China
Trump’s currency war without a cause
Author: Yiping Huang, Peking University
The greatest economic damage of the ongoing trade war between China and the United States is caused by policy uncertainty, not import tariffs. In early August 2019, US President Donald Trump introduced some new shocks. Amidst the new round of trade talks between the two countries, Trump announced that the United States will start putting tariffs of 10 per cent on the remaining US$300 billion of goods imported from China. Quickly following that, the US Treasury Department designated China as a ‘currency manipulator’.
This currency war reminds me of an old Chinese saying: ‘Even when right a scholar cannot win an argument with a soldier’ — because it defies any common sense about currency manipulation. At one of the earlier G20 meetings, a US official warned that the United States would name China a currency manipulator if it did not intervene to hold up the value of Chinese renminbi (RMB). In fact, it would have been more appropriate to label China the ‘currency non-manipulator’.
The US Treasury Department usually follows three criteria to determine if a trading partner is a currency manipulator — the first is a bilateral trade surplus with the United States of more than US$200 billion; the second is a current account surplus of more than 3 per cent of GDP; and the third is a total purchase of foreign exchange equivalent to more than 2 per cent of GDP within 12 months.
Of these, China only satisfies the first criterion. And even this one needs to be looked at with caution. It is widely known that China’s bilateral trade surplus with the United States is a result of the global supply chain, as its overall trade account is almost balanced. And even this bilateral surplus is shrinking rapidly.
The US Treasury’s action might have been triggered by the weakening of the RMB on 5 August, with its bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar (USD) exceeding 7.0 for the first time in more than ten years. But this depreciation was a direct result of Trump’s announcement of additional tariffs that could deteriorate China’s external account. Several months ago, a senior IMF official suggested to me a hypothetical scenario, in which Trump would push down the value of the RMB by escalating trade tensions and then would call China a currency manipulator. This was exactly what happened.
If there was a cause for the new currency war, it was single-handedly created by Trump.
In July 2005, China started the managed floating exchange rate regime with reference to a basket of currencies. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) pursues a policy agenda trying to make the exchange rate more market-determined over time but attempting to avoid excessive volatility in the short term. The RMB appreciated gradually before mid-2014 but suffered from periodical depreciation pressures after that. But since the beginning of 2017, the PBoC has avoided intervening heavily in the foreign exchange markets.
‘Management’ of the exchange rate is done mainly through the application of the ‘counter-cyclical factor’ by setting central parity at the start of trading days. The 12-month moving average of exchange rate volatility of the RMB increased steadily from late 2010 and was already close to those of major global currencies — such as the US dollar, the Euro and the Japanese yen — in early 2019.
By and large, the purpose of the ‘management’ is to reduce excessive exchange rate volatility, not to lower the currency value. The perception that a weaker currency strengthens economic growth is also outdated since it only considers the trade channel of the exchange rate effect on growth. But the effect of the finance channel could be the opposite — a weaker currency encourages capital outflow and weakens economic growth. During the second half of 2015, for instance, RMB depreciation was accompanied by sharp declines of net capital inflow.
Empirical analyses also confirm that, in China today, the finance channel already dominates the trade channel. Therefore, it is no longer in China’s own interest to single-mindedly pursue a policy of a weak RMB.
Likewise, a US policy of a weak US dollar would likely be futile, because US comparative advantages are more concentrated in the service sectors rather than in manufacturing industries. As C Fred Bergsten pointed out, Trump’s trade wars with China and many other countries reduced US imports, but did not boost US exports or bring back manufacturing facilities from overseas.
Unfortunately, such an unreasonable currency war would…
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP