China
Has the Vatican lost its voice in China?
Author: Fredrik Fällman, University of Gothenburg
2020 ended on a sad note for China–Vatican relations. News emerged on 30 December that two nuns from the unofficial Vatican office in Hong Kong were detained for three weeks in Hebei in May 2020. They were not allowed to return to Hong Kong and likely remain under house arrest.
Most Catholic clergies — likely fearful of breaking the new Hong Kong national security law — did not speak openly about the case. The only exception was Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, Archbishop of Hong Kong between 2002 and 2009, who has been among the harshest critics of Vatican China policy for many years.
This is a sign that the increased pressure from Beijing and subsequent limitation of Hong Kong’s relative openness are reaching the Catholic Church, which may be symbolic of Sino-Vatican relations more generally. The Church has a broad presence in Hong Kong society through schools and charitable institutions. Many leading persons are Catholics — including former and current chief executives Donald Tsang and Carrie Lam.
The Hong Kong Catholic diocese is facing multiple challenges, especially since it has been without a bishop since 2019. The impending choice of a new one will undoubtedly create more tensions as he will be scrutinised for where his allegiance lies. The choice of a ‘pro-Beijing’ bishop will not go down well among many Hong Kongers, while the choice of a more independent and critical bishop may put pressure on Hong Kong Catholics.
If the Vatican wants to restore the order of episcopal appointments and do away with clandestine practices, then it must engage in dialogue with any necessary counterpart — ‘pro-Beijing’ or not. But dialogue on equal terms is not what is happening. In the ‘pastoral guidelines of the Holy See concerning the civil registration of clergy in China’ published in 2019, the Holy See recognises that ‘many pastors remain deeply disturbed’ by the Chinese system.
While the guidelines ask for ‘no intimidatory pressures’ to be put on unregistered Catholic communities, they also ask for compliance with Chinese regulations. But if registration procedures do not ‘appear respectful of the Catholic faith’, priests and bishops are asked to first state their faithfulness to Catholic doctrine in writing or orally to a witness before complying.
The guidelines seem to be a way to keep up an appearance of integrity, while in reality, they are a compromise and a concession. How can the Church proceed when the situation for openly practised religious life is deteriorating?
In 2018, all registered religious organisations in China published their five-year plans for ‘Sinicization’. The purpose is supposedly to adapt to Chinese culture, but they focus on adapting to and following the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Sinicization is the latest attempt in the drive to ‘adapt religion to socialist society’, a policy started in the 1990s under Jiang Zemin.
The CCP is increasingly claiming the right to interpretation of what is ‘Chinese’ in all contexts, adding Chinese characteristics to everything from the market economy to theology to human rights. China’s constitution only protects ‘normal religious activity’, leaving religious groups in constant doubt as to whether their actions are normal or not.
Vatican representatives described the Provisional Agreement between the Holy See and China in 2018 as ‘a genuinely pastoral agreement’. After prolonging the agreement in October 2020, the Holy See acknowledged that the agreement was ‘not perfect’ but still ‘a step forward’.
French Jesuit and Fudan University Professor Benoit Vermander has discussed the dangers of excluding China from the world community and argues for finding a way where dialogue and criticism can co-exist. Vermander is right that dialogue is essential, but is there really any dialogue between the Holy See and China?
The Catholic Church often comments on the situation in other countries. Yet in China, the Vatican keeps silent on many concerning developments — including structural religious persecution, labour rights issues and human rights abuses against the Uyghurs. It seems Vatican officials are holding China to a different standard compared to other countries.
China should be treated like any other country and play by the same rules as others. With increasing Chinese influence on the world scene, there is a risk that ‘Chinese characteristics’ may be applied outside China, twisting and turning universal values and…
Business
Wegovy: The Popular Weight-Loss Drug Now Available in China
Novo Nordisk launched Wegovy in China after approval, competing with Eli Lilly’s upcoming weight-loss drug. The treatment, costing 1,400 yuan, targets obesity but has potential side effects and isn’t covered by healthcare.
Wegovy Launch in China
Novo Nordisk recently launched its weight-loss drug, Wegovy, in China after obtaining approval from local health authorities in June. The introduction of Wegovy is expected to increase competition with Eli Lilly, which has also received approval for its weight-loss treatment, although it has not yet been released in China’s significant pharmaceutical market.
