China
Chinese chains on competition
It is very easy to claim that China works to suppress economic competition — one only need point to the state sector.
A stronger claim is that China’s suppression of competition remains intense compared to market economies, with effects starting at home but also extending overseas. And that the outlook for more open competition is poor.
This should ring true at least initially, since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) loathes any sort of political competition even down to the level of individual dissidents and small social groups. Extending beyond politics is the desire to control information — the CCP casts itself as the only legitimate information source for all decision making, including economic.
The setting for economic competition is therefore discouraging. In general, what matters most for large economies is not exports or foreign investment, but fundamental policies at home pertaining to capital, innovation, labour and land. An assessment of these policies in China reveals intense repression.
Despite talk of reform, the mobility of Chinese workers remains restricted for reasons of ‘social stability’, with the effect of reducing competition and productivity in the labour market.
The state also controls most land, a powerful tool to tilt the playing field. Preferred recipients can receive free land while unwanted firms are blocked from land purchases entirely. These are potentially serious export subsidies and barriers to entry respectively. Land is tied to warping competition for the sake of ‘innovation’. It is the government that decides which sectors are highly valued at any time, leaving firms in many other sectors starving for land and capital. This practice long pre-dates the now somewhat infamous ‘Made in China 2025’ policy.
Capital allocation is also anti-competitive. The banking system sees only a few private players, being otherwise dominated by the state. The rise of non-bank financials has been driven primarily by moving assets off state bank books. On the borrower side, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have privileged access to loans and creditors cannot force them into bankruptcy. Others can be credit-starved.
Nor is the future bright. While October’s 19th Party Congress provides an opportunity for change, labour market reform is likely to maintain its painfully slow pace. There is again talk of sharper land ownership rights for private entities, but we have heard this before.
Stilted corporate competition was tipped at the 2013 CCP plenary meetings, a time wrongly hailed by some as heralding reform. What was actually promised was more private cooperation with the state sector — the exact opposite of what is needed. Since then, the state sector has seen a series of mergers, which is termed ‘reform’ but turns oligopolies into monopolies.
Suppression of economic competition goes hand in hand with suppression of political and information competition to give the Party control over Chinese society. There is a further goal: the giant enterprises created by free land, free capital and enforced consolidation in the home market are to become global champions. Of course, other countries are expected to offer a fair and open competitive environment.
The inconsistency belies President Xi’s support of globalisation. With China now the world’s premier manufacturer, Beijing advocates open trade in most manufactured goods. But service imports are inhibited both indirectly through capital and land subsidies and directly through assured market share for state-owned banks, insurers, telecom firms, media, professional services and so on, which are never allowed to fail.
The hypocrisy extends beyond services and trade. Foreign companies are limited to peripheral investments in energy, petrochemicals, shipping and other ‘sensitive’ industries.
Chinese officials still bemoan the unfairness of the United States rejecting China National Off-Shore Oil’s (CNOOC) 2005 bid for Unocal, though an American attempt to buy CNOOC remains inconceivable.
It is not just isolated cases. While China is deliberating whether to create new SOE monopolies, the anti-monopoly law is employed with increasing frequency. It is not being used against SOEs — they are largely exempt. Instead, the biggest targets are what Beijing sees as ‘dangerously competitive’ multinationals.
There is a counter-argument: there’s far more economic competition in China than 40 years ago. Of course this is true, and important. But the same cannot be said in comparison to China 10 or even 15 years ago. Pro-competitive reforms disappeared under Hu Jintao and show no signs of reappearing under Xi Jinping.
The extent of and trend in China’s repression of competition…
Author: Derek Scissors, AEI
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China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP