China
China’s economic growth now depends on the West
Author: Yukon Huang, Carnegie Endowment
China’s leadership expected that economic growth in 2020 would be a celebratory event, marking a doubling of the economy’s size over the past decade. But the new coronavirus (COVID-19) has obliterated those forecasts despite Beijing’s draconian measures effectively bringing the epidemic under control sooner than anticipated. The nationwide shutdown led to the epidemic’s slowdown in mid-February, but by then the extent and speed of the virus’s spread already paralysed Chinese society.
Chinese President Xi Jinping took a victory lap on 10 March by visiting the epicentre of virus in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province. By 19 March, the number of new domestically driven cases fell to zero. Almost all new cases were recent returnees from abroad who found it safer to be in China than in Europe, the epidemic’s new epicentre, or the United States, where the spread of the virus is accelerating.
Yet the economic damage to China is severe, and the prospects for recovery — even with massive financial support — remain uncertain. Sustainably restoring China’s productive capacity in the coming weeks would require an unlikely revival of US demand. China’s recently announced economic indicators for January and February were much weaker than market watchers had forecast. Year over year, retail sales fell by 20.5 per cent and industrial production by 13.5 per cent — China’s worst numbers on record.
The prolonged containment effort has left millions of migrant workers unable to return to work, and factories are still struggling to return to full capacity given the shortages of labour and essential parts. Analysts have downgraded their outlook for the Chinese economy and consider a historic contraction in the first quarter nearly guaranteed. Even with a major fiscal stimulus and interest rate cuts, estimates for 2020 growth vary from 1–4 per cent compared to the original target of 6 per cent.
By contrast, the 2002–2003 economic recovery from the SARS virus was V-shaped, as China made up the entirety of its short-term losses by quickly tapping into strong consumer demand in the West. China was relatively unaffected by the 2008 global financial crisis, when global production and supply networks continued to function, enabling it to maintain rapid growth. Moreover, China’s debt situation today compared with a decade ago makes it less likely that it can rely on expansionary monetary policies or credit-fuelled support for the property market to stimulate growth.
While China’s economy is slowly restarting, the global spread of COVID-19 means that major European economies are in turmoil and the United States is still in the early stages of ramping up its response with unprecedented fiscal measures. China will likely struggle to find enough customers in the West, and emerging markets in Asia and elsewhere are simply not large enough to compensate. Affected sectors include automobiles, as major Western companies have closed down production, and communications equipment, as supply chains have been disrupted.
The outbreak will likely force a re-examination of the logic underpinning the US administration’s extensive use of tariffs to pressure China on trade and investment reforms. The phase one trade deal concluded in January is now inoperative, since there is no possibility that China can meet its agreement to purchase vast quantities of US goods this year.
More importantly, the US strategy to pair tariffs with trade restrictions is incompatible with new priorities, such as arresting the pandemic and ensuring producers have access to necessary parts. There are critical shortages in medicinal supplies emerging in the United States, for example, for which availability and cost have been aggravated by the White House’s tariffs and export restrictions. For better or for worse, the global economy is based on connectivity. The revival of world trade and well-functioning supply networks is essential to resuscitating growth in both China and the West.
Yukon Huang is a Senior Fellow with the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
A version of this article originally appeared here on Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
China
U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.
China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”
China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.
Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.
As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.
The stronghold of the U.S. dollar
The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).
In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.
The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.
Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.
U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.
However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”
There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.
Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.
On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.
Unsustainable debt
The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.
The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.
That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.
With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.
Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.
This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.
An opportunity for China
This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.
However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.
It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.
This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.
China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy
China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.
At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.
China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.
As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.