China
What Next for Taiwan’s Opposition?
Agence France-Presse/Getty Images Tsai Ing-wen, the presidential candidate of Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party, waves to supporters at her campaign headquarters in New Taipei City on January 14, 2012 after losing her bid to challenge incumbent Ma Ying-jeou. More In Taiwan Top China Stories from WSJ: Growth Slows, Taiwan Letdown Taiwan Looks Ahead After President Is Re-Elected Top China Stories from WSJ: Taiwan Votes, Apple’s China Challenge Netizens React: The Taiwan Vote Photos: Taiwan Votes for President Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ing-wen made history by being the island’s first female presidential candidate, but her wider-than-expected defeat last Saturday to incumbent Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang has raised questions about the future of her moderate approach. Ms. Tsai finished with 45.6% of the vote to Mr. Ma’s 51.6%, a loss that prompted her to say she would resign as DPP leader. A professor before she became a politician, Ms. Tsai is often credited with lifting the pro-independence DPP out of the mire after former president Chen Shui-bian’s rocky and scandal-ridden tenure at the helm. “She brings gentleness and sensibility to the party,” Joseph Wu, a former Taiwan envoy to the U.S. and a top advisor to the DPP, said shortly after the election. “She is also very capable in facilitating talks between the factions in the party and consolidating opinions.” That conciliatory leadership style and approachable personality were what drove her surging popularity both within and outside the party, he added. But Ms. Tsai also won support by dialing back the DPP’s pro-independence rhetoric, analysts said. An example of that more moderate China policy was her appeal for further dialogues with Beijing and her promise to accept all 16 cross-strait trade agreements signed under Mr. Ma’s leadership. Although she adamantly rejected the 1992 Consensus—a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party that Taiwan and China are one country but each is free to define the term as they see fit—her proposal of a new “ Taiwan Consensus ” did not completely shut out the option of an eventual unification, a sharp detour from the policy pursued by Mr. Chen. Despite that softening, Ms. Tsai’s candidacy still did not appear sit well with leaders in Beijing, who warned that any deviation from the 1992 Consensus would compromise the growing harmony on the Taiwan Strait. During the campaign, the “Taiwan Consensus” became one favorite points of attack for Mr. Ma and the KMT, who pointed to it as evidence that Ms. Tsai was naïve to the realities of cross-strait relations. Yet some analysts said they expected Beijing might still be open to dialogue with a Tsai administration — a notion considered far-fetched during the previous DPP regime. What effect Ms. Tsai’s loss will have on the party’s platform remains to be seen. The fact that she lost by six percentage points – late polls had her losing by between 3% and 5% — is already being interpreted by some as an indictment of her decision to emphasize social equality and her deviation from the party’s anti-China orthodoxy. “Obviously, a campaign focused on social justice was not enough to excite the traditional DPP supporters,” said Wu, adding in the future, the party should incorporate more of the possible threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty under the KMT such as China’s continual interference in Taiwan’s quest for more international participation. Shelley Rigger, a professor of political science at Davidson College expressed similar views, saying that while Ms. Tsai should be lauded for restoring burnishing the DPP’s image, she might have overlooked a key constituency – the “green” pro-independence die-hards—who might constrain the DPP from moving to the center. “[Tsai] did as well as anyone could have done at pacifying the deep greens, by refusing to accept the ’92 consensus, and at the same time minimizing the role of those ideological issues in the elections, by trying not to talk about that anymore than she had to. The result was still hitting that 45% ceiling,” she said. Ms. Tsai’s tenure as party leader will officially terminate on March 1, the DPP said, and it’s unclear what she plans to do next. She has said she plans to maintain an office and rumors suggest she may take the reins at a think tank she helped set up. Analysts say Beijing is concerned less about Ms. Tsia’s future and more about who her successor might be and whether that person will continue the moderate stance she has championed. “Beijing takes a great interest in the DPP’s leadership because there is always a chance that the DPP might return to power. But I think no matter who becomes the next DPP chairman, the party will retain the more moderate stance,” said Shih Cheng-feng, a dean at National Dong Hwa University. Party heavyweights Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang are widely speculated to be vying for the seat, though some political commentators on the island say the party should allow up-and-coming stars, such as some of the current DPP county magistrates, to have a shot. Whether or not Ms. Tsai tries her luck again in 2016, her contribution to the DPP seems likely to be remembered as revolutionary, in a moderate way. – Jenny W. Hsu
- Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
- Tsai Ing-wen, the presidential candidate of Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party, waves to supporters at her campaign headquarters in New Taipei City on January 14, 2012 after losing her bid to challenge incumbent Ma Ying-jeou.
Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ing-wen made history by being the island’s first female presidential candidate, but her wider-than-expected defeat last Saturday to incumbent Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang has raised questions about the future of her moderate approach.
Ms. Tsai finished with 45.6% of the vote to Mr. Ma’s 51.6%, a loss that prompted her to say she would resign as DPP leader.
A professor before she became a politician, Ms. Tsai is often credited with lifting the pro-independence DPP out of the mire after former president Chen Shui-bian’s rocky and scandal-ridden tenure at the helm.
“She brings gentleness and sensibility to the party,” Joseph Wu, a former Taiwan envoy to the U.S. and a top advisor to the DPP, said shortly after the election. “She is also very capable in facilitating talks between the factions in the party and consolidating opinions.”
That conciliatory leadership style and approachable personality were what drove her surging popularity both within and outside the party, he added.
But Ms. Tsai also won support by dialing back the DPP’s pro-independence rhetoric, analysts said. An example of that more moderate China policy was her appeal for further dialogues with Beijing and her promise to accept all 16 cross-strait trade agreements signed under Mr. Ma’s leadership.
Although she adamantly rejected the 1992 Consensus—a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party that Taiwan and China are one country but each is free to define the term as they see fit—her proposal of a new “Taiwan Consensus” did not completely shut out the option of an eventual unification, a sharp detour from the policy pursued by Mr. Chen.
Despite that softening, Ms. Tsai’s candidacy still did not appear sit well with leaders in Beijing, who warned that any deviation from the 1992 Consensus would compromise the growing harmony on the Taiwan Strait. During the campaign, the “Taiwan Consensus” became one favorite points of attack for Mr. Ma and the KMT, who pointed to it as evidence that Ms. Tsai was naïve to the realities of cross-strait relations.
Yet some analysts said they expected Beijing might still be open to dialogue with a Tsai administration — a notion considered far-fetched during the previous DPP regime.
What effect Ms. Tsai’s loss will have on the party’s platform remains to be seen. The fact that she lost by six percentage points – late polls had her losing by between 3% and 5% — is already being interpreted by some as an indictment of her decision to emphasize social equality and her deviation from the party’s anti-China orthodoxy.
“Obviously, a campaign focused on social justice was not enough to excite the traditional DPP supporters,” said Wu, adding in the future, the party should incorporate more of the possible threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty under the KMT such as China’s continual interference in Taiwan’s quest for more international participation.
Shelley Rigger, a professor of political science at Davidson College expressed similar views, saying that while Ms. Tsai should be lauded for restoring burnishing the DPP’s image, she might have overlooked a key constituency – the “green” pro-independence die-hards—who might constrain the DPP from moving to the center.
“[Tsai] did as well as anyone could have done at pacifying the deep greens, by refusing to accept the ’92 consensus, and at the same time minimizing the role of those ideological issues in the elections, by trying not to talk about that anymore than she had to. The result was still hitting that 45% ceiling,” she said.
Ms. Tsai’s tenure as party leader will officially terminate on March 1, the DPP said, and it’s unclear what she plans to do next. She has said she plans to maintain an office and rumors suggest she may take the reins at a think tank she helped set up.
Analysts say Beijing is concerned less about Ms. Tsia’s future and more about who her successor might be and whether that person will continue the moderate stance she has championed.
“Beijing takes a great interest in the DPP’s leadership because there is always a chance that the DPP might return to power. But I think no matter who becomes the next DPP chairman, the party will retain the more moderate stance,” said Shih Cheng-feng, a dean at National Dong Hwa University.
Party heavyweights Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang are widely speculated to be vying for the seat, though some political commentators on the island say the party should allow up-and-coming stars, such as some of the current DPP county magistrates, to have a shot.
Whether or not Ms. Tsai tries her luck again in 2016, her contribution to the DPP seems likely to be remembered as revolutionary, in a moderate way.
– Jenny W. Hsu
Cumulative appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar since the end of the dollar peg was more than 20% by late 2008, but the exchange rate has remained virtually pegged since the onset of the global financial crisis.
The Chinese government faces numerous economic development challenges, including:
(a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic demand through increased corporate transfers and a strengthened social safety net;
(b) sustaining adequate job growth for tens of millions of migrants and new entrants to the work force; (c) reducing corruption and other economic crimes; and
(d) containing environmental damage and social strife related to the economy’s rapid transformation.
China is also the second largest trading nation in the world and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods.
The PRC government’s decision to permit China to be used by multinational corporations as an export platform has made the country a major competitor to other Asian export-led economies, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.
Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.
The country is one of the world’s largest producers of a number of industrial and mineral products, including cotton cloth, tungsten, and antimony, and is an important producer of cotton yarn, coal, crude oil, and a number of other products.
