China
Laws on Paper vs. Law in Practice
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, is a Distinguished Lecturer in Residence at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999). China has enacted 240 laws, 706 administrative regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations since August 2011, according to the latest official government review of China’s legal system. But what do these add up to in practice? A white paper issued by the State Council on last month pays too much attention to laws on paper, while slighting meaningful discussion of how the legal system actually works—or doesn’t. Tracing legislation since the People’s Republic was established, especially since 1978, the State Council’s lengthy review does reflect the extraordinary progress of post-Mao China. It cites successive Constitutions and important laws among the legislative flood that within the short span of 30 years has produced the framework for the “socialist market economy” and all the branches of the modern Chinese state. The document celebrates the creation of a ”socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics,” which is hailed as having established the “legal foundation for economic, political, cultural and social development.” Knowledgeable observers will have difficulty recognizing some aspects of the system that is described. For example, the white paper claims that China has developed “a comparatively complete legal system to protect human rights” – a statement contradicted by the country’s continuing repression of dissent and heightened censorship of the media, and by an ongoing assault on lawyers who lawfully assert their clients’ rights. Rather than dissecting obviously questionable claims, however, a hard look at what the document omits yields useful insight into China’s legal system. One message that is conspicuously muted is the need to resist interference with the independence of decision-making by the courts and procuracy. The white paper states that the courts and procuracy exercise their power “independently,” which is flatly not the case. An editorial published in the state-run China Daily after the white paper was issued shares the celebratory tone of the document, but adds a note of caution: ….just as the white paper has observed, having laws alone does not mean rule of law. More needs to be done in order to add teeth to our laws. The judiciary must be divested from departmental and local interests. And those in positions of power, no matter institutions or individuals, must set the right example. None other than Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier, has called for an independent judiciary in stronger language than is used in the latest document. In an interview at the World Economic Forum in Geneva in September of this year, Premier Wen said: “We need to uphold judicial justice. Procuratorial and judicial authorities should keep their due independence and be free from interference by any administrative organ, social group or individual.” In a speech at the same conference, Wen elaborated further on the point. “The most important mission of a ruling party is to abide by and act in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws,” he said. “The Party should not replace the government in governance, and problems of absolute power and overconcentration of power should be redressed.” This last statement was interpreted by one knowledgeable foreign observer, Elizabeth Economy, as meaning that “the Party does not act according to the Constitution; and the Party abuses its power.” The white paper also underemphasizes the endemic instances of poor law enforcement or nonenforcement of the very laws whose existence it celebrates, though it does acknowledge the issue: The vitality of laws lies in their enforcement. …Now, the problem of ensuring that laws are observed and strictly enforced and that lawbreakers are prosecuted has become more pronounced and pressing. Therefore, China will take active and effective steps to guarantee the effective enforcement of the Constitution and laws, and accelerate the advance of the rule of law and the building of a socialist country under the rule of law. One example of this problem appeared in a report on food safety in the China Daily the day before the white paper was published. The State Council cited the Food Safety Law as an example of laws enacted “to protect the people’s health and safety,” but the China Daily article, consistent with other reports of poor product safety that appear almost daily in the Chinese media, told of farmers adding a harmful chemical to food given to sheep. The report went on to quote a researcher at the China Animal Agricultural Association as saying that local officials “always try to conceal their malpractice when such food safety issues are exposed because it is their dereliction that partly caused such problems.” Conspicuously absent from the white paper is any discussion of conflicts between laws and the policies that force local governments to chose between them. For example, on the day the white paper was published, the China Daily carried a story about pressures on to “drive up” local GDP. It said that local governments may “gobble up land for economic development” resulting in “illegal land use” that “may become rampant.” Examples included “illegally permitting projects like golf courses, railways and industrial parks to attract investment.” (In 2004, the State Council issued a notice to suspend construction of new golf courses, but since then more than 400 golf courses have been constructed across the country.) The white paper is not completely devoid of comments on the relation between law and society, acknowledging in a passage near the bottom that law must evolve: Social practice is the foundation of laws, and laws encapsulate practical experience. Social practice is endless, and legislative work should also constantly move forward with the times. Building socialism with Chinese characteristics is a long-term historic task. Improving the socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics is also a long-term and arduous historic task, and it must advance in tandem with the practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics. By preceding the change of leadership next year, this document could mark a pause in legislative activity. Since the next leaders have not yet been officially chosen, their agenda is unknown. Given the problems unmentioned in the white paper that have been noted here, more attention should be placed on how laws are implemented as on what they say. What is necessary – someday– is a shift from using law as a political tool to promoting it as a force in Chinese society more distinct from Party policy. That, however, depends on the leadership’s willingness to endow laws with greater significance than they have today. The task is challenging, but vital for China’s governance.
Stanley Lubman, a long-time specialist on Chinese law, is a Distinguished Lecturer in Residence at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao,” (Stanford University Press, 1999). China has enacted 240 laws, 706 administrative regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations since August 2011, according to the latest official government review of China’s legal system. But what do these add up to in practice? A white paper issued by the State Council on last month pays too much attention to laws on paper, while slighting meaningful discussion of how the legal system actually works—or doesn’t. Tracing legislation since the People’s Republic was established, especially since 1978, the State Council’s lengthy review does reflect the extraordinary progress of post-Mao China. It cites successive Constitutions and important laws among the legislative flood that within the short span of 30 years has produced the framework for the “socialist market economy” and all the branches of the modern Chinese state. The document celebrates the creation of a ”socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics,” which is hailed as having established the “legal foundation for economic, political, cultural and social development.” Knowledgeable observers will have difficulty recognizing some aspects of the system that is described. For example, the white paper claims that China has developed “a comparatively complete legal system to protect human rights” – a statement contradicted by the country’s continuing repression of dissent and heightened censorship of the media, and by an ongoing assault on lawyers who lawfully assert their clients’ rights. Rather than dissecting obviously questionable claims, however, a hard look at what the document omits yields useful insight into China’s legal system. One message that is conspicuously muted is the need to resist interference with the independence of decision-making by the courts and procuracy. The white paper states that the courts and procuracy exercise their power “independently,” which is flatly not the case. An editorial published in the state-run China Daily after the white paper was issued shares the celebratory tone of the document, but adds a note of caution: ….just as the white paper has observed, having laws alone does not mean rule of law. More needs to be done in order to add teeth to our laws. The judiciary must be divested from departmental and local interests. And those in positions of power, no matter institutions or individuals, must set the right example. None other than Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier, has called for an independent judiciary in stronger language than is used in the latest document. In an interview at the World Economic Forum in Geneva in September of this year, Premier Wen said: “We need to uphold judicial justice. Procuratorial and judicial authorities should keep their due independence and be free from interference by any administrative organ, social group or individual.” In a speech at the same conference, Wen elaborated further on the point. “The most important mission of a ruling party is to abide by and act in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws,” he said. “The Party should not replace the government in governance, and problems of absolute power and overconcentration of power should be redressed.” This last statement was interpreted by one knowledgeable foreign observer, Elizabeth Economy, as meaning that “the Party does not act according to the Constitution; and the Party abuses its power.” The white paper also underemphasizes the endemic instances of poor law enforcement or nonenforcement of the very laws whose existence it celebrates, though it does acknowledge the issue: The vitality of laws lies in their enforcement. …Now, the problem of ensuring that laws are observed and strictly enforced and that lawbreakers are prosecuted has become more pronounced and pressing. Therefore, China will take active and effective steps to guarantee the effective enforcement of the Constitution and laws, and accelerate the advance of the rule of law and the building of a socialist country under the rule of law. One example of this problem appeared in a report on food safety in the China Daily the day before the white paper was published. The State Council cited the Food Safety Law as an example of laws enacted “to protect the people’s health and safety,” but the China Daily article, consistent with other reports of poor product safety that appear almost daily in the Chinese media, told of farmers adding a harmful chemical to food given to sheep. The report went on to quote a researcher at the China Animal Agricultural Association as saying that local officials “always try to conceal their malpractice when such food safety issues are exposed because it is their dereliction that partly caused such problems.” Conspicuously absent from the white paper is any discussion of conflicts between laws and the policies that force local governments to chose between them. For example, on the day the white paper was published, the China Daily carried a story about pressures on to “drive up” local GDP. It said that local governments may “gobble up land for economic development” resulting in “illegal land use” that “may become rampant.” Examples included “illegally permitting projects like golf courses, railways and industrial parks to attract investment.” (In 2004, the State Council issued a notice to suspend construction of new golf courses, but since then more than 400 golf courses have been constructed across the country.) The white paper is not completely devoid of comments on the relation between law and society, acknowledging in a passage near the bottom that law must evolve: Social practice is the foundation of laws, and laws encapsulate practical experience. Social practice is endless, and legislative work should also constantly move forward with the times. Building socialism with Chinese characteristics is a long-term historic task. Improving the socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics is also a long-term and arduous historic task, and it must advance in tandem with the practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics. By preceding the change of leadership next year, this document could mark a pause in legislative activity. Since the next leaders have not yet been officially chosen, their agenda is unknown. Given the problems unmentioned in the white paper that have been noted here, more attention should be placed on how laws are implemented as on what they say. What is necessary – someday– is a shift from using law as a political tool to promoting it as a force in Chinese society more distinct from Party policy. That, however, depends on the leadership’s willingness to endow laws with greater significance than they have today. The task is challenging, but vital for China’s governance.
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Laws on Paper vs. Law in Practice
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
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