China
The rise of populism in Australia’s China policy
Author: Greg McCarthy, UWA
The growing tensions between Australia and China are often attributed to external factors. But Australia’s policy towards China is also an expression of the Liberal–National coalition government’s domestic politics. It is the connection between domestic and foreign affairs that provides the political ballast for the government’s China policy. In both, ‘national sovereignty’ is invoked to enhance and defend the power of the government while closing off debates over liberal democratic rights.
A clear instance of the growing power of the state over civil society under the rubric of defending national sovereignty from Chinese interference is the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018. A section deemed the ‘China clause’ compels individuals suspected of acting on the behalf of foreign governments for political or government influence to provide information to Australian authorities.
The government expected that the legislation would require the 13 Confucius institutes in Australia to register but they all declined, arguing they did not meet the legislation’s specifications. Unexpectedly, former prime minister Tony Abbott was asked to register as an ‘agent of foreign influence’ because he was a speaker at a US-connected conservative political conference, prompting civil libertarians to argue that the legislation would be fitting for a ‘totalitarian regime’.
No such voices were raised when the homes and offices of New South Wales parliamentarian Shaoquett Moselmane of the Australian Labor Party and his part-time staffer John Zhang were raided by the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The raids were depicted as ‘the most serious ASIO counter foreign interference operation since the Cold War’. Prime Minister Scott Morrison, in populist language, said, ‘We won’t cop anyone coming and seeking to interfere in our political system … We are a resilient people. We will stand up to it. And we will take action as what you’ve seen today demonstrates’.
Another example of the ‘China threat’ being used to enhance the federal government’s power is the stoush over the Victorian state government’s generic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreement with China. Federal Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton described the BRI as ‘a propaganda initiative from China’ that brings an ‘enormous amount of foreign interference’. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that if the Victorian BRI agreement ever ventured into telecommunications, the United States would ‘simply disconnect’ from Australia.
To assert power over Victoria’s BRI agreement, the government presented in September the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Bill 2020 to the federal parliament, despite its adverse effects on civil rights, federalism and university autonomy.
The Bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee for consultation. Following multiple submissions, the Committee held hearings on the legislation in October. Questioning in one session focused in on Beijing’s ‘predatory’ activities at both the state and local government levels and in universities. When George Williams, constitutional law expert and deputy vice-chancellor at the University of New South Wales, appeared before the Committee he argued the Bill was ‘not fit to be enacted’. Williams noted that the Bill gave extraordinary power to the minister of foreign affairs without procedural fairness.
The overreach of the Bill is exacerbated by the lack of clarity on key terms, leaving substantial discretion to the foreign minister. As Williams’ remarks, ‘foreign relations is not defined at all’ and ‘foreign policy’ is so ill-defined as to ‘include the concept “any things outside of Australia”.’ The legislation also requires Australian universities to seek government approval to cooperate with foreign universities that do not pass an ‘institutional autonomy’ test, but doesn’t specify what institutional autonomy means.
When university representatives appeared before the Committee, they also raised the issue of what institutional autonomy meant. The questioning made clear that the term is targeted at Chinese universities — the session’s chair, Senator Eric Abetz, pointedly asked the CEO of Universities Australia, Catriona Jackson, ‘If it’s so difficult, can you tell me whether the Chinese universities are institutionally autonomous from the Chinese Communist Party?’
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Business
China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival began in Xiamen on Nov 13, featuring awards, cultural projects worth 31.63 billion yuan, and fostering international film collaborations.
2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival Opens
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival commenced in Xiamen, Fujian province, on November 13. This prestigious event showcases the top film awards in China and spans four days, concluding with the China Golden Rooster Awards ceremony on November 16.
The festival features various film exhibitions, including the Golden Rooster Mainland Film Section and the Golden Rooster International Film Section. These showcases aim to highlight the achievements of Chinese-language films and foster global cultural exchanges within the film industry.
On the festival’s opening day, a significant milestone was reached with the signing of 175 cultural and film projects, valued at 31.63 billion yuan ($4.36 billion). Additionally, the International Film and Television Copyright Service Platform was launched, furthering the globalization of Chinese film and television properties.
Source : China’s Golden Rooster film festival opens in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
- China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
- Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
- China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
- U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
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