China
Flare from Party’s Red Star Signals a Brewing Storm in Beijing
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Russell Leigh Moses While many international observers are looking to see if Beijing can help the heavy financial weather that is battering the euro zone , the makings of a political storm are building in China. Last week, while China watched European financial markets get pummeled, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, did some punching of his own at home. Bo–who has been seen as ripe for promotion to a higher post in Beijing but who had been below the waterline in recent months—launched a full-on attempt to answer critics who have been arguing that his tenure in Chongqing has focused on ideology at the expense of economics. In a presentation to a visiting group of editors of provincial newspapers attending a conference in Chongqing ( in Chinese ), Bo defended his governance of the municipality, saying that the media focus on revolutionary nostalgia (such as singing red songs ) was “a total misreading” of what he was up to in Chongqing. Bo blasted back at doubters and dissenters in the Party, asking if perhaps “some comrades have misunderstood, feeling that development of the economy and improve people’s livelihood might be a contradiction?” Bo insisted that his administration was focused on “people-oriented development,” and that the initiatives he had implemented had been “effective in improving people’s livelihood, not only by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses, but also by effectively promoting consumption and promoting development,” while “shrinking the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.” Chongqing, Bo insisted, was attempting to “achieve the ideal of socialism by carrying out a specific and concrete exploration,” not something abstract or whimsical. Why is Bo’s eruption significant? To start with, Bo Xilai’s defense of his tenure is another attack on the political status quo in Beijing. By talking about “common prosperity,” Bo was taking on the Party line of “building a moderately prosperous society.” Bo is going after both those cadres who argue that growth is the greater good in China and those (in Guangdong and elsewhere) who think that pursuing simple happiness for citizens can bridge the growing abyss separating the upper class from the underclass here. Neither alone is sufficient for social stability, Bo is insisting. He thinks that Chongqing demonstrates that both hard and soft development can be achieved more widely—perhaps if he is put in charge. But Bo Xilai is very much a single-handed sailor in the current political seas. His efforts in Chongqing have not been adopted elsewhere in the country with any force. The recent annual meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on protecting and expanding “socialist culture,” but Bo received no public credit for the campaigns he inaugurated in the same vein. And though Bo has captured a lavish amount of foreign media attention and enjoyed a good deal of adulation in the Chinese blogosphere, he has yet to receive universal approval from Beijing for his brand of reform. Still, Bo has his supporters, especially in cyberspace . His fans see him as less of a nostalgic revolutionary and more of a populist firebrand, eager to shake up a calcified and corrupt system. There are cadres and citizens in China who think that someone powerful making waves is precisely what the Party and the country need. Bo might well share that feeling and he might now be wondering if it’s time for him to make some sort of a play for a top spot, before his prospects for promotion to Beijing plunge any further. Whatever the motivation, Bo’s pushback does not come at a good time for the Chinese leadership. The recent Party plenum concluded in happy form, but without any clear consensus on major economic issues. Some Chinese provinces seem in need of revenue, but efforts to increase taxes have not inspired quiet compliance on the part of some citizenry. The recent shuffling of financial overseers might be bringing new but reliable officials into decision-making, but recent economic indicators continue to confound anyone who might be arguing that Beijing has clear sailing ahead. Bo’s outburst reminds us that the political winds in China have a way of switching suddenly. It’s good to see Beijing looking outwards to see if it can support a major trading partner. It might be even better for those who think the leadership transition is proceeding on a secure and steady heading to check their compasses again.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
- Russell Leigh Moses
While many international observers are looking to see if Beijing can help the heavy financial weather that is battering the euro zone, the makings of a political storm are building in China.
Last week, while China watched European financial markets get pummeled, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, did some punching of his own at home. Bo–who has been seen as ripe for promotion to a higher post in Beijing but who had been below the waterline in recent months—launched a full-on attempt to answer critics who have been arguing that his tenure in Chongqing has focused on ideology at the expense of economics.
