China
Flare from Party’s Red Star Signals a Brewing Storm in Beijing
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system. Russell Leigh Moses While many international observers are looking to see if Beijing can help the heavy financial weather that is battering the euro zone , the makings of a political storm are building in China. Last week, while China watched European financial markets get pummeled, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, did some punching of his own at home. Bo–who has been seen as ripe for promotion to a higher post in Beijing but who had been below the waterline in recent months—launched a full-on attempt to answer critics who have been arguing that his tenure in Chongqing has focused on ideology at the expense of economics. In a presentation to a visiting group of editors of provincial newspapers attending a conference in Chongqing ( in Chinese ), Bo defended his governance of the municipality, saying that the media focus on revolutionary nostalgia (such as singing red songs ) was “a total misreading” of what he was up to in Chongqing. Bo blasted back at doubters and dissenters in the Party, asking if perhaps “some comrades have misunderstood, feeling that development of the economy and improve people’s livelihood might be a contradiction?” Bo insisted that his administration was focused on “people-oriented development,” and that the initiatives he had implemented had been “effective in improving people’s livelihood, not only by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses, but also by effectively promoting consumption and promoting development,” while “shrinking the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.” Chongqing, Bo insisted, was attempting to “achieve the ideal of socialism by carrying out a specific and concrete exploration,” not something abstract or whimsical. Why is Bo’s eruption significant? To start with, Bo Xilai’s defense of his tenure is another attack on the political status quo in Beijing. By talking about “common prosperity,” Bo was taking on the Party line of “building a moderately prosperous society.” Bo is going after both those cadres who argue that growth is the greater good in China and those (in Guangdong and elsewhere) who think that pursuing simple happiness for citizens can bridge the growing abyss separating the upper class from the underclass here. Neither alone is sufficient for social stability, Bo is insisting. He thinks that Chongqing demonstrates that both hard and soft development can be achieved more widely—perhaps if he is put in charge. But Bo Xilai is very much a single-handed sailor in the current political seas. His efforts in Chongqing have not been adopted elsewhere in the country with any force. The recent annual meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on protecting and expanding “socialist culture,” but Bo received no public credit for the campaigns he inaugurated in the same vein. And though Bo has captured a lavish amount of foreign media attention and enjoyed a good deal of adulation in the Chinese blogosphere, he has yet to receive universal approval from Beijing for his brand of reform. Still, Bo has his supporters, especially in cyberspace . His fans see him as less of a nostalgic revolutionary and more of a populist firebrand, eager to shake up a calcified and corrupt system. There are cadres and citizens in China who think that someone powerful making waves is precisely what the Party and the country need. Bo might well share that feeling and he might now be wondering if it’s time for him to make some sort of a play for a top spot, before his prospects for promotion to Beijing plunge any further. Whatever the motivation, Bo’s pushback does not come at a good time for the Chinese leadership. The recent Party plenum concluded in happy form, but without any clear consensus on major economic issues. Some Chinese provinces seem in need of revenue, but efforts to increase taxes have not inspired quiet compliance on the part of some citizenry. The recent shuffling of financial overseers might be bringing new but reliable officials into decision-making, but recent economic indicators continue to confound anyone who might be arguing that Beijing has clear sailing ahead. Bo’s outburst reminds us that the political winds in China have a way of switching suddenly. It’s good to see Beijing looking outwards to see if it can support a major trading partner. It might be even better for those who think the leadership transition is proceeding on a secure and steady heading to check their compasses again.
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
- Russell Leigh Moses
While many international observers are looking to see if Beijing can help the heavy financial weather that is battering the euro zone, the makings of a political storm are building in China.
Last week, while China watched European financial markets get pummeled, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, did some punching of his own at home. Bo–who has been seen as ripe for promotion to a higher post in Beijing but who had been below the waterline in recent months—launched a full-on attempt to answer critics who have been arguing that his tenure in Chongqing has focused on ideology at the expense of economics.
In a presentation to a visiting group of editors of provincial newspapers attending a conference in Chongqing (in Chinese), Bo defended his governance of the municipality, saying that the media focus on revolutionary nostalgia (such as singing red songs) was “a total misreading” of what he was up to in Chongqing. Bo blasted back at doubters and dissenters in the Party, asking if perhaps “some comrades have misunderstood, feeling that development of the economy and improve people’s livelihood might be a contradiction?”
