China
Satellite Hack Attempt Shows U.S. Blind Spot
Associated Press/U.S. Navy A U.S. Navy satellite launched in Kodiak, Alaska, in September. The commander of U.S. military space operations says he lacks sufficient data to determine who interfered with two U.S. government satellites through a ground station in Norway, as revealed in a report on China sent to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday. “The best information that I have is that we cannot attribute those two occurrences,” the Reuters news agency quoted General Robert Kehler, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, as saying in a teleconference. “I guess I would agree that we don’t have sufficient detail,” he said. Gen. Kehler was speaking on the same day that Australian authorities said they had not consulted the U.S. before allowing China to use a ground station in Western Australia that is run by a Swedish state-owned company and is also used by NASA. The bipartisan U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, which was created by Congress, said in its 2011 annual report that at least two U.S. environment-monitoring satellites were interfered with four or more times in 2007 and 2008. It didn’t say how, but earlier drafts of the report that were made public said the interfence was conducted through the Svalbard ground station in Spitsbergen, Norway. The ground station is owned and run by Kongsberg Satellite Services, which is owned 50/50 by a Norwegian state company and a private Norwegian defense company. Kongsberg Satellite Services has denied there was any such interference through its ground station. The 12-member commission said in the report released on Wednesday that the interference had not been traced directly to China, but that the techniques used “appear consistent with authoritative Chinese military writings” that have advocated disabling an enemy’s satellite control facilities on the ground in a conflict. “If executed successfully, such interference has the potential to pose numerous threats, particularly if achieved against satellites with more sensitive functions. For example, access to a satellite’s controls could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite. The attacker could also deny or degrade as well as forge or otherwise manipulate the satellite’s transmission,” it said. The report also said that China’s military continued to play a central role in civil space activities, and directly controlled the manned space program, noting that “ground-based infrastructure enables all space operations.” It recommended that Congress mandate that the Pentagon and other government space operators to assess and report on their “preparedness for potential Chinese counterspace activities.” “To the extent that commercial entities provide essential services, assessments should also cover their systems,” it said. China has maintained that its space ambitions are peaceful and that it is often a victim itself of such intrusions. China’s embassy in Washington said in response that it was “obvious that the commission is entrusted with the mission of vilifying China’s image and spreading China threat theory by patching up unwarranted allegations against China,” according to Reuters. “We urge the commission to stop issuing such reports for the good of increasing mutual trust between our two countries while China will continue to play a responsible role in both the realistic and the virtual worlds,” the agency quoted Wang Baodong, the embassy spokesman, as saying in an email. – Jeremy Page
- Associated Press/U.S. Navy
- A U.S. Navy satellite launched in Kodiak, Alaska, in September.
The commander of U.S. military space operations says he lacks sufficient data to determine who interfered with two U.S. government satellites through a ground station in Norway, as revealed in a report on China sent to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday.
“The best information that I have is that we cannot attribute those two occurrences,” the Reuters news agency quoted General Robert Kehler, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, as saying in a teleconference.
“I guess I would agree that we don’t have sufficient detail,” he said.
Gen. Kehler was speaking on the same day that Australian authorities said they had not consulted the U.S. before allowing China to use a ground station in Western Australia that is run by a Swedish state-owned company and is also used by NASA.
The bipartisan U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, which was created by Congress, said in its 2011 annual report that at least two U.S. environment-monitoring satellites were interfered with four or more times in 2007 and 2008.
It didn’t say how, but earlier drafts of the report that were made public said the interfence was conducted through the Svalbard ground station in Spitsbergen, Norway. The ground station is owned and run by Kongsberg Satellite Services, which is owned 50/50 by a Norwegian state company and a private Norwegian defense company. Kongsberg Satellite Services has denied there was any such interference through its ground station.
The 12-member commission said in the report released on Wednesday that the interference had not been traced directly to China, but that the techniques used “appear consistent with authoritative Chinese military writings” that have advocated disabling an enemy’s satellite control facilities on the ground in a conflict.
“If executed successfully, such interference has the potential to pose numerous threats, particularly if achieved against satellites with more sensitive functions. For example, access to a satellite’s controls could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite. The attacker could also deny or degrade as well as forge or otherwise manipulate the satellite’s transmission,” it said.
The report also said that China’s military continued to play a central role in civil space activities, and directly controlled the manned space program, noting that “ground-based infrastructure enables all space operations.”
It recommended that Congress mandate that the Pentagon and other government space operators to assess and report on their “preparedness for potential Chinese counterspace activities.”
“To the extent that commercial entities provide essential services, assessments should also cover their systems,” it said.
China has maintained that its space ambitions are peaceful and that it is often a victim itself of such intrusions.
China’s embassy in Washington said in response that it was “obvious that the commission is entrusted with the mission of vilifying China’s image and spreading China threat theory by patching up unwarranted allegations against China,” according to Reuters.