In a presentation to a visiting group of editors of provincial newspapers attending a conference in Chongqing (in Chinese), Bo defended his governance of the municipality, saying that the media focus on revolutionary nostalgia (such as singing red songs) was “a total misreading” of what he was up to in Chongqing. Bo blasted back at doubters and dissenters in the Party, asking if perhaps “some comrades have misunderstood, feeling that development of the economy and improve people’s livelihood might be a contradiction?”
Bo insisted that his administration was focused on “people-oriented development,” and that the initiatives he had implemented had been “effective in improving people’s livelihood, not only by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses, but also by effectively promoting consumption and promoting development,” while “shrinking the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.” Chongqing, Bo insisted, was attempting to “achieve the ideal of socialism by carrying out a specific and concrete exploration,” not something abstract or whimsical.
Why is Bo’s eruption significant?
To start with, Bo Xilai’s defense of his tenure is another attack on the political status quo in Beijing. By talking about “common prosperity,” Bo was taking on the Party line of “building a moderately prosperous society.” Bo is going after both those cadres who argue that growth is the greater good in China and those (in Guangdong and elsewhere) who think that pursuing simple happiness for citizens can bridge the growing abyss separating the upper class from the underclass here. Neither alone is sufficient for social stability, Bo is insisting. He thinks that Chongqing demonstrates that both hard and soft development can be achieved more widely—perhaps if he is put in charge.
But Bo Xilai is very much a single-handed sailor in the current political seas. His efforts in Chongqing have not been adopted elsewhere in the country with any force. The recent annual meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on protecting and expanding “socialist culture,” but Bo received no public credit for the campaigns he inaugurated in the same vein. And though Bo has captured a lavish amount of foreign media attention and enjoyed a good deal of adulation in the Chinese blogosphere, he has yet to receive universal approval from Beijing for his brand of reform.
Still, Bo has his supporters, especially in cyberspace. His fans see him as less of a nostalgic revolutionary and more of a populist firebrand, eager to shake up a calcified and corrupt system. There are cadres and citizens in China who think that someone powerful making waves is precisely what the Party and the country need. Bo might well share that feeling and he might now be wondering if it’s time for him to make some sort of a play for a top spot, before his prospects for promotion to Beijing plunge any further.
Whatever the motivation, Bo’s pushback does not come at a good time for the Chinese leadership. The recent Party plenum concluded in happy form, but without any clear consensus on major economic issues. Some Chinese provinces seem in need of revenue, but efforts to increase taxes have not inspired quiet compliance on the part of some citizenry.
The recent shuffling of financial overseers might be bringing new but reliable officials into decision-making, but recent economic indicators continue to confound anyone who might be arguing that Beijing has clear sailing ahead.
Bo’s outburst reminds us that the political winds in China have a way of switching suddenly. It’s good to see Beijing looking outwards to see if it can support a major trading partner. It might be even better for those who think the leadership transition is proceeding on a secure and steady heading to check their compasses again.
Reforms started in the late 1970s with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.
Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.
The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.
Some economists believe that Chinese economic growth has been in fact understated during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, failing to fully factor in the growth driven by the private sector and that the extent at which China is dependent on exports is exaggerated.
Its mineral resources are probably among the richest in the world but are only partially developed.
A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.
China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.
The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.
In this period the average annual growth rate stood at more than 50 percent.
China reiterated the nation’s goals for the next decade – increasing market share of pure-electric and plug-in electric autos, building world-competitive auto makers and parts manufacturers in the energy-efficient auto sector as well as raising fuel-efficiency to world levels.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.
Growing domestic demand beginning in the mid-1990s, however, has forced the nation to import increasing quantities of petroleum.
There are also deposits of vanadium, magnetite, copper, fluorite, nickel, asbestos, phosphate rock, pyrite, and sulfur.
China also has extensive hydroelectric energy potential, notably in Yunnan, W Sichuan, and E Tibet, although hydroelectric power accounts for only 5% of the country’s total energy production.
The east and northeast are well served by railroads and highways, and there are now major rail and road links with the interior.
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Flare from Party’s Red Star Signals a Brewing Storm in Beijing
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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