China
China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Here comes the hard line again. Back from their working break at the summer resort of Beidaihe—and with no major decisions about the economy materializing in the wake of the those meetings–the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided that it’s high time to reaffirm its control over society. And this time, there’s a new target: the social media. After weeks of taking jabs to the chin from an angry microblogging public, leading forces in the Party have decided to punch back. Politburo member Liu Qi visited the Beijing offices of Sina.com’s popular microblogging service Weibo earlier this week and impressed upon the staff there the need for “the Internet’s healthy development”—code words for staying away from topics which attack the rule of the Communist Party or hold officials up for public ridicule. It’s not clear why the Party leadership took so long to issue this warning to Weibo. If there were previously any doubts in Beijing about the threat the service poses to the government’s ability to control public discourse, they would have been eviscerated weeks ago with the unprecedented outpouring of rage on the site over the July 23 high-speed train collision near the city of Wenzhou. Of course, the Wenzhou accident illustrated how Weibo functions as a safety valve for some in society, and so refraining from interfering might have been seen as the smart choice, lest outrage at further media controls spill from cyberspace into the streets. Weibo also provides Party overseers with a good sense of what netizens are dissatisfied about—a pulse-taking when the conversation gets political. The most likely explanation, however, is that the upper echelons simply could not agree on how to manage a situation where indignation at the authorities appeared so forcefully. Bogged down in Beidaihe trying to sort out a consensus on economic matters, leaders were probably wavering then over what could and should be done in the wake of the Wenzhou train tragedy. Liu’s strong-arm visit follows a series of admonitions in the Party media, warning journalists to get back into the government fold and to play the role of conveying to a skeptical society that cadres care ( in Chinese ). The hardline view, expressed in a recent article posted in the “People’s Forum” run by the official People’s Daily ( in Chinese ), is that microblogging is best confronted, not by embracing it as a way for the public to supervise the Party, but by the Party’s “use [of] the mass media to tell the truth.” Indeed, many officials here think the social media is a slippery slope to the wrong type of reform. If there is going to be any sort of shift in securing Party legitimacy, the consensus seems to be focusing on the people’s interest—specifically, their “happiness.” This emphasis on “happiness” is a swing towards the approach of Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, who has strongly promoted the notion of “a happiness index” to measure Party achievements and evaluate cadre performance. It’s an emphasis that’s getting some political traction and high-level attention. Recently, General Secretary Hu Jintao glided into Guangzhou to praise Wang. There, Hu referred to the needs of people for both economic development and popular satisfaction, and said that “the use of material civilization and spiritual civilization [would] make a pair of bumper double harvests” for the Party and its legitimacy. Still, this is happiness with a hardline, with the military, not microblogging, to assist in the undertaking. In Guangzhou, Hu underscored the need for social stability by meeting with security troops and tasking them with the ungentle assignment of “weeding out the old to make new contributions” — a phrase denoting more confrontation than cooperation. So even this effort to put a smile in people’s faces comes with some teeth. The leadership’s ability of the years to bounce back and confront whatever threat emerges has been impressive. But how this new hardline helps with handling the economy — for example, the lending binge which keeps local officials happy but worries bank regulators — is not at all clear. It seems far easier at present for cadres to agree on social control, and to postpone making the hard choices on the economy. It’s a good strategy–if the economic challenges ease in the coming months and the political transition continues apace. But if economic troubles mount in the absence of serious focus, then this attention to stifling the social media is going to seem off-target.
More here:
China’s Hardliners Take Aim at a New Target
Business
McKinsey Reduces Workforce by 500 in Overhaul of China Operations – WSJ
McKinsey plans to cut about 500 jobs in China, reducing its workforce by a third as part of a strategic revamp focused on minimizing security risks and decreasing government-linked clients.
McKinsey Job Cuts in China
McKinsey & Company, the renowned US consulting firm, is reportedly laying off approximately 500 employees as part of a significant restructuring in its Chinese operations. This decision reflects the company’s shift away from government-linked clientele, a strategy aimed at mitigating political and security risks in the region.
Workforce Reduction
The job cuts will result in a reduction of McKinsey’s workforce in China by roughly one-third. Over the past two years, the firm has been downsizing its personnel across Greater China, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan, affecting hundreds of positions. As of June 2023, McKinsey employed nearly 1,500 individuals in Greater China.
Strategic Separation
To address rising security concerns, McKinsey is separating its China unit from its global operations. This move aims to enhance operational security while navigating the complexities of the Chinese market. McKinsey has not yet commented on these developments following a request for information.
Source : McKinsey Cuts 500 Jobs Amid Revamp of China Business – WSJ
China
India’s Setback in Bangladesh May Not Equate to China’s Advantage
The fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is detrimental to India, as her regime fostered strong ties. China may gain influence but faces significant challenges in capitalizing on this opportunity.
Strategic Loss for India
The recent fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina marks a significant strategic setback for India. Hasina was an unusually pro-Indian leader, and her departure has created fears that China may capitalize on this political upheaval. However, while China’s influence in Bangladesh might grow, such assumptions about its immediate gains are overstated.
Challenges to Chinese Expansion
Beijing’s opportunity to bolster its presence in Bangladesh is hindered by significant challenges. The ongoing crisis in Bangladesh could slow China’s attempts to extend its influence in the region. Despite the current turmoil favoring China, the practicalities of political dynamics in Bangladesh may make it difficult for Beijing to fully seize this chance.