The technological level and quality standards of its industry as a whole are still fairly low, notwithstanding a marked change since 2000, spurred in part by foreign investment.
The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship, whilst retaining state domination of the economy.
The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.
In this period the average annual growth rate stood at more than 50 percent.
It also aims to sell more than 15 million of the most fuel-efficient vehicles in the world each year by then.
China’s challenge in the early 21st century will be to balance its highly centralized political system with an increasingly decentralized economic system.
Agriculture is by far the leading occupation, involving over 50% of the population, although extensive rough, high terrain and large arid areas – especially in the west and north – limit cultivation to only about 10% of the land surface.
In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.
Hogs and poultry are widely raised in China, furnishing important export staples, such as hog bristles and egg products.
China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.
China’s leading export minerals are tungsten, antimony, tin, magnesium, molybdenum, mercury, manganese, barite, and salt.
The largest completed project, Gezhouba Dam, on the Chang (Yangtze) River, opened in 1981; the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest engineering project, on the lower Chang, is scheduled for completion in 2009.
Beginning in the late 1970s, changes in economic policy, including decentralization of control and the creation of special economic zones to attract foreign investment, led to considerable industrial growth, especially in light industries that produce consumer goods.
There are railroads to North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, and Vietnam, and road connections to Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Myanmar.
Business
China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
The Chinese government demolished the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Center in Xinjiang, affecting Uyghur culture and commerce, prompting criticism from activists amid concerns over cultural erasure and human rights violations.
Demolition of a Cultural Landmark
The Chinese government recently demolished the Rebiya Kadeer Trade Center in Urumqi, Xinjiang, a vital hub for Uyghur culture and commerce, as reported by VOA. This center, once inhabited by more than 800 predominantly Uyghur-owned businesses, has been deserted since 2009. Authorities forcibly ordered local business owners to vacate the premises before proceeding with the demolition, which took place without any public notice.
Condemnation from Activists
Uyghur rights activists have condemned this demolition, perceiving it as part of China’s broader strategy to undermine Uyghur identity and heritage. The event has sparked heightened international concern regarding China’s policies in Xinjiang, which have been characterized by allegations of mass detentions and cultural suppression, prompting claims of crimes against humanity.
Rebiya Kadeer’s Response
Rebiya Kadeer, the center’s namesake and a notable Uyghur rights advocate, criticized the demolition as a deliberate attempt to erase her legacy. Kadeer, who has been living in exile in the U.S. since her release from imprisonment in 2005, continues to advocate for Uyghur rights. She has expressed that her family members have suffered persecution due to her activism, while the Chinese government has yet to comment on the legal ramifications of the demolition.
Source : China Demolishes Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
China
China Expands Nationwide Private Pension Scheme After Two-Year Pilot Program
China’s private pension scheme, previously piloted in 36 cities, will roll out nationwide on December 15, 2024, enabling workers to open tax-deferred accounts. The initiative aims to enhance retirement savings, address aging population challenges, and stimulate financial sector growth.
After a two-year pilot program, China has officially expanded its private pension scheme nationwide. Starting December 15, 2024, workers covered by urban employee basic pension insurance or urban-rural resident basic pension insurance across the country can participate in this supplementary pension scheme. This nationwide rollout represents a significant milestone in China’s efforts to build a comprehensive pension system, addressing the challenges of a rapidly aging population.
On December 12, 2024, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, together with four other departments including the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Financial Regulatory Administration, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, announced the nationwide implementation of China’s private pension scheme effective December 15, 2024. The initiative extends eligibility to all workers enrolled in urban employee basic pension insurance or urban-rural resident basic pension insurance.
A notable development is the expansion of tax incentives for private pensions, previously limited to pilot cities, to a national scale. Participants can now enjoy these benefits across China, with government agencies collaborating to ensure seamless implementation and to encourage broad participation through these enhanced incentives.
China first introduced its private pension scheme in November 2022 as a pilot program covering 36 cities and regions, including major hubs like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xi’an, and Chengdu. Under the program, individuals were allowed to open tax-deferred private pension accounts, contributing up to RMB 12,000 (approximately $1,654) annually to invest in a range of retirement products such as bank deposits, mutual funds, commercial pension insurance, and wealth management products.
Read more about China’s private pension pilot program launched two years ago: China Officially Launches New Private Pension Scheme – Who Can Take Part?
The nationwide implementation underscores the Chinese government’s commitment to addressing demographic challenges and promoting economic resilience. By providing tax advantages and expanding access, the scheme aims to incentivize long-term savings and foster greater participation in personal retirement planning.
