China
China–India border crisis reaches new heights
Authors: Harsh V Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, ORF
The latest crisis to engulf China and India erupted over their disputed border in early May 2020, when India discovered the presence of a large number Chinese forces in its claimed territory. It became quickly evident that China had occupied several areas on India’s side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in western Ladakh, as well as a portion of territory in the Indian state of Sikkim.
The ongoing China–India border crisis has its roots in history. India inherited unsettled borders from the British when it gained independence in 1947. Due to the absence of a clearly delineated boundary, there were several bloody clashes between Chinese and Indian forces in the 1950s and 1960s, including a full-scale war in 1962. Another bloody clash in 1967 claimed hundreds of casualties, albeit on a lower scale and intensity than in 1962.
The last time fatalities occurred on the Indian side was in 1975 at Tulung La along the LAC, although it is unclear whether it was the result of an accident or an ambush. Another crisis erupted in 1986 when China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied territory at Somdurong Chu, leading to a massive Indian counter-mobilisation. Although this crisis did not result in bloodshed, the face-off lasted seven years before culminating in the 1993 Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Agreement and Chinese forces withdrawing from the area. A 1996 agreement on confidence-building measures sought to prevent further tensions.
Despite these mechanisms, a violent clash occurred between the Indian and Chinese armies on 15 July 2020, causing the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of PLA casualties.
The territorial claims made by each side defy easy resolution, and both Beijing and New Delhi have mobilised large forces across the entire stretch of the LAC — notwithstanding limited de-escalation in the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, and Gogra in Ladakh. Though the central sector of the LAC adjacent to the Indian state of Sikkim was previously stable, the Chinese are believed to have made a two-kilometre incursion in an area known as Naku La. It is not evident that the PLA has yet vacated this area.
China is also escalating the situation by laying claim to territory under Bhutan’s control. Beijing is claiming Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan — close to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that Beijing also claims. China appears to be attempting to drive a stronger bargain in negotiations with India through these expansive claims.
There are several potential pathways to a resolution, but none may have sufficient traction. The first would be New Delhi accepting China’s change of the status quo as a forcible eviction of the PLA might prove well-nigh impossible. These small territorial grabs are primarily tactical on China’s side, targeting minor areas where the chances of success are greatest. But for India, conceding to China’s territorial seizures would only legitimise Beijing’s ill-begotten gains and leave India a diminished power within the region and the wider Indo-Pacific. Its credibility would suffer and New Delhi would run the risk of being tested by its smaller neighbours.
A second pathway is more protracted. Both sides could remain mobilised as happened at Somdurong Chu. Even in such cases, precedents exist for a diplomatic resolution. Both Beijing and New Delhi might see wisdom in adhering to the foundational agreements concluded in 1993 and 1996 — and more limited agreements concluded in 2005, 2012 and 2013 that provide protocols for managing differences along the LAC. But the context of the resolution at Somdurong Chu was vastly different to the situation today. China was a much weaker power, and Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were more cautious than current Chinese President Xi Jinping.
A third pathway towards resolution is by way of military means. New Delhi could decide to escalate symmetrically by confining a military response to the areas where China entered Indian-claimed territory. This option is likely to be costly and a failure — and more importantly, it does not prevent China from escalating things further. India would also find it difficult to escalate the confrontation to new areas as Chinese forces will now be far more alert. In either case, political will and a readiness to run risks would be essential for the Indian government get a public buy-in.
India and China could also settle for a compromise that involves China withdrawing from specific ridges along the Pangong Tso…
Business
China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival began in Xiamen on Nov 13, featuring awards, cultural projects worth 31.63 billion yuan, and fostering international film collaborations.
2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival Opens
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival commenced in Xiamen, Fujian province, on November 13. This prestigious event showcases the top film awards in China and spans four days, concluding with the China Golden Rooster Awards ceremony on November 16.
The festival features various film exhibitions, including the Golden Rooster Mainland Film Section and the Golden Rooster International Film Section. These showcases aim to highlight the achievements of Chinese-language films and foster global cultural exchanges within the film industry.
On the festival’s opening day, a significant milestone was reached with the signing of 175 cultural and film projects, valued at 31.63 billion yuan ($4.36 billion). Additionally, the International Film and Television Copyright Service Platform was launched, furthering the globalization of Chinese film and television properties.
Source : China’s Golden Rooster film festival opens in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in