China
Mao’s ‘people’s war’ revisited : China’s military cyber power and ‘cyber militias’
Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population
China’s military cyber power capabilities are increasingly being augmented by a civilian dimension to increase their potency.
However, in this relatively new domain for civil–military integration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is taking action to consolidate state control over China’s cyber power projection.
Just before the 19th CCP Congress in 2018, the Cyberspace Administration of China released one of the most authoritative policy documents to date outlining Chinese thinking on cyberspace.
The document outlines the need to ‘promote the deepened development of military–civilian integration for cybersecurity and informatisation’. It also features instructions to implement civil–military integration systems, cybersecurity projects and innovation policies.
This policy document followed the creation in January 2017 of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development.
Under the instructions of the Commission, China’s first ‘cybersecurity innovation centre’ was established in December 2017. Operated by 360 Enterprise Security Group (one of China’s primary cybersecurity companies), the centre’s remit is to foster private sector cooperation to ‘help [the military] win future cyber wars’.
The strong civil–military dimension of Chinese military power has existed since the formation of the People’s Republic of China. Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population.
The push to leverage the civilian sector for the development of China’s military cyber capabilities is gaining steam outside of military circles as well.
The National Outline for Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Planning (2006–20) emphasises the importance of integrating civilian and military scientific and technical efforts.
The PLA has heeded such calls, deepening its partnerships with the civilian telecommunications sector — especially ZTE and Huawei — and developing further links with universities.
China’s ‘cyber militias’ are one of the clearest products of this shift
These groups have grown to feature a collective membership of more than 10 million people since the turn of the millennium, and are often based in universities and civilian corporations. While the PLA endorsed cyber militias as a concept in 2006, these groups will likely be restrained to cyber espionage as opposed to offensive cyber operations, given the risk of potentially undermining the work of regular PLA cyber units.
Of the cyber militias, China’s infamous ‘patriotic hackers’ are perhaps the most well known. While these hackers can be a useful tool in hampering state adversaries, they can also often be unruly, erratic and heavy-handed.
These hackers are typically driven by popular nationalism, as demonstrated by instances like the cyber stoushes between US and Chinese hackers that followed the US EP-3 incident in 2001.
The Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been the PLA’s answer to mitigating the risk of erratic cyber militias while still harnessing their capabilities. Established in December 2015 to merge and centralise all of the PLA’s space, cyber and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities in one body, the SSF has also assumed control over a number of PLA research institutes.
The integration of these civilian entities into formalised state structures like the SSF represents a desire by China to mitigate the volatility of these hackers.
But this integration means the PLA and the Chinese state will have to forego plausible deniability when their hackers’ operations are uncovered by other states. The improved US ability to attribute cyber operations to Chinese actors, combined with Washington’s budding approach of sanctioning major Chinese state-owned enterprises in retaliation, has made Beijing realise it needs to run a tighter ship.
The centralisation that Beijing is pursuing is a manifestation of the so-called ‘corporate state’ that increasingly defines the Chinese political system. Here, the CCP acknowledges the presence of societal interest groups as an inevitable result of a pluralising society. At the same time, the CCP seeks to co-opt or direct the behaviour of these entities to serve its ends and maintain stability.
The civil–military dimension of China’s cyber power projection has been sporadically apparent since the early 2000s. But it is only recently that we are seeing concerted efforts to leverage the civilian sphere and, more importantly, to centralise and organise it so that it can consistently serve China’s defence and military aims.
Author: Nicholas Lyall, ANU
Business
Wegovy: The Popular Weight-Loss Drug Now Available in China
Novo Nordisk launched Wegovy in China after approval, competing with Eli Lilly’s upcoming weight-loss drug. The treatment, costing 1,400 yuan, targets obesity but has potential side effects and isn’t covered by healthcare.
Wegovy Launch in China
Novo Nordisk recently launched its weight-loss drug, Wegovy, in China after obtaining approval from local health authorities in June. The introduction of Wegovy is expected to increase competition with Eli Lilly, which has also received approval for its weight-loss treatment, although it has not yet been released in China’s significant pharmaceutical market.