Bo insisted that his administration was focused on “people-oriented development,” and that the initiatives he had implemented had been “effective in improving people’s livelihood, not only by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses, but also by effectively promoting consumption and promoting development,” while “shrinking the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.” Chongqing, Bo insisted, was attempting to “achieve the ideal of socialism by carrying out a specific and concrete exploration,” not something abstract or whimsical.
Why is Bo’s eruption significant?
To start with, Bo Xilai’s defense of his tenure is another attack on the political status quo in Beijing. By talking about “common prosperity,” Bo was taking on the Party line of “building a moderately prosperous society.” Bo is going after both those cadres who argue that growth is the greater good in China and those (in Guangdong and elsewhere) who think that pursuing simple happiness for citizens can bridge the growing abyss separating the upper class from the underclass here. Neither alone is sufficient for social stability, Bo is insisting. He thinks that Chongqing demonstrates that both hard and soft development can be achieved more widely—perhaps if he is put in charge.
But Bo Xilai is very much a single-handed sailor in the current political seas. His efforts in Chongqing have not been adopted elsewhere in the country with any force. The recent annual meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on protecting and expanding “socialist culture,” but Bo received no public credit for the campaigns he inaugurated in the same vein. And though Bo has captured a lavish amount of foreign media attention and enjoyed a good deal of adulation in the Chinese blogosphere, he has yet to receive universal approval from Beijing for his brand of reform.
Still, Bo has his supporters, especially in cyberspace. His fans see him as less of a nostalgic revolutionary and more of a populist firebrand, eager to shake up a calcified and corrupt system. There are cadres and citizens in China who think that someone powerful making waves is precisely what the Party and the country need. Bo might well share that feeling and he might now be wondering if it’s time for him to make some sort of a play for a top spot, before his prospects for promotion to Beijing plunge any further.
Whatever the motivation, Bo’s pushback does not come at a good time for the Chinese leadership. The recent Party plenum concluded in happy form, but without any clear consensus on major economic issues. Some Chinese provinces seem in need of revenue, but efforts to increase taxes have not inspired quiet compliance on the part of some citizenry.
The recent shuffling of financial overseers might be bringing new but reliable officials into decision-making, but recent economic indicators continue to confound anyone who might be arguing that Beijing has clear sailing ahead.
Bo’s outburst reminds us that the political winds in China have a way of switching suddenly. It’s good to see Beijing looking outwards to see if it can support a major trading partner. It might be even better for those who think the leadership transition is proceeding on a secure and steady heading to check their compasses again.
Reforms started in the late 1970s with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.
Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.
The country’s per capita income was at $6,567 (IMF, 98th) in 2009.
Some economists believe that Chinese economic growth has been in fact understated during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, failing to fully factor in the growth driven by the private sector and that the extent at which China is dependent on exports is exaggerated.
Its mineral resources are probably among the richest in the world but are only partially developed.
A report by UBS in 2009 concluded that China has experienced total factor productivity growth of 4 per cent per year since 1990, one of the fastest improvements in world economic history.
China’s increasing integration with the international economy and its growing efforts to use market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem.
The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.
In this period the average annual growth rate stood at more than 50 percent.
China reiterated the nation’s goals for the next decade – increasing market share of pure-electric and plug-in electric autos, building world-competitive auto makers and parts manufacturers in the energy-efficient auto sector as well as raising fuel-efficiency to world levels.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Sheep, cattle, and goats are the most common types of livestock.
Growing domestic demand beginning in the mid-1990s, however, has forced the nation to import increasing quantities of petroleum.
There are also deposits of vanadium, magnetite, copper, fluorite, nickel, asbestos, phosphate rock, pyrite, and sulfur.
China also has extensive hydroelectric energy potential, notably in Yunnan, W Sichuan, and E Tibet, although hydroelectric power accounts for only 5% of the country’s total energy production.
The east and northeast are well served by railroads and highways, and there are now major rail and road links with the interior.
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Flare from Party’s Red Star Signals a Brewing Storm in Beijing
China
Ping-pong diplomacy: Australian table tennis players return to China, five decades after historic tour
Two original members of Australia’s 1971 ping-pong diplomacy team return to Beijing, celebrating 50 years of bilateral relations initiated by their historic visit, fostering enduring cultural and diplomatic ties.
This week, two of the original members of Australia’s 1971 “ping-pong diplomacy” team are returning to Beijing to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations.
