China
China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
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China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
- Gordonstoun Severs Connections with Business Led by Individual Accused of Espionage for China
- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
- China Expands Nationwide Private Pension Scheme After Two-Year Pilot Program
