China
Changes to China’s ‘Indigenous Innovation’ Policy: Don’t Get Too Excited
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, teaches at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999). China has announced a significant retreat from a policy initiated in a 2006 report on “indigenous innovation” that established “guidelines” intended to reduce dependence on foreign technology. Subsequent government actions at first seemed to threaten to exclude foreign companies from selling intellectual property developed outside of China to government agencies, to the alarm of foreign governments and technology companies. But while government policy on procurement has receded from the original position and “indigenous innovation” has been “delinked” from government procurement requirements, implementation of this shift is problematic because acceptance and commitment by sub-central (provincial and municipal) governments are needed to make it meaningful. Given the evolution of policy in China, that implementation deserves to be watched closely. Indigenous innovation was first clearly linked to government procurement in 2009. The policy was to be carried out via a national catalogue of industrial products that were targeted as most desirable to develop in order to raise the nation’s technological level. It required that to qualify as “indigenous innovation,” a product had to be produced by an enterprise that owned the intellectual property in China, had a trademark owned by a Chinese company, was registered in China and embodied a high degree of innovation. Foreign sellers objected vigorously, in part out of fears that foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) would be excluded. In January 2010, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued a notice that modified the policy. It provided that to be eligible for accreditation, applicants must be manufacturing enterprises that are legal persons in China (including registered foreign-invested enterprises) and their products must comply with national laws, regulations and ”technology” policies. In addition, applicants must own the IP rights, and have the exclusive right to use the trademark for the product in China. The notice also stated that the product must be “advanced” according to criteria expressed only very generally, and must be “reliable” in quality. The policy was modified in April 2010 replacing the demand that applicants own IP rights with a requirement that they merely have a license to use the IP. Then, in January 2011, President Hu Jintao, during a visit to Washington, promised to “delink” indigenous innovation from government procurement. Mr. Hu appeared to have made good on his pledge last month when the Ministry of Finance announced that it would revoke three laws linking procurement with “indigenous innovation.” In a recent report on China’s innovation policy for the East-West Center ( pdf ), economist Dieter Ernst wrote that the modifications to the policy were undertaken “possibly in response” to foreign complaints and reflected “greater pragmatism in the implementation of China’s innovation policies.” Although this is a welcome reversal, it does not by its terms extend to sub-central agencies. Whether provincial and municipal governments will fall into line by allowing foreign competition rather than favoring local companies remains to be seen. The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China recently issued a report on European business experience in competing for public contracts in China ( pdf ) stating that “ although [the delinking of indigenous innovation from national procurement] was a “major positive development, the international business community remains concerned that discriminatory policies might continue to be enforced locally in spite of national commitments to the contrary.” While it appears that a national catalogue will not be issued after all, a considerable number of provincial and municipal level governments have already released their own indigenous innovation product catalogues. A survey by the US-China Business Council found 61 such sub-central catalogs had been issued by November of last year. The council identified an additional 13 this past February. Although it says it hasn’t reviewed all of the catalogues, the council found that the local lists it had studied “appeared to discriminate against foreign invested enterprises products by including only a handful of FIE products.” The Shanghai catalogue, for example, listed only two indigenous innovation products from FIEs out of a total of 523. Of 42 products listed in the Beijing catalogue, only one came from an FIE. On Nanjing’s list, there were none. Similarly, the EU Chamber report refers to a “fragmentation of the Chinese government procurement market” because “sub-central authorities develop their own procedures, procurement catalogues and unwritten procedures.” Another discouraging note on “fragmentation” comes from Ken Wasch, president of the Software and Information Industry association, who noted in testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission in May ( pdf ) that the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Finance claim that “they lack jurisdiction over local catalogues.” In April, The Wall Street Journal reported complaints from U.S. companies that local governments had not seemed to have adjusted their policies to conform to national policy. Foreign impatience can be expected to grow if, as seems likely, the “delinking” of sub-central government procurement from indigenous innovation is slow. As this column has reported in a variety of contexts and as any foreign business with experience in China must know, local government failures to implement national policy are common. It is useful to recall that although China is theoretically a unitary state, in practice national laws and policies are often poorly and tardily implemented. Doing away with provincial catalogues will not prevent provincial governments from keeping the procurement process opaque and from using the lack of transparency to favor local firms. Indigenous innovation is not the only issue that confronts foreign companies as they deal with China’s drive to develop advanced technology domestically rather than importing it. Related emphases are seen in the setting of technical standards “favoring domestic industries at the expense of internationally accepted foreign standards and technologies,” as the U.S. International Trade Commission has shown in a recent report ( pdf ). As China pursues the upgrading of its economy, there will be more debate over policies on technology development. The very tentativeness with which indigenous innovation has been pursued may be a hopeful sign that continued dialogue may bring about adjustments of measures that are deemed protectionist.