Cost and Accessibility
In China, a set of four Wegovy injections will be priced at 1,400 yuan (approximately $194), significantly lower than the drug’s U.S. price. However, patients will need to pay the full amount out of pocket since Wegovy is not yet covered by the national healthcare insurance plan.
Benefits and Side Effects
Research indicates that Wegovy can help users lose over 10% of their body weight. The drug contains semaglutide, which assists with appetite control and satiety. While Wegovy has been gaining traction globally, it may cause side effects like nausea. Concerns have emerged about its misuse among individuals who are not obese, prompting medical professionals to remain vigilant.
Source : Popular weight-loss drug Wegovy goes on sale in China
China
China Implements New Measures to Increase Foreign Investment in A-Share Market
China’s 2024 updates to strategic investment rules simplify A-share market access for foreign investors by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and increasing investment options, reflecting a commitment to greater market openness and participation in economic reform.
The 2024 updates to China’s strategic investment rules simplify entry for foreign investors in the A-share market by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and expanding investment options, signaling a commitment to increased market openness and flexibility through these new measures.
China’s capital markets are undergoing a significant transformation as part of the nation’s ongoing commitment to economic reform and openness. The recent update to the Administrative Measures for Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (hereinafter, the “new measures”) reflects this commitment, targeting an increase in foreign investor participation in China’s A-share market. For nearly two decades, China’s “strategic investment” pathway provided foreign investors with access to shares in A-share listed companies, but strict requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and prolonged lock-up periods—made it accessible only to select large investors.
The new measures, effective December 2, 2024, relax many of these restrictions to attract a broader and more diverse range of foreign investors. Key changes include lowering the minimum shareholding threshold from 10 percent to 5 percent, reducing the asset requirements from US$100 million to US$50 million in assets, and shortening the lock-up period from three years to one. Additionally, foreign investors can now use equity from unlisted overseas companies as consideration, while new investment routes, like tender offers, enhance flexibility.
In 2005, China introduced the Strategic Investment Regime as part of its broader efforts to open up its financial markets to foreign capital while retaining a level of control over sensitive industries. This framework allowed qualified foreign investors to acquire strategic stakes in Chinese A-share listed companies, aiming to promote foreign participation in the domestic market.
However, the stringent requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and extended lock-up periods—restricted this pathway to a limited pool of large, multinational investors. The regime reflected China’s cautious approach at the time, seeking to balance openness with economic stability and control over critical sectors.
A decade later, in 2015, China implemented its first significant revisions to the Strategic Investment Regime. These amendments sought to make the investment process more accessible by easing certain restrictions, aiming to encourage foreign capital inflow as China continued its gradual integration into global markets.
While some requirements were relaxed, the fundamental limitations—such as high entry thresholds and complex approval processes—remained in place, meaning that access to China’s A-share market was still primarily confined to major institutional investors with substantial capital.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
Rising concerns over China’s industrial overcapacity have led countries to impose higher tariffs, including Indonesia’s planned 200% tariffs on Chinese goods, risking Indonesia’s competitiveness and economic security.
Tariffs Escalate Amid Concerns of Overcapacity
Concerns regarding China’s industrial overcapacity have prompted countries to increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Indonesia, following the U.S. example, plans to impose tariffs as high as 200 percent on various Chinese imports, including textiles and ceramics. This response aims to safeguard local jobs from the influx of inexpensive Chinese products.
Economic Impact of Tariffs
These tariffs are designed as safeguards and anti-dumping measures against potential job losses in Indonesia. However, the ongoing investigations have not definitively shown that China’s practices are the root cause of these issues. The political appeal of broad tariffs might lead to unintended consequences, such as reducing the overall competitiveness of Indonesian exports and risking retaliatory measures from affected countries.
Dependency on Chinese Goods
Indonesia heavily relies on Chinese manufacturing inputs, which constituted over 26 percent of its intermediary goods imports in 2021. With competitive pricing, these inputs have enhanced Indonesia’s export capabilities, particularly to markets like the U.S., where the trade surplus increased from $8.58 billion in 2019 to $11.96 billion in 2023. Reducing trade openness may ultimately undermine the Indonesian economy’s resilience against geopolitical challenges.
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- Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
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