“We urge the commission to stop issuing such reports for the good of increasing mutual trust between our two countries while China will continue to play a responsible role in both the realistic and the virtual worlds,” the agency quoted Wang Baodong, the embassy spokesman, as saying in an email.
– Jeremy Page
After keeping its currency tightly linked to the US dollar for years, China in July 2005 revalued its currency by 2 % against the US dollar and moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies.
In 2009, the global economic downturn reduced foreign demand for Chinese exports for the first time in many years.
China has emphasized raising personal income and consumption and introducing new management systems to help increase productivity.
Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.
The disparities between the two sectors have combined to form an economic-cultural-social gap between the rural and urban areas, which is a major division in Chinese society.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
On top of this, foreign direct investment (FDI) this year was set to “surpass $100 billion”, compared to $90 billion last year, ministry officials predicted.
” Although the figure is already “quite amazing,” the volume is “not large enough” considering China’s economic growth and local companies’ expanding demand for international opportunities, Shen said.
It also aims to sell more than 15 million of the most fuel-efficient vehicles in the world each year by then.
Although China is still a developing country with a relatively low per capita income, it has experienced tremendous economic growth since the late 1970s.
Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.
China is the world’s largest producer of rice and wheat and a major producer of sweet potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.
Horses, donkeys, and mules are work animals in the north, while oxen and water buffalo are used for plowing chiefly in the south.
Offshore exploration has become important to meeting domestic needs; massive deposits off the coasts are believed to exceed all the world’s known oil reserves.
There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.
Hydroelectric projects exist in provinces served by major rivers where near-surface coal is not abundant.
As part of its continuing effort to become competitive in the global marketplace, China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001; its major trade partners are the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Germany.
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Satellite Hack Attempt Shows U.S. Blind Spot
China
China Implements New Measures to Increase Foreign Investment in A-Share Market
China’s 2024 updates to strategic investment rules simplify A-share market access for foreign investors by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and increasing investment options, reflecting a commitment to greater market openness and participation in economic reform.
The 2024 updates to China’s strategic investment rules simplify entry for foreign investors in the A-share market by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and expanding investment options, signaling a commitment to increased market openness and flexibility through these new measures.
China’s capital markets are undergoing a significant transformation as part of the nation’s ongoing commitment to economic reform and openness. The recent update to the Administrative Measures for Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (hereinafter, the “new measures”) reflects this commitment, targeting an increase in foreign investor participation in China’s A-share market. For nearly two decades, China’s “strategic investment” pathway provided foreign investors with access to shares in A-share listed companies, but strict requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and prolonged lock-up periods—made it accessible only to select large investors.
The new measures, effective December 2, 2024, relax many of these restrictions to attract a broader and more diverse range of foreign investors. Key changes include lowering the minimum shareholding threshold from 10 percent to 5 percent, reducing the asset requirements from US$100 million to US$50 million in assets, and shortening the lock-up period from three years to one. Additionally, foreign investors can now use equity from unlisted overseas companies as consideration, while new investment routes, like tender offers, enhance flexibility.
In 2005, China introduced the Strategic Investment Regime as part of its broader efforts to open up its financial markets to foreign capital while retaining a level of control over sensitive industries. This framework allowed qualified foreign investors to acquire strategic stakes in Chinese A-share listed companies, aiming to promote foreign participation in the domestic market.
However, the stringent requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and extended lock-up periods—restricted this pathway to a limited pool of large, multinational investors. The regime reflected China’s cautious approach at the time, seeking to balance openness with economic stability and control over critical sectors.
A decade later, in 2015, China implemented its first significant revisions to the Strategic Investment Regime. These amendments sought to make the investment process more accessible by easing certain restrictions, aiming to encourage foreign capital inflow as China continued its gradual integration into global markets.
While some requirements were relaxed, the fundamental limitations—such as high entry thresholds and complex approval processes—remained in place, meaning that access to China’s A-share market was still primarily confined to major institutional investors with substantial capital.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
Rising concerns over China’s industrial overcapacity have led countries to impose higher tariffs, including Indonesia’s planned 200% tariffs on Chinese goods, risking Indonesia’s competitiveness and economic security.
Tariffs Escalate Amid Concerns of Overcapacity
Concerns regarding China’s industrial overcapacity have prompted countries to increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Indonesia, following the U.S. example, plans to impose tariffs as high as 200 percent on various Chinese imports, including textiles and ceramics. This response aims to safeguard local jobs from the influx of inexpensive Chinese products.
Economic Impact of Tariffs
These tariffs are designed as safeguards and anti-dumping measures against potential job losses in Indonesia. However, the ongoing investigations have not definitively shown that China’s practices are the root cause of these issues. The political appeal of broad tariffs might lead to unintended consequences, such as reducing the overall competitiveness of Indonesian exports and risking retaliatory measures from affected countries.
