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A global problem requiring a global solution

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Pedestrians wearing protective masks ride an escalator near an overpass with an electronic board showing stock information, following an outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), at Lujiazui financial district in Shanghai, China, 17 March 2020 (Photo: Reuters/Aly Song).

Authors: John WH Denton, ICC and Peter Drysdale, ANU

The rapidly escalating coronavirus pandemic is, first and foremost, a public health emergency. But as the virus spreads and governments take dramatic actions to curb the disease, it is also rapidly causing a global economic crisis. A prolonged outbreak — with reduced demand, disturbed supply chains and increasing uncertainty — could lead to widespread job losses and businesses closing down and cause other second-order economic effects. The pandemic has undoubtedly become the greatest health and economic crisis in modern times.

The economic impact of the disease will importantly depend on how successfully societies can collectively contain transmission by drastically pruning contact networks. Absent swift and effective action, the number of deaths and infections will grow dramatically, health systems will become overwhelmed, businesses will struggle to function and the global economy will suffer major consequences. Given the tight correlation between economic performance and health (life expectancy), the more the economy suffers, the worse the long-term health impacts will be.

While governments are taking increasingly drastic domestic measures, they must also not neglect the international dimension. If the rapid spread of coronavirus makes one thing clear, it is that what happens abroad can have major impacts at home. Australia’s economic fortunes, for example, are not only contingent on how the virus spreads locally but also on how our major trading partners and the global economy fare. And in our hyperconnected world this is true for every country: all have a major stake in effective health and economic measures taken in other countries and cooperation that makes that possible.

In this context, the leaders of G20 countries should urgently agree on a comprehensive global action plan to address the COVID-19 outbreak. While the G7 is convening an emergency video conference meeting to discuss a coordinated response, the G20 must be the primary convener for a truly global response given its global authority, more inclusive membership (comprising both the major advanced as well as the major emerging economies) and, what’s more, its successful role in managing the Global Financial Crisis.

Australia, as a key driver for the establishment of the G20, has special responsibility to argue for G20 action now. That action should include both collective interventions to enhance the global response to stem the spread of coronavirus and coordinate action to restore stability in the global economy.

The G20 has the opportunity and the obligation to step up to provide the global leadership we require to confront a virus that knows no borders but is causing a loss of confidence and increased volatility in global markets. Just as they did in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis, G20 leaders must take swift and decisive action to help reassure global business, markets and citizens throughout the world in the face of growing uncertainty and major potential economic disruption.

There has been very little coordination or cooperation between countries so far. Bilateral initiatives, such as China’s shipping respirators to Italy, now the outbreak is abating at home, help save lives. But more can be done together. Difficult action at home is made easier when done with others through global cooperation. Instead, knee-jerk responses, including those that stigmatise ethnic groups and the elderly, make it harder for other countries to respond to the crisis.

An initial priority must be for G20 leaders to agree on coordinated action to ensure access to essential medical supplies everywhere in the world. This must involve at least three core elements. First, leaders must reverse and commit to avoid export bans or limits on the free flow of all necessary medical supplies, medicines, disinfectant, soap and personal protective equipment. In a global pandemic, we need to ensure essential supplies are available where they are needed most. Resorting to ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies during a global health crisis inflicts much more than economic pain on other countries, and ultimately would be a self-inflicting wound.

Second, national leaders must reduce the costs of necessary medical supplies. This can be achieved by lifting import taxes, quotas and other government-imposed costs. And third, governments must commit to scale public health financing to tackle coronavirus in the poorest countries in the world least able to cope — whether through increasing aid funding…

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China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges

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In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.


China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.

The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.

In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.

The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.

Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:

From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

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Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study

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Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.

Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.

This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.

We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.

We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.

In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.

We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.

Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy

The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.

Boycotting Russian goods

Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.

Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.

This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.

Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.

This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.

While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.

Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP

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In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.


China’s Interest in the CPTPP

In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.

Economic Implications for Australia

A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.

Reform Commitments Required from China

For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.

Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP

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