Half a century ago, few could foresee that a spur-of-the-moment, unscheduled visit by a young Australian sports team would lead to one of Australia’s most important – and sometimes turbulent – bilateral relations.
Only weeks after the team’s headline-making tour, Australia’s then opposition leader, Gough Whitlam, led a delegation to Beijing promising to open diplomatic relations “when elected”.
Whitlam delivered on that promise in 1972. Three weeks after taking office as Australia’s 21st prime minister, his government reached an agreement with the People’s Republic of China on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The following year, Australia’s first embassy in Beijing opened with the appointment of Stephen FitzGerald as the first ambassador.
As FitzGerald recounted on my podcast, The Ticket, this week:
The Chinese have a big love of sport, as do Australians. At one stage they used to talk about the three great balls. One was table tennis, one was basketball and one was volleyball.
Former coach Noel Shorter, former player Paul Pinkewich and former Australian ambassador to China Stephen FitzGerald.
Tracey Holmes
‘A crowd of 8,000 people’
The 1971 ping-pong tour wasn’t the first time sport was used as a diplomatic tool, but it was perhaps one of the most successful of the Cold War period, with long-term benefits.
After competing in the Table Tennis World Championships in Japan in late March 1971, Australian and American table tennis players were invited to travel to China by the country’s first premier, Zhou Enlai. A revolutionary who became one of China’s most revered statesmen, he advocated peaceful co-existence with the West and other nations.
The American team embarked on their tour first – setting the stage for then-President Richard Nixon’s famous visit to Beijing in 1972. The Australians made their trip to China a couple weeks later.
Read more:
50 years after Gough Whitlam established diplomatic relations with China, what has changed?
Paul Pinkewich had just turned 20 at the time of the visit, teammate Steve Knapp was only 18. Now in their 70s, they will return to Beijing for a function at the Australian embassy today and share a meal with some of the Chinese players they competed against.
Pinkewich is taking his table tennis paddle with him in case he can get in a few matches with his old rivals.
“We had three great matches in China. You know, we’re used to 20 to 50 people in Australia watching tournaments. Our first match in Canton, now Guangzhou, I think it was a crowd of 8,000 people,” he recalls.
“There’s this one table in the stadium and we went out there, we actually had a win. We won 5-4. It was fantastic.
“I think friendship was more important than competition.”
The Australians suffered a narrow defeat in the second match in Shanghai. The third and final match was played in the Chinese capital. At the May Day celebrations that followed, the team was invited to the Great Hall of the People to meet Zhou.
According to the Sun-Herald report from the journalist travelling with the team, the premier asked Knapp about his long hair and sideburns.
“Do you wear this hair because of your disagreement with society or because it is a style?”
Knapp replied, “It is the fashion.”
The Sun-Herald’s front-page story on the team’s visit.
Author provided
Pinkewich says he will never forget the sound of the crowds during the tour.
“Can you believe, one table in the middle of the Capital Stadium [in Beijing] with 18,000 spectators, and that was just an amazing experience. We got trounced 8-1 that night. But they always let the woman win.”
That woman was Anne Middleton, the other player on the 1971 tour, who has since passed away.
Leading the delegation were the then-president of Table Tennis Australia, John Jackson, who is now deceased, and coach Noel Shorter, who at 85 is not making this week’s commemorative trip.
Shorter remembers getting everything packed up from their coaching clinic in Tokyo with only four hours’ notice after being told there had been a change of plans and the team was heading later that day to China.
“At that time the [Australian] government was quite racial, as far as the Chinese were concerned, and they didn’t show any interest at all,” Shorter recalls.
“It’s funny. After the trip we were labelled as communists […] but we were interested in friendship first, competition second.”
Noel Shorter (left) shaking hands with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971.
Noel Shorter
Why sport diplomacy matters
Beijing has continued to use sport as a diplomatic tool, including becoming the first city in the world to host both a summer and winter Olympic Games (Beijing in 2008 and 2022).
French educator Baron Pierre de Coubertin founded the International Olympic Committee in 1894, believing Olympics were a global event. “All people must be allowed in, without debate,” he said.
That ethos is facing major challenges today as a new global rift emerges between the West and autocratic regimes like Russia, China and others. A new term has also emerged in recent years – almost always applied by researchers in democratic nations – to describe undemocratic nations’ forays into global sport: sportswashing.
Viewed through today’s lens, China’s invitation to the Australian team five decades ago would most likely be reported as an attempt by the Communist Party to use sport to wash its image.
