China
China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
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China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
Business
China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival began in Xiamen on Nov 13, featuring awards, cultural projects worth 31.63 billion yuan, and fostering international film collaborations.
2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival Opens
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival commenced in Xiamen, Fujian province, on November 13. This prestigious event showcases the top film awards in China and spans four days, concluding with the China Golden Rooster Awards ceremony on November 16.
The festival features various film exhibitions, including the Golden Rooster Mainland Film Section and the Golden Rooster International Film Section. These showcases aim to highlight the achievements of Chinese-language films and foster global cultural exchanges within the film industry.
On the festival’s opening day, a significant milestone was reached with the signing of 175 cultural and film projects, valued at 31.63 billion yuan ($4.36 billion). Additionally, the International Film and Television Copyright Service Platform was launched, furthering the globalization of Chinese film and television properties.
Source : China’s Golden Rooster film festival opens in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
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