China Expands Nationwide Private Pension Scheme After Two-Year Pilot Program
