China
US retreat from multilateralism blunts the fight against COVID-19
Author: David Lubin, Citigroup
During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF and the World Bank were quick to trumpet their contribution to stabilising the global economy from an unprecedented shock. But the noisy claims belie the fact that multilateral institutions have little room to manoeuvre now that the United States — the country that underpins multilateralism — has lost interest in the idea.
Take the World Bank. Although its widely voiced promise was that it would lend US$160 billion to help the developing world deal with the crisis, it turns out not a penny of this represents additional lending — it is all money the Bank would have disbursed anyway.
Granted, it is accelerating some disbursements and offering a temporary moratorium on debt service payments from poor countries. But given the scale of this crisis, one might have expected more.
The basic problem is that the World Bank’s capital is down to 22 per cent of its loan book and, for prudential reasons, it cannot fall below 20 per cent. One way out would be for the Bank to seek more capital, which the Trump administration has in the past agreed to provide. But these days it’s hard to imagine the US government looking kindly on such a request.
As President Trump told the UN General Assembly last September, ‘The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots’. From Trump’s point of view, the IMF and the World Bank are globalist by nature. They also fail his value-for-money calculation: US influence in these institutions is too small, he thinks, to justify the cheques written by the United States to keep them going.
This kind of thinking has been plainly on display in the way the United States has limited the role of the IMF in managing the global crisis. The most straightforward way for the IMF to support its members is to provide international liquidity in the form of additional Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). These SDRs, credited to the accounts of IMF member countries, are exchangeable for the five basket currencies: the US dollar, euro, sterling, yen and renminbi.
Creating SDRs formed part of the IMF’s response to the global financial crisis in 2009, but this time around the idea was quashed by US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin. To be fair, there is one good reason why SDR creation may not have been the right tool: SDRs are allocated according to members’ quotas at the IMF, meaning some 70 per cent of the extra liquidity would have gone to rich countries who need it least. But two other lines of thought were likely more influential in the US decision.
The first is that the more SDRs there are out there, the more prominence the IMF has as an institution. The United States would rather keep the IMF dependent on resources that it has to borrow from rich countries, enhancing US leverage and keeping the Fund on a short leash.
The second is that giving the SDR prominence plays straight into China’s agenda. In 2009, then governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan pushed for the creation of a ‘super-sovereign reserve currency’ to take over the US dollar’s central role in the international monetary system. Zhou argued that the SDR should be the seed from which such a currency might grow.
In the Trumpian worldview, what’s good for China is not good for the United States. Keeping the dollar as the centre of the international monetary system has huge strategic value for Washington. It keeps China dependent on a currency it has no power to print.
Multilateralism as we have known it since the Second World War has only ever been a set of institutions underpinned by US power. Multilateralism is useful to the United States so long as those institutions — including the IMF and the World Bank — serve its interests.
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization is the starkest evidence yet that Washington no longer believes this condition is being met. Equally significant, though less visible, is the United States hobbling of the role that the IMF and World Bank can play in easing the economic pain of COVID-19. The anchor on which post-war multilateralism has depended is coming loose.
How much weaker might this anchor get? We should know more in early November.
David Lubin is head of emerging markets economics at Citigroup. He is also an associate fellow of the Global Economy and Finance programme at Chatham House.
This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.
The post US retreat from…
Business
China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
China is restricting the export of high-tech manufacturing equipment and personnel to India and Southeast Asia, aiming to maintain domestic production amid potential US tariffs, impacting companies like Foxconn and BYD.
China Curbs on High-Tech Manufacturing
China is intensifying restrictions on the movement of employees and specialized equipment essential for high-tech manufacturing in India and Southeast Asia. This measure aims to prevent companies from relocating production due to potential tariffs under the incoming US administration. Beijing has urged local governments to restrict technology transfers and export of manufacturing tools as part of this strategy.
Impact on Foxconn and Apple’s Strategy
Foxconn, Apple’s primary assembly partner, is facing challenges in sending staff and receiving equipment in India, which could impact production. Despite these hurdles, current manufacturing operations remain unaffected. The Chinese government insists it treats all nations equally while reinforcing its domestic production to mitigate job losses and retain foreign investments.
Broader Implications for India
Additionally, these restrictions affect electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturers in India, notably BYD and Waaree Energies. Although the measures are not explicitly targeting India, they complicate the business landscape. As foreign companies seek alternatives to China, these developments are likely to reshape manufacturing strategies amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
- EFIS Maroc and China Eastern Airlines Set to Launch Service Between Morocco and China
- China Considers Selling TikTok US Operations to Musk as a Viable Option – Bloomberg
