Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.

While many international observers are looking to see if Beijing can help the heavy financial weather that is battering the euro zone, the makings of a political storm are building in China.

Last week, while China watched European financial markets get pummeled, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, did some punching of his own at home. Bo–who has been seen as ripe for promotion to a higher post in Beijing but who had been below the waterline in recent months—launched a full-on attempt to answer critics who have been arguing that his tenure in Chongqing has focused on ideology at the expense of economics.

In a presentation to a visiting group of editors of provincial newspapers attending a conference in Chongqing (in Chinese), Bo defended his governance of the municipality, saying that the media focus on revolutionary nostalgia (such as singing red songs) was “a total misreading” of what he was up to in Chongqing. Bo blasted back at doubters and dissenters in the Party, asking if perhaps “some comrades have misunderstood, feeling that development of the economy and improve people’s livelihood might be a contradiction?”

Bo insisted that his administration was focused on “people-oriented development,” and that the initiatives he had implemented had been “effective in improving people’s livelihood, not only by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses, but also by effectively promoting consumption and promoting development,” while “shrinking the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.” Chongqing, Bo insisted, was attempting to “achieve the ideal of socialism by carrying out a specific and concrete exploration,” not something abstract or whimsical.

Why is Bo’s eruption significant?

To start with, Bo Xilai’s defense of his tenure is another attack on the political status quo in Beijing. By talking about “common prosperity,” Bo was taking on the Party line of “building a moderately prosperous society.” Bo is going after both those cadres who argue that growth is the greater good in China and those (in Guangdong and elsewhere) who think that pursuing simple happiness for citizens can bridge the growing abyss separating the upper class from the underclass here. Neither alone is sufficient for social stability, Bo is insisting. He thinks that Chongqing demonstrates that both hard and soft development can be achieved more widely—perhaps if he is put in charge.

But Bo Xilai is very much a single-handed sailor in the current political seas. His efforts in Chongqing have not been adopted elsewhere in the country with any force. The recent annual meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on protecting and expanding “socialist culture,” but Bo received no public credit for the campaigns he inaugurated in the same vein. And though Bo has captured a lavish amount of foreign media attention and enjoyed a good deal of adulation in the Chinese blogosphere, he has yet to receive universal approval from Beijing for his brand of reform.

Still, Bo has his supporters, especially in cyberspace. His fans see him as less of a nostalgic revolutionary and more of a populist firebrand, eager to shake up a calcified and corrupt system. There are cadres and citizens in China who think that someone powerful making waves is precisely what the Party and the country need. Bo might well share that feeling and he might now be wondering if it’s time for him to make some sort of a play for a top spot, before his prospects for promotion to Beijing plunge any further.

Whatever the motivation, Bo’s pushback does not come at a good time for the Chinese leadership. The recent Party plenum concluded in happy form, but without any clear consensus on major economic issues. Some Chinese provinces seem in need of revenue, but efforts to increase taxes have not inspired quiet compliance on the part of some citizenry.

The recent shuffling of financial overseers might be bringing new but reliable officials into decision-making, but recent economic indicators continue to confound anyone who might be arguing that Beijing has clear sailing ahead.

Bo’s outburst reminds us that the political winds in China have a way of switching suddenly. It’s good to see Beijing looking outwards to see if it can support a major trading partner. It might be even better for those who think the leadership transition is proceeding on a secure and steady heading to check their compasses again.

Reforms started in the late 1970s with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.

Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.

The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.

Some economists believe that Chinese economic growth has been in fact understated during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, failing to fully factor in the growth driven by the private sector and that the extent at which China is dependent on exports is exaggerated.

Its mineral resources are probably among the richest in the world but are only partially developed.

A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.

China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.

The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.

In this period the average annual growth rate stood at more than 50 percent.

China reiterated the nation’s goals for the next decade – increasing market share of pure-electric and plug-in electric autos, building world-competitive auto makers and parts manufacturers in the energy-efficient auto sector as well as raising fuel-efficiency to world levels.

In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.

Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.

In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.

Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.

Growing domestic demand beginning in the mid-1990s, however, has forced the nation to import increasing quantities of petroleum.

There are also deposits of vanadium, magnetite, copper, fluorite, nickel, asbestos, phosphate rock, pyrite, and sulfur.

China also has extensive hydroelectric energy potential, notably in Yunnan, W Sichuan, and E Tibet, although hydroelectric power accounts for only 5% of the country’s total energy production.

The east and northeast are well served by railroads and highways, and there are now major rail and road links with the interior.

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Flare from Party’s Red Star Signals a Brewing Storm in Beijing