The reform is expected to catalyze growth in China’s financial and insurance sectors while offering individuals a reliable mechanism to enhance their retirement security.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
How a scandal over sanitary pads is shaping feminist activism in China
Chinese sanitary pad brands face scandal over misleading product quality and pH levels. Consumer outrage grows amid larger issues of women’s health neglect and activism for better standards linked to declining fertility rates.
A string of prominent sanitary pad brands in China have become embroiled in a scandal about the quality of their products. The controversy began in early November when consumers complained that that the advertised lengths of many sanitary pads were misleading.
Then, a few days later, customers discovered that many pads had pH levels similar to textiles such as curtains and tablecloths that do not come into frequent contact with skin, potentially causing irritation or harm to users.
The anger only intensified when ABC, one of the companies at the centre of the controversy, responded dismissively to concerned consumers. ABC emphasised that it was complying with national standards, and reportedly replied to a complaint with: “If you cannot accept it, then you can choose not to buy it”.
Chinese companies have since apologised for their sub-par products, and ABC has even said that it was “deeply sorry” for its “inappropriate” response. But for many women in China, this scandal is about more than just defective products. It is part of a troubling pattern in which women’s health and dignity is blatantly disregarded.
In 2022, Chinese women took to social media to advocate for sanitary pads to be sold on trains. Their demands were swiftly dismissed, with China Railway saying sanitary pads were “private items” that women should prepare for themselves in advance.
Some people on the internet echoed this sentiment, arguing that it was inappropriate and unhygienic to sell sanitary pads on trains. “You don’t want sanitary pads sold alongside food, do you?”, one wrote.
Remarks like this laid bare not only the stigma surrounding menstrual blood in China, where it is seen as polluting and shameful, but also the widespread ignorance among men about menstruation. This was again highlighted by one social media user who questioned absurdly: “Why can’t women just hold it in?” The recent scandal over poor quality sanitary pads is yet another chapter in this story.
The neglect of women’s basic needs in China has worsened with the government’s push for higher birth rates. China’s ruling Communist party began actively promoting higher birth rates in the mid-2010s after decades of limiting most families to one child. The push is driven primarily by the state’s concerns over an ageing population and a shrinking labour force.
This pro-natalist agenda, which has been bolstered by media campaigns urging women to prioritise marriage and motherhood, has pressured many to sacrifice their education and careers. In anticipation of having to provide paid maternity leave, employers also often discriminate in the processes of hiring and promotions.
Meanwhile, feminist advocacy faces censorship and suppression. This has included the shutdown of influential media platforms like Feminist Voices and the blocking of #MeToo-related hashtags. Activists have resorted to creative methods, such as using symbols like the “Rice Bunny” (a term that is pronounced “mi tu” in Chinese) emoji, to navigate strict surveillance and content filtering that targets discussions on gender equality.
Why the #RiceBunny hashtag has become China’s #MeToo.
Fighting for change
Women in China are now rallying for higher standards in the production and regulation of sanitary products. They are actively submitting comments via the government’s online platform for the public to provide feedback to standard setting officials.
On November 22, a representative from the organisation responsible for drafting the new standards stated that public feedback had been heard and will be considered in the process. However, this response is far from satisfactory. The same companies that produce sanitary pads in China are heavily involved in setting these standards.
Women’s active involvement in shaping the revision of national standards is reflective of a consistent strategy in which they use government-provided channels for political participation. Yet women in China have now also started to link the issue of low-quality sanitary products to broader societal challenges, including falling fertility rates.
In the 1970s, when China first implemented its one-child policy, over six children were born for every woman of childbearing age. This had dropped to an average of one-and-a-half by the 2000s. At the same time, there is a growing prevalence of infertility in China. A 2021 study published in The Lancet, a peer-reviewed medical journal, shows that China’s infertility rate rose from 12% in 2007 to 18% in 2020. One in every 5.6 Chinese couples of childbearing age faces challenges in conceiving a baby.
Throughout the recent sanitary pad scandal, hashtags such as #LowQualitySanitaryPadsCauseFemaleIntertility have spread across Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo. By aligning their grievances with national anxieties, feminist activists in China are strategically reframing their demands to align with state priorities.
Such an approach may, on the one hand, risk unintentionally reinforcing existing stereotypes about women and societal expectations. But it may also increase the likelihood of their concerns being addressed, as it presents better sanitary product standards as a critical public health and national concern rather than a “women’s issue” that can simply be dismissed.
Feminist activism in China looks to be growing in maturity. Narratives and strategies are now being carefully crafted to ensure maximum impact both in public and policy arenas.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
- China Expands Nationwide Private Pension Scheme After Two-Year Pilot Program
- How a scandal over sanitary pads is shaping feminist activism in China
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