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, teaches at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999). China has announced a significant retreat from a policy initiated in a 2006 report on “indigenous innovation” that established “guidelines” intended to reduce dependence on foreign technology. Subsequent government actions at first seemed to threaten to exclude foreign companies from selling intellectual property developed outside of China to government agencies, to the alarm of foreign governments and technology companies. But while government policy on procurement has receded from the original position and “indigenous innovation” has been “delinked” from government procurement requirements, implementation of this shift is problematic because acceptance and commitment by sub-central (provincial and municipal) governments are needed to make it meaningful. Given the evolution of policy in China, that implementation deserves to be watched closely. Indigenous innovation was first clearly linked to government procurement in 2009. The policy was to be carried out via a national catalogue of industrial products that were targeted as most desirable to develop in order to raise the nation’s technological level. It required that to qualify as “indigenous innovation,” a product had to be produced by an enterprise that owned the intellectual property in China, had a trademark owned by a Chinese company, was registered in China and embodied a high degree of innovation. Foreign sellers objected vigorously, in part out of fears that foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) would be excluded. In January 2010, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued a notice that modified the policy. It provided that to be eligible for accreditation, applicants must be manufacturing enterprises that are legal persons in China (including registered foreign-invested enterprises) and their products must comply with national laws, regulations and ”technology” policies. In addition, applicants must own the IP rights, and have the exclusive right to use the trademark for the product in China. The notice also stated that the product must be “advanced” according to criteria expressed only very generally, and must be “reliable” in quality. The policy was modified in April 2010 replacing the demand that applicants own IP rights with a requirement that they merely have a license to use the IP. Then, in January 2011, President Hu Jintao, during a visit to Washington, promised to “delink” indigenous innovation from government procurement. Mr. Hu appeared to have made good on his pledge last month when the Ministry of Finance announced that it would revoke three laws linking procurement with “indigenous innovation.” In a recent report on China’s innovation policy for the East-West Center ( pdf ), economist Dieter Ernst wrote that the modifications to the policy were undertaken “possibly in response” to foreign complaints and reflected “greater pragmatism in the implementation of China’s innovation policies.” Although this is a welcome reversal, it does not by its terms extend to sub-central agencies. Whether provincial and municipal governments will fall into line by allowing foreign competition rather than favoring local companies remains to be seen. The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China recently issued a report on European business experience in competing for public contracts in China ( pdf ) stating that “ although [the delinking of indigenous innovation from national procurement] was a “major positive development, the international business community remains concerned that discriminatory policies might continue to be enforced locally in spite of national commitments to the contrary.” While it appears that a national catalogue will not be issued after all, a considerable number of provincial and municipal level governments have already released their own indigenous innovation product catalogues. A survey by the US-China Business Council found 61 such sub-central catalogs had been issued by November of last year. The council identified an additional 13 this past February. Although it says it hasn’t reviewed all of the catalogues, the council found that the local lists it had studied “appeared to discriminate against foreign invested enterprises products by including only a handful of FIE products.” The Shanghai catalogue, for example, listed only two indigenous innovation products from FIEs out of a total of 523. Of 42 products listed in the Beijing catalogue, only one came from an FIE. On Nanjing’s list, there were none. Similarly, the EU Chamber report refers to a “fragmentation of the Chinese government procurement market” because “sub-central authorities develop their own procedures, procurement catalogues and unwritten procedures.” Another discouraging note on “fragmentation” comes from Ken Wasch, president of the Software and Information Industry association, who noted in testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission in May ( pdf ) that the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Finance claim that “they lack jurisdiction over local catalogues.” In April, The Wall Street Journal reported complaints from U.S. companies that local governments had not seemed to have adjusted their policies to conform to national policy. Foreign impatience can be expected to grow if, as seems likely, the “delinking” of sub-central government procurement from indigenous innovation is slow. As this column has reported in a variety of contexts and as any foreign business with experience in China must know, local government failures to implement national policy are common. It is useful to recall that although China is theoretically a unitary state, in practice national laws and policies are often poorly and tardily implemented. Doing away with provincial catalogues will not prevent provincial governments from keeping the procurement process opaque and from using the lack of transparency to favor local firms. Indigenous innovation is not the only issue that confronts foreign companies as they deal with China’s drive to develop advanced technology domestically rather than importing it. Related emphases are seen in the setting of technical standards “favoring domestic industries at the expense of internationally accepted foreign standards and technologies,” as the U.S. International Trade Commission has shown in a recent report ( pdf ). As China pursues the upgrading of its economy, there will be more debate over policies on technology development. The very tentativeness with which indigenous innovation has been pursued may be a hopeful sign that continued dialogue may bring about adjustments of measures that are deemed protectionist.
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Changes to China’s ‘Indigenous Innovation’ Policy: Don’t Get Too Excited
Business
China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival began in Xiamen on Nov 13, featuring awards, cultural projects worth 31.63 billion yuan, and fostering international film collaborations.
2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival Opens
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival commenced in Xiamen, Fujian province, on November 13. This prestigious event showcases the top film awards in China and spans four days, concluding with the China Golden Rooster Awards ceremony on November 16.
The festival features various film exhibitions, including the Golden Rooster Mainland Film Section and the Golden Rooster International Film Section. These showcases aim to highlight the achievements of Chinese-language films and foster global cultural exchanges within the film industry.
On the festival’s opening day, a significant milestone was reached with the signing of 175 cultural and film projects, valued at 31.63 billion yuan ($4.36 billion). Additionally, the International Film and Television Copyright Service Platform was launched, furthering the globalization of Chinese film and television properties.
Source : China’s Golden Rooster film festival opens in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in