Impact on India-Bangladesh Relations
Sheikh Hasina’s government served as a crucial ally for India, fostering a stable relationship that addressed longstanding concerns regarding cross-border issues and support for minority groups. The partnership facilitated vital infrastructure projects, including railway connections that enhance regional integration under Indian leadership. With Hasina’s government now collapsed, the hard-won gains in India-Bangladesh relations are at risk.
Source : India’s loss in Bangladesh not necessarily China’s gain
China
Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals
China plans to deepen its relationship with Africa, pledging $51 billion in loans and investments, aiming for increased diplomatic ties, economic growth, and expanded influence amidst Western concerns about debt-trap diplomacy.
China’s relationship with Africa is set to deepen. At a summit in Beijing in early September, China’s president, Xi Jinping, pledged to deliver US$51 billion (£39 billion) in loans, investment and aid to the continent over the next three years, as well as upgrading diplomatic ties.
Beijing’s close engagement with Africa is not new. Since 1950, the first overseas trip of the year for Chinese foreign ministers has almost always been to one or more African countries. But Xi’s commitments are still sure to raise concerns in the US and other western countries, which are competing with China for global influence.
They may well also bring back fears of China using “debt-trap diplomacy” to push African countries into default and thereby gain leverage over them. Such is the strength of this narrative that South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, felt compelled to deny it at the summit.
The notion of Chinese debt traps, particularly the infamous case of Sri Lanka’s port of Hambantota that, in 2017, was leased by the Sri Lankan government to a Chinese company to raise liquidity, has been debunked several times.
But with African populations and economies growing, and China’s engagement with them continuing to deepen, it is important to understand what China hopes to achieve with its diplomacy.
China’s engagement with Africa is strategic as well as economic. Whether it’s gaining votes at the UN, better access to resources, or increasing the international use of its currency, China’s diplomatic relations with Africa play into its ambitions of being a major player in a multipolar world.
Chinese children hold national flags as they prepare for the arrival of Togo’s president, Faure Gnassingbe, at Beijing International Airport ahead of the summit.
Ken Ishii / Pool / EPA
The long game
From a purely economic perspective, Africa is a potentially lucrative market for China. With its under-served market and booming population, the scope for expansion into Africa offers huge potential for Chinese firms.
This is particularly true now that the African Continental Free Trade Area (which was established in 2018) opens up the possibility of cross-border value chains developing in Africa.
Most of the goods that China imports from Africa are natural resources. Many of these resources have strategic relevance, for example, in manufacturing batteries. In return, Chinese companies export a wide range of goods to Africa, including manufactured products, industrial and agricultural machinery, and vehicles.
In terms of foreign direct investment, Chinese companies are still only the fifth-largest investors in Africa after their Dutch, French, US and UK counterparts. But their ascent has been relatively quick, and while western companies are focused on resources and the financial sector, Chinese ones also invest heavily in construction and manufacturing.
Chinese companies are major players in Africa’s construction sector, often working on projects funded by loans from Chinese banks to African governments. In 2019, for example, Chinese contractors accounted for about 60% of the total value of construction work in Africa.
Some of the infrastructure financed by China has done little to improve trade or economic development in Africa. And it has, admittedly, also contributed to the increased debt burden of several African countries.
The costly expressways that connect Nairobi in Kenya and Kampala in Uganda to the respective international airports, for instance, have made life easier for city elites and international travellers. But they have not led to economic growth.
So, China has moved to recalibrate its infrastructure finance in recent years. In 2021, Xi introduced the concept of “small and beautiful” projects better targeted at the partner country’s needs – a concept he repeated at the recent summit.
It is this alignment with the requests of African leaders that differentiates China’s engagement with Africa from that of the west. A key request of many African leaders is for investment in manufacturing value chains and imports of African processed goods rather than just raw resources.
Xi’s keynote speech addressed these two concerns. He promised more investment in key sectors and to allow more African goods to enter China without duties.
The construction of the Nairobi Expressway was supposed to decongest Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi.
Daniel Irungu / EPA
China’s support to African nations is political as well as economic. Its policy of non-interference in Africa’s internal affairs have been well received by African leaders – a sharp contrast to western nations who have often tied their support to the respect of certain social or economic conditions.
This has, in turn, bolstered China’s diplomatic influence on the continent. A good indicator of this influence is how many countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which the Chinese government sees as part of China’s territory. In Africa, only Eswatini has full relations with Taiwan and just a handful of other countries have representative offices.
Another Chinese goal is to expand the global reach of its currency, the renminbi. Its motive here is to challenge the dominance of the US dollar, which gives America control over transactions anywhere in the world.
Since the late 2000s, the People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to conduct transactions in renminbi. And China is aiming to increase the use of renminbi in official lending, both through domestic banks such as the China Development Bank and regional institutions such as the New Development Bank.
Much like Africa’s western partners, China pursues both political and economic interests in its dealings with the continent. But, with western leaders paying little attention to Africa, China doesn’t need to pursue debt-trap diplomacy to increase its influence there. It just needs to put forward a better partnership offer to gain ground.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- McKinsey Reduces Workforce by 500 in Overhaul of China Operations – WSJ
- India’s Setback in Bangladesh May Not Equate to China’s Advantage
- Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals
- Trends in China’s Outbound Investment: Key Sources, Destinations, and Sectors
- This Chinese EV Manufacturer is Ready to Compete with Elon Musk in China
- China’s probe of Canadian canola will put both exports and farmers in jeopardy