Cost and Accessibility
In China, a set of four Wegovy injections will be priced at 1,400 yuan (approximately $194), significantly lower than the drug’s U.S. price. However, patients will need to pay the full amount out of pocket since Wegovy is not yet covered by the national healthcare insurance plan.
Benefits and Side Effects
Research indicates that Wegovy can help users lose over 10% of their body weight. The drug contains semaglutide, which assists with appetite control and satiety. While Wegovy has been gaining traction globally, it may cause side effects like nausea. Concerns have emerged about its misuse among individuals who are not obese, prompting medical professionals to remain vigilant.
Source : Popular weight-loss drug Wegovy goes on sale in China
China
China Implements New Measures to Increase Foreign Investment in A-Share Market
China’s 2024 updates to strategic investment rules simplify A-share market access for foreign investors by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and increasing investment options, reflecting a commitment to greater market openness and participation in economic reform.
The 2024 updates to China’s strategic investment rules simplify entry for foreign investors in the A-share market by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and expanding investment options, signaling a commitment to increased market openness and flexibility through these new measures.
China’s capital markets are undergoing a significant transformation as part of the nation’s ongoing commitment to economic reform and openness. The recent update to the Administrative Measures for Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (hereinafter, the “new measures”) reflects this commitment, targeting an increase in foreign investor participation in China’s A-share market. For nearly two decades, China’s “strategic investment” pathway provided foreign investors with access to shares in A-share listed companies, but strict requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and prolonged lock-up periods—made it accessible only to select large investors.
The new measures, effective December 2, 2024, relax many of these restrictions to attract a broader and more diverse range of foreign investors. Key changes include lowering the minimum shareholding threshold from 10 percent to 5 percent, reducing the asset requirements from US$100 million to US$50 million in assets, and shortening the lock-up period from three years to one. Additionally, foreign investors can now use equity from unlisted overseas companies as consideration, while new investment routes, like tender offers, enhance flexibility.
In 2005, China introduced the Strategic Investment Regime as part of its broader efforts to open up its financial markets to foreign capital while retaining a level of control over sensitive industries. This framework allowed qualified foreign investors to acquire strategic stakes in Chinese A-share listed companies, aiming to promote foreign participation in the domestic market.
However, the stringent requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and extended lock-up periods—restricted this pathway to a limited pool of large, multinational investors. The regime reflected China’s cautious approach at the time, seeking to balance openness with economic stability and control over critical sectors.
A decade later, in 2015, China implemented its first significant revisions to the Strategic Investment Regime. These amendments sought to make the investment process more accessible by easing certain restrictions, aiming to encourage foreign capital inflow as China continued its gradual integration into global markets.
While some requirements were relaxed, the fundamental limitations—such as high entry thresholds and complex approval processes—remained in place, meaning that access to China’s A-share market was still primarily confined to major institutional investors with substantial capital.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
Rising concerns over China’s industrial overcapacity have led countries to impose higher tariffs, including Indonesia’s planned 200% tariffs on Chinese goods, risking Indonesia’s competitiveness and economic security.
Tariffs Escalate Amid Concerns of Overcapacity
Concerns regarding China’s industrial overcapacity have prompted countries to increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Indonesia, following the U.S. example, plans to impose tariffs as high as 200 percent on various Chinese imports, including textiles and ceramics. This response aims to safeguard local jobs from the influx of inexpensive Chinese products.
Economic Impact of Tariffs
These tariffs are designed as safeguards and anti-dumping measures against potential job losses in Indonesia. However, the ongoing investigations have not definitively shown that China’s practices are the root cause of these issues. The political appeal of broad tariffs might lead to unintended consequences, such as reducing the overall competitiveness of Indonesian exports and risking retaliatory measures from affected countries.
Dependency on Chinese Goods
Indonesia heavily relies on Chinese manufacturing inputs, which constituted over 26 percent of its intermediary goods imports in 2021. With competitive pricing, these inputs have enhanced Indonesia’s export capabilities, particularly to markets like the U.S., where the trade surplus increased from $8.58 billion in 2019 to $11.96 billion in 2023. Reducing trade openness may ultimately undermine the Indonesian economy’s resilience against geopolitical challenges.
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