Dependency on Chinese Goods
Indonesia heavily relies on Chinese manufacturing inputs, which constituted over 26 percent of its intermediary goods imports in 2021. With competitive pricing, these inputs have enhanced Indonesia’s export capabilities, particularly to markets like the U.S., where the trade surplus increased from $8.58 billion in 2019 to $11.96 billion in 2023. Reducing trade openness may ultimately undermine the Indonesian economy’s resilience against geopolitical challenges.
China
What does China want from the next US president?
Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te asserts sovereignty amid Chinese military threats following his National Day speech. Beijing desires reunification, while U.S. relations with Taiwan remain complex and pivotal.
During a Taiwan National Day speech on October 10, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te said that Taipei was determined to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty against “annexation and encroachment”, and emphasised that “China has no right to represent Taiwan”.
China’s response was swift. Less than a week after Lai’s provocative speech, a record 153 Chinese war planes swarmed and surrounded Taiwan during a Chinese military exercise over 24 hours. Beijing’s intention was simple: issue Taipei a “stern warning” for what China considers a “separatist act”.
Beijing sees the island as a “sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory” that must return to the fold. The Taiwanese president sees things differently. Currently, the self-governing island has a different political system, and few Taiwanese are in favour of reunification with China.
Though Washington doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Taipei officially, it does have regular communication through back channels and a strong economic relationship. The island is a key US trading partner and is a major supplier of semiconductors which are critical to the production of computers and other technologies. It also sells arms to Taiwan, although this has reduced significantly under Joe Biden.
China has not ruled out taking Taiwan by force, and if it does, the US might come to the self-ruling island’s defence as indicated by Washington in the past.
China holds extensive military exercises around the island of Taiwan in October 2024.
But Xi will be hoping the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election might bring a leader that would have a different attitude to Taiwan as well as helping China resolve its economic storm, which has resulted in a rising number of protests. So, between an outspoken Donald Trump and a seemingly even-tempered Kamala Harris, does Beijing have a favourite? And do either of them offer Xi anything new?
Taiwan and Xi’s legitimacy
Aside from Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, Xi is the only sitting Chinese head of state without term limits and whose political ideology is enshrined in the Chinese constitution.
Xi could potentially prove his place in history by resolving China’s economic crisis. However, Beijing’s increasing isolation from the west due to its support of Russia’s Ukraine conquest makes this doubly hard.
Like it or not, Xi might have to ramp up whatever agenda Beijing has for Taiwan. If he could make sufficient progress towards unification, he may be hailed as one of the greats of the Chinese Communist Party, which would consolidate his status within the party, and distract from the nation’s economic woes.
Unlike Harris, who appears to take take alliances and partnerships seriously, Trump questions the benefits of many alliances forged by the US. In fact, the few times that he spoke about Taiwan centres on how the island state has taken America’s semiconductor business, and should pay more to the US for its defence.
So, would Trump come to Taiwan’s aid if China does invade Taiwan? Given the importance of semiconductors to electronics and AI, he just might. But Trump also has a reputation as a “dealmaker-in-chief”, so he might just cut a deal with Beijing, which erodes Taiwan’s independence. And that is likely to worry Taipei.
The Russia dilemma
As Russia’s “partner of no limits”, China has been supplying Russia with technology that fuels Russia’s war machinery against Ukraine. But this has strained Sino-western relations and earned Beijing trade and import restrictions, which hampers China’s economic recovery.
China could halt its aid to Russia to avoid western scrutiny, but that is not likely. Beijing needs a strong Russia to be a viable ally in its battle against a US-led world order, and to avoid being the focus of the west if Russia falters amid its conquest in Ukraine.
While Harris backs Kyiv and sees the war as a strategic and moral issue, Trump has criticised US aid to Ukraine. He also believes that Kyiv should provide concessions to Russia to end the war that Putin started in February 2022.
A future Trump administration might strengthen Russia by withdrawing support for Ukraine and lifting sanctions against Russia. And a more robust Russia is good news for Beijing.
US economic hostility
So, at first glance, Trump and Harris’s approaches towards China are different. Trump’s return to the White House could also intensify the trade war that he started in 2018, as tariffs on Chinese goods could go to as high as 60%. This might hasten the economic decoupling between the US and China.
Harris, on the other hand, wishes to “de-risk” China. This approach seeks to maintain US global interest while engaging with the east Asian economic behemoth. In such a scenario, Beijing might prefer a Harris presidency as it leaves room for negotiation.
However, Harris has relatively little foreign policy experience, and is expected to pick up where Joe Biden left off. This means the tariffs and technological restrictions that China faced under a Biden administration could stay under her presidency.
Another factor is Tesla founder Elon Musk, who is an ardent supporter of Trump, and may take a top job within a Trump administration.
How much influence the tech multi-billionaire actually has over Trump is uncertain. However, it’s worth noting that Musk has substantial business dealings in China, and might seek to lean on Trump if the former president’s policies harms Tesla’s interests.
With many of these factors unclear at the moment, Beijing will be hoping for a US leader who is more interested in economic wins than protecting Taiwan, and one that Xi can negotiate with to warm up relations between the two countries.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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