China
China Adds a Spyglass in Space, Hints at More to Come
Matt Durnin is a Beijing-based researcher at the World Security Institute’s China Program and associate editor of the policy journal China Security. He specializes in China’s defense modernization and space programs. China launched two satellites Wednesday as part of a decade-long rapid expansion of earth-monitoring capabilities that also buttress the country’s growing military prowess. Yaogan-12, the primary cargo of the launch, is the twelfth model in a series of “remote sensing” satellites that many analysts believe are tasked with gathering military intelligence. China, which has never acknowledged a defense-related launch, claims that the satellite will be used for “scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment, and disaster monitoring.” Piggybacking on the ride was Tianxun-1, a 35-kg micro-satellite with a low-resolution camera. A 2010 paper in China Science and Technology Review described the satellite’s design as “low-observable,” suggesting it may be a test bed for basic stealth technology that could make small satellites even harder to track from the ground. Since China’s controversial shoot-down of one of its weather satellites in early 2007, the U.S. defense community has churned with speculation about Beijing’s military intentions in space. China has recently shown more concerted focus on military reconnaissance satellites, which are key components of its plans for a more integrated and aware People’s Liberation Army. This is a change from the 1990s when Chinese satellites were often dual-use, serving both military and civilian functions. According to Kevin Pollpeter, deputy director of Defense Group Inc.’s East Asia Program, China’s satellite projects have since split into distinctly different groups. “You see on one side China’s satellites becoming more solely devoted to national security purposes,” he says. “On the other hand, on the civilian side they have been increasingly open with other countries.” Earth-monitoring satellites will contribute to Chinese weather prediction, disaster relief and civil planning, but dedicated military variants will also amplify the effectiveness of PLA weapons. Roger Cliff, a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, says that such assets provide the PLA with crucial situational awareness. “Ten years ago, if they had wanted to use their ballistic missiles to attack an airfield, they would have essentially been firing blind,” he says. “That’s not true anymore.” Today China’s better reconnaissance satellites are thought to have ground resolutions under two meters, and perhaps as low as half a meter. Though these specifications pale in comparison to U.S. spy satellite capabilities, they are likely good enough for China’s defense needs. According to Pollpeter, focus on basic yet proven technologies is likely an effective and intentional Chinese strategy. “A lot of time with U.S. defense technology we go for the platinum-plated version, but you don’t actually have to do that all the time,” he says. “In our own weapon systems we usually demand solutions that work in 100 percent of circumstances, when often the 80 percent solution might suffice.” Though the price tags of Chinese reconnaissance satellites are not publicly known, they are thought to be a fraction of the cost of U.S. spy satellite programs, which frequently reach into the billions of dollars . The relative low cost of Chinese satellite programs is complimented by a rapid launch tempo. Last year China successfully launched 15 rockets, matching the U.S. total for the first time . This year China may soar past that number. Yuan Jiajun, deputy general director of China Aerospace and Technology Corp., told the state-run Xinhua news agency last week that China is scheduled to launch 25 satellites on 20 rockets in 2011. Since 13 rockets have carried 14 Chinese satellites into orbit so far this year, and one more has failed, Yuan’s comments imply that 10 more satellites could reach space by the end of December. Yet it is perhaps too easy to be starstruck by China’s achievements in space. Cliff warns that although China has passed some impressive milestones, its limitations must be kept in perspective. He points out that China’s satellite programs seem to have hit road bumps in several areas, including radar satellites that have failed in orbit or have been repeatedly delayed. “We shouldn’t make Chinese technological capabilities out to be ten feet tall,” he says. “The things that they are doing are not cutting edge in the first place and they’re not always going smoothly either.”
Matt Durnin is a Beijing-based researcher at the World Security Institute’s China Program and associate editor of the policy journal China Security. He specializes in China’s defense modernization and space programs.
China launched two satellites Wednesday as part of a decade-long rapid expansion of earth-monitoring capabilities that also buttress the country’s growing military prowess.
Yaogan-12, the primary cargo of the launch, is the twelfth model in a series of “remote sensing” satellites that many analysts believe are tasked with gathering military intelligence. China, which has never acknowledged a defense-related launch, claims that the satellite will be used for “scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment, and disaster monitoring.”
Piggybacking on the ride was Tianxun-1, a 35-kg micro-satellite with a low-resolution camera. A 2010 paper in China Science and Technology Review described the satellite’s design as “low-observable,” suggesting it may be a test bed for basic stealth technology that could make small satellites even harder to track from the ground.
