China
Domestic concerns shape China’s policy strategies
Author: Ryan Manuel, Hong Kong
In the US–China relationship, ideology now trumps interests. In July, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech on China at the Nixon Library repeatedly referred to Chinese leader Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (‘the Party’) rather than as the president of China.
Referring only to Xi’s power over the Party in this way is part of a US government drive to appear anti-Party rather than anti-China.
It is a fundamental mistake to treat relations with China as an ideological mission. Viewing China as an ideological threat — rather than just a big power competitor — focusses too much on Xi Jinping and overlooks how his power is constrained by the Party apparatus and China’s sheer size. It also inaccurately interprets Xi’s personal leadership style as Chinese ideology.
Power within the CCP comes from being able to make others in the Party do what one wants behind closed doors, rather than from one’s job title. Xi Jinping is rather good at this.
Though formally he cannot fire anyone, in practice, by appointing a handpicked lieutenant with strict orders, he can get rid of anyone he wants. The same can be said for his power over appointments: while other people may formally hold those positions, Xi’s power of persuasion and the fear of investigation still grants him the ability to rule.
Given there are over 90 million party members across more than 30 provinces, nearly 900 municipalities and nearly 3000 counties, there exists a vast bureaucracy that is fundamental to the prosecution of the leader’s interests. Xi deals with subnational leaders by fusing the previously separated systems of party and government.
Party inspectors and party incentives now override the conduct of national governance. Performance is measured against top-down party indicators, rather than on indicators of competence relative to other officials of the same level and paygrade.
Xi believes two things will help the Party maintain its power. The first is a traditional Chinese focus on inculcating moral values under the guidance of the Party, rather than seeking checks and balances on individual power. The second is ensuring that the Party has a voice in all private enterprises and continues to encourage large state-owned enterprises.
This ideology drives Xi’s governance approach. He has taken powers away from local leaders and executive bodies, moving them to the legislatures and internal inspectors in a sort of top-down populism, under which he wants people to follow his orders more strictly. This puts pressure on the drafters of legislation and central planners. It makes local leaders more likely to work to rule, rather than to take responsibility in their local area. (It also makes China’s governance more brittle, as these local leaders focus more on upwards reports and ideological purity, instead of having the flexibility to address what they see as the most pressing local issues).
But Xi’s ideological focus is on domestic matters rather than international competition or foreign policy. Xi is reportedly in charge of US–China relations, and the Politburo, the main decision-making body, discusses foreign policy for perhaps 20 per cent of the time.
But discussions are usually framed in terms of ‘great powers’ rather than in terms of ‘ideological competition’. Foreign policy is rarely the main topic of Politburo meetings: only one-seventh of formal study sessions and briefings are on foreign issues.
Treating China as an ideological threat is likely to lead those outside China to the wrong conclusions. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), for example, declared the United Front, one of the weaker Party ministries, ‘an inspiration for the CCP’s engagement with political parties around the world’. But the United Front is a domestically focused body, forming part of the consultative organs. Foreign work makes up less than 20 per cent of its functions.
When ideology is pushed overseas, it is a bug, not a feature. China’s foreign policy today suffers from being too domestically driven to be effective.
Take the recent emergence of ‘wolf warriors’, aggrieved and abrasive Chinese diplomats who launch into Twitter tirades against those they feel are hurting Chinese interests.
They win no overseas hearts and minds and have little to no success in spreading Chinese values. But they may look tough back home, regardless of their diplomatic self-harm. And this is the audience they care most about, rather than the nation they may be…
Business
China Telecom Gulf Officially Launches Operations in Saudi Arabia for Business Expansion
China Telecom Gulf was launched in Riyadh, enhancing digital cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia under the “Belt and Road Initiative,” with a focus on technological innovation and infrastructure development.
China Telecom Gulf Launches in Riyadh
On November 21, 2024, China Telecom Gulf was officially inaugurated in Riyadh, symbolizing a significant advancement in China Telecom’s internationalization efforts and commitment to the "Belt and Road Initiative." The event was attended by over 100 dignitaries, including Mr. Liu Guiqing, Executive Director of China Telecom Corporation, and Mr. Fawaz from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Riyadh Branch, marking a milestone in fostering a shared future between China and Arab nations.
Commitment to Digital Transformation
In his speech, Mr. Liu highlighted China Telecom’s dedication to collaborating with Saudi enterprises and local governments to enhance digital infrastructure. By leveraging its expertise in technologies like 5G and artificial intelligence, the company aims to provide high-quality communication services, thereby driving socio-economic growth in the region.
Strategic Partnerships for Growth
During the launch, China Telecom Gulf signed strategic agreements with several prominent companies, including Saudi Telecom Company and Huawei. These collaborations are geared towards optimizing digital experiences for Saudi customers and contributing to the broader Sino-Saudi cooperation in technology and economic development, solidifying China Telecom’s role in the Middle Eastern telecom landscape.
Source : China Telecom Gulf Officially Launches in Saudi Arabia for Business
China
India Initiates a Shift in Security Focus Regarding China Amid Economic Ambitions
Since 2014, India’s Modi government aimed to boost manufacturing through the Make-in-India campaign. However, tensions with China led to increased scrutiny of Chinese investments post-COVID-19, limiting their influence.
Modi’s Manufacturing Push
Since Narendra Modi took office in 2014, his administration has focused on boosting the manufacturing sector’s contribution to India’s GDP. The launch of the Make-in-India campaign aimed to enhance manufacturing capabilities and attract foreign direct investment (FDI), even in sensitive sectors such as defense and railways, thereby fostering economic growth.
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During this period, Chinese companies like Oppo and ZTE sought to capitalize on India’s manufacturing potential. However, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for safeguard measures against potential foreign takeovers. In response, India revised its FDI policy to increase scrutiny on investments from neighboring countries, particularly targeting Chinese investments, which now require governmental approval.
Geopolitical Tensions and FDI Impact
Tensions escalated after the June 2020 Galwan clash, severely straining Indo-China relations. This ongoing border standoff has posed challenges to the evolving dynamics between the two nations. As a result of these geopolitical tensions and pandemic-era policies, Chinese capital inflow to India constituted merely 0.43% of the total FDI from April 2000 to December 2021, highlighting a significant downturn in bilateral economic ties.
Source : India begins a rebalance of security concerns over China and economic aspirations
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China’s Ruling on Cryptocurrency
In a pivotal decision for the nation and its BRICS alliance, China has officially classified cryptocurrency as property while maintaining prohibitions against business transactions involving digital assets. A notable ruling from the Shanghai Songjiant People’s Court affirmed cryptocurrencies as property, sparking optimism within the crypto industry regarding future regulations.
Implications for the Crypto Industry
As cryptocurrencies gain significance globally, the Chinese ruling is viewed as a potential-positive shift amidst ongoing restrictions. While individuals can hold virtual currency, businesses remain barred from engaging in investment transactions or issuing tokens independently. This decision has generated anticipation for more accommodating regulations in the future.
Future Prospects for Cryptocurrency in China
Experts like Max Keiser believe this ruling indicates China’s growing acknowledgment of Bitcoin’s influence. As BRICS nations explore increased cryptocurrency utilization in trade, this legal shift could enhance market demand and lead to greater acceptance of cryptocurrencies as a legitimate asset class, setting the stage for potential developments in 2025.
Source : BRICS: China Rules Crypto as Property, Bars Business Holdings
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