China
Simandou is China’s poisoned chalice
Authors: Luke Hurst, Lydekker and Peter Cai, Lowy Institute
In September 2021, Alpha Conde — the octogenarian president of Guinea — was toppled by the special forces he created. It is the latest episode of political instability in the West African state with not only rich resources but also a history of military coups.
A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, in an unusual move, spoke against the military coup and urged the immediate release of the former president. This is a departure from Beijing’s cardinal foreign policy dictate of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.
China has a big stake in the country. Guinea is China’s biggest supplier of bauxite, a key raw material for the aluminium industry. But perhaps more importantly, Guinea is home to the world’s largest untapped iron ore deposit, Simandou.
With an estimated 2.4 billion tons of high-grade iron ore reserves, Simandou is widely seen as China’s best hope of reducing dependency on Australia, which is by far the largest supplier of iron ore to the country. Beijing’s relationship with Canberra has sunk to new lows during the last two years over a range of bitter disputes from the South China Sea to the decision to exclude Huawei from Australia’s 5G network.
Guinea was mentioned as an option for China to develop a large-scale iron ore mine in its five-year plan for the steel industry released by the Ministry of Information Technology and Industry in early 2021. It is a key piece in China’s strategy of achieving a higher degree of resource security.
Two Chinese companies already have strategic stakes in the Simandou project — the state-owned Chinaclo and the privately controlled Weiqiao. In 2020, China’s largest steelmaker, Baowu Steel Group, was reportedly exploring the possibility of establishing a US$6 billion consortium to develop Simandou in partnership with other steelmakers, engineering companies and sovereign wealth funds.
The ouster of Alpha Condo could derail Beijing’s ambition to reduce its dependency on Australia for iron ore, highlighting one of Simandou’s biggest risk factors: political instability in a country ravaged by civil war and tribal conflicts.
China is cognisant of political risk and is not afraid of airing it publicly. China Geological Survey published a report in 2020 highlighting the Guinea government’s lack of respect for contractual arrangements, political instability and rising African resource nationalism.
The report is critical of industrial relations in the country and cites increasingly frequent strikes as a ‘negative’ for investment. It concludes by saying that while the Simandou project’s advantages are clear, the risks are also significant, including huge investment outlay, a long investment cycle, and uncertainty. Chinese firms have acquired mining rights, but there is significant uncertainty about the profitability of the project. The report notes, ‘Chinese companies will face significant challenges during implementation and operation stages of this project’.
The Chinese government’s geology services further warn about the Guinean government’s desire to extract as much as US$15.5 billion in tax. A non-Chinese mining executive who was heavily involved in the early development of the Simandou project noted: ‘the biggest [issue] is that Simandou is a national crown jewel and in any country … resources of that scale come with very big political strings … this is far bigger than anything they’ve ever had to deal with before’.
Australian miner and Chinalco’s partner in the project, Rio Tinto, understood the risk too well as the victim of Guinea’s past expropriations after winning the exclusive development rights in 1997. Today, Rio Tinto’s share in the Simandou project has been whittled down to 44.05 per cent.
In Simandou, Beijing faces a huge dilemma. It is a significant opportunity to reduce its dependency on a supplier that it no longer trusts. But geography, price fluctuations and political instability also present significant risks.
Despite Beijing’s established ties in Africa, its large cheque book and ability to deliver massive infrastructure projects quickly, there are things even the Chinese Communist Party find beyond their control.
Luke Hurst is Managing Director at Lydekker, an Australian-based Asia strategy and market advisory firm.
Peter Cai is Research Fellow and Director of China-Australia relations at the Lowy Institute.
The post Simandou is China’s poisoned chalice first appeared on East Asia Forum.
Business
HSBC Chairman to Head