But without that young Australian sports team breaking down barriers by travelling to China, who knows how different Australia’s current economic and cultural landscape would be?
China’s current ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, has described the relationship between the two nations as “half a century of storms and sunshine”.
The Chinese ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, speaks to media at the embassy in Canberra.
Lukas Coch/AAP
His comments are included in a book published by the Chinese embassy, titled Fifty People Fifty Stories. It details the experiences of dozens of Australians who have at one time lived and worked in Beijing.
“The relationship between China and Australia has become more mature, stable and resilient,” Xiao writes. “Amity between people holds the key to sound relations between countries.”
At the heart of such amity, sport continues to play a significant role.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
European Business in China: Key Insights from the EU Chamber’s 2024/2025 Position Paper
The EU Chamber’s Position Paper 2024/2025 highlights challenges faced by European businesses in China, including economic slowdown and regulatory compliance. It offers recommendations for policy reform, bilateral cooperation, and emphasizes the need for consistent regulations to enhance investment attractiveness amidst uncertainty.
In our overview of the EU Chamber’s European Business in China Position Paper 2024/2025, we delve into the key challenges European businesses face amid China’s slow economic recovery and regulatory uncertainties. The Position Paper highlights significant issues, including economic slowdown, overcapacity, and regulatory compliance difficulties, while providing targeted recommendations for policy reform and enhanced bilateral cooperation. The report emphasizes the need for consistent policy implementation and clear regulatory guidelines, while advocating for proactive EU engagement and strategic adjustments by European companies to navigate the evolving market landscape effectively.
On September 11, 2024, the European Chamber released its annual European Business in China Position Paper 2024/2025 (the “Position Paper”), addressing the growing challenges faced by European companies operating in China.
Drawing on insights from over 1,700 member companies and 35 working groups, the Position Paper offers comprehensive recommendations to improve the business environment. It outlines the increasing difficulties European companies are encountering and proposes key areas for policy reform.
While European companies remain invested in China’s success, the growing risks associated with operating in the country are making it increasingly difficult to justify further investments.
Below we explore the key challenges European companies face and the EU Chamber’s recommendations for making China a more attractive destination for European investors.
In 2024, European companies are contending with a sluggish economic recovery in China. According to the Position Paper, China’s growth has hit historically low levels. The weaker-than-expected post-COVID rebound has significantly dampened business confidence, with the automotive sector, for example, experiencing reduced demand and slower sales compared to pre-pandemic times. This economic slowdown has made long-term investments and strategic planning more challenging.
China’s recent economic policies, including substantial investments in manufacturing and green technologies, have led to notable overcapacity. The Position Paper points to the solar panel industry as a prime example, where the surge in production has created a surplus that outstrips domestic demand.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
Yutong, China’s Leading Electric Bus Manufacturer, Showcases New Technology Amidst Rising Exports
Yutong Bus launched a technology platform to enhance electric bus efficiency, increasing driving range by 10% and cutting costs by 20%, during Australia’s National Bus and Coach show.
Yutong Bus Introduces New Technology Platform
Yutong Bus, the largest electric-bus manufacturer globally, has launched a new technology platform aimed at enhancing driving ranges and reducing operational costs. This initiative comes as the company advances its position in a growing market driven by the decarbonization of public transport fleets worldwide.
Based in Zhengzhou, China, Yutong presented its platform during Australia’s National Bus and Coach show in Brisbane, highlighting four new electric buses. The platform combines software and hardware advancements to enhance the safety, reliability, and efficiency of its commercial electric vehicles.
In collaboration with battery partner CATL, Yutong plans to boost driving range by 10% while lowering operating costs by 20%. New batteries can fully charge in just 2.5 hours, while long-distance coaches can achieve a 50% charge during driver breaks in only 30 minutes.
Source : China’s world-leading electric-bus maker Yutong touts new tech as exports grow
- Ping-pong diplomacy: Australian table tennis players return to China, five decades after historic tour
- European Business in China: Key Insights from the EU Chamber’s 2024/2025 Position Paper
- Yutong, China’s Leading Electric Bus Manufacturer, Showcases New Technology Amidst Rising Exports
- Fosun in Negotiations to Sell Club Med Stake to CapitaLand of Singapore
- China Demonstrates Expertise in Influencing Global AI Governance
- View from The Hill: China-Australia relations head back to room temperature, with Albanese’s November visit