Since China’s controversial shoot-down of one of its weather satellites in early 2007, the U.S. defense community has churned with speculation about Beijing’s military intentions in space.
China has recently shown more concerted focus on military reconnaissance satellites, which are key components of its plans for a more integrated and aware People’s Liberation Army. This is a change from the 1990s when Chinese satellites were often dual-use, serving both military and civilian functions.
According to Kevin Pollpeter, deputy director of Defense Group Inc.’s East Asia Program, China’s satellite projects have since split into distinctly different groups. “You see on one side China’s satellites becoming more solely devoted to national security purposes,” he says. “On the other hand, on the civilian side they have been increasingly open with other countries.”
Earth-monitoring satellites will contribute to Chinese weather prediction, disaster relief and civil planning, but dedicated military variants will also amplify the effectiveness of PLA weapons.
Roger Cliff, a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, says that such assets provide the PLA with crucial situational awareness.
“Ten years ago, if they had wanted to use their ballistic missiles to attack an airfield, they would have essentially been firing blind,” he says. “That’s not true anymore.”
Today China’s better reconnaissance satellites are thought to have ground resolutions under two meters, and perhaps as low as half a meter. Though these specifications pale in comparison to U.S. spy satellite capabilities, they are likely good enough for China’s defense needs.
According to Pollpeter, focus on basic yet proven technologies is likely an effective and intentional Chinese strategy. “A lot of time with U.S. defense technology we go for the platinum-plated version, but you don’t actually have to do that all the time,” he says. “In our own weapon systems we usually demand solutions that work in 100 percent of circumstances, when often the 80 percent solution might suffice.”
Though the price tags of Chinese reconnaissance satellites are not publicly known, they are thought to be a fraction of the cost of U.S. spy satellite programs, which frequently reach into the billions of dollars.
The relative low cost of Chinese satellite programs is complimented by a rapid launch tempo. Last year China successfully launched 15 rockets, matching the U.S. total for the first time. This year China may soar past that number.
Yuan Jiajun, deputy general director of China Aerospace and Technology Corp., told the state-run Xinhua news agency last week that China is scheduled to launch 25 satellites on 20 rockets in 2011. Since 13 rockets have carried 14 Chinese satellites into orbit so far this year, and one more has failed, Yuan’s comments imply that 10 more satellites could reach space by the end of December.
Yet it is perhaps too easy to be starstruck by China’s achievements in space. Cliff warns that although China has passed some impressive milestones, its limitations must be kept in perspective. He points out that China’s satellite programs seem to have hit road bumps in several areas, including radar satellites that have failed in orbit or have been repeatedly delayed.
“We shouldn’t make Chinese technological capabilities out to be ten feet tall,” he says. “The things that they are doing are not cutting edge in the first place and they’re not always going smoothly either.”
China’s economy during the past 30 years has changed from a centrally planned system that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that has a rapidly growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy.
Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.
China is also the second largest trading nation in the world and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods.
The PRC government’s decision to permit China to be used by multinational corporations as an export platform has made the country a major competitor to other Asian export-led economies, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.
Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.
Agricultural output has been vulnerable to the effects of weather, while industry has been more directly influenced by the government.
China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through trade and also has built a number of advanced engineering plants capable of manufacturing an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, including nuclear weapons and satellites, but most of its industrial output still comes from relatively ill-equipped factories.
Over the years, large subsidies were built into the price structure, and these subsidies grew substantially in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.
In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.
China reiterated the nation’s goals for the next decade – increasing market share of pure-electric and plug-in electric autos, building world-competitive auto makers and parts manufacturers in the energy-efficient auto sector as well as raising fuel-efficiency to world levels.
In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.
Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Horses, donkeys, and mules are work animals in the north, while oxen and water buffalo are used for plowing chiefly in the south.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
In addition, implementation of some reforms was stalled by fears of social dislocation and by political opposition, but by 2007 economic changes had become so great that the Communist party added legal protection for private property rights (while preserving state ownership of all land) and passed a labor law designed to improve the protection of workers’ rights (the law was passed amid a series of police raids that freed workers engaged in forced labor).
Brick, tile, cement, and food-processing plants are found in almost every province.
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China Adds a Spyglass in Space, Hints at More to Come
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
- Gordonstoun Severs Connections with Business Led by Individual Accused of Espionage for China
- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
- China Expands Nationwide Private Pension Scheme After Two-Year Pilot Program
