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India’s China choice

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India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Himalayan region of Ladakh, 3 July 2020 (Photo: India's Press Information Bureau Handout via Reuters).

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

The border clash between China and India on 15 June in the harsh Himalayan terrain of the Galwan Valley resulted in deaths, including at least 20 Indian soldiers, and casualties on both sides. Clashes along the disputed border had become more common in the last few years but this was the most serious conflict since 1962.

Leaders on both sides have avoided escalation but there is little ballast in the relationship that gives confidence in calming tensions. The Himalayas that separate the two countries are a big buffer, with the terrain making it difficult to drive tanks over or assemble large forces, as Hugh White reminds us. But that won’t stop the relationship from deteriorating further.

This conflict may mark a critical turning point in Sino-Indian relations. It may further drive the world’s two most populous countries apart or it could be a catalyst for a more constructive future.

With both countries dealing with the health and economic crises from COVID-19, the climate is ripe for stoking nationalism and raising the tensions. Prime Minister Modi has walked India back from the brink but is still under huge pressure to retaliate somehow.

For India to achieve the vision of its rightful place in a multipolar world, Delhi will have to find a way to accommodate China and this border clash may yet force the action that’s needed.

The presumption of hostility towards China casts the Chinese economy as a massive threat to India’s. It is five times the size of the Indian economy and as India’s trade deficit continues to grow, much of it appears to derive from China’s competitive power. The real cause, of course, is India’s appetite for foreign savings to finance growth. But trade deficits, including that with China, have become in the new Indian nationalist conception — articulated after Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party’s electoral victory in May that brought in a rare absolute majority — the  central reason for the shift back to a ‘self-reliant’ India after three decades of gradual opening up.

The Indian economy is almost the same size as the 10 ASEAN economies combined and, although the Southeast Asian grouping is far from acting in unison, their economies have embraced and benefited from China’s rise. India appears cowed by it. Yet to be internationally competitive, Indian firms need to compete, not to be sheltered from embracing integration with the international economy including that of China.

In this week’s lead essay, Suman Bery and Alicia Garcia-Herrero argue that ‘India has the scale and sophistication to recalibrate its economic relationship with China such that deeper interdependence reduces, rather than increases, New Delhi’s economic vulnerability’.

The path to power, prosperity and security is not economic retreat and ‘economic retaliation’ that costs the Indian people and makes them poorer and India smaller. It requires proactive engagement, alongside Australia, Japan, Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia with China, not isolation from it.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement is politically radioactive in India, just as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was for many countries in the East Asia and Pacific, and ultimately for its central proponent, the United States itself. Many in India believe that RCEP is China-led and signing up to it will decimate Indian industry. But RCEP is an Indonesian and ASEAN-led agreement that was created to manage Southeast Asia’s relations with their large neighbouring economic powers.

The conception of RCEP as a China agenda is a totally incorrect perception of its origins and strategic purpose — RCEP is and was from the beginning an ASEAN agenda for dealing with China and the regional economic powers in a multilateral setting.

It was political pressure, including riots, that forced Modi to walk away from the deal in Bangkok last November at the 11th hour after his negotiators had done pretty much all the hard work and the agreement was there for the taking.

Retreat from RCEP due to fear of the Chinese economy is a missed opportunity. Failure to engage in RCEP foregoes the opportunity to leverage regional weight in economic dealings with China and the opportunity to balance and engage with China with the support of ASEAN, Japan, China, Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

RCEP or no RCEP, India still has to deal with China. Without RCEP, India will have to deal with China alone, bilaterally. In asymmetric bilateral economic dealings, the smaller power, as for…

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Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications

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Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.


Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.

On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).

Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.

The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.

The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.

The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

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China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures

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China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.


Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes

China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.

Monthly and Yearly Comparisons

According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.

Second-Hand Home Market Trends

Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.

Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in

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U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity

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China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.

China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”

China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.

Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.

As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.

The stronghold of the U.S. dollar

The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).

In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.

The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.

Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.

U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.

However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”

There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.

Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.

On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.

Unsustainable debt

The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.

The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.

That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.

With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.

Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.

This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.

An opportunity for China

This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.

However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.

It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.

This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.

China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy

China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.

At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.

China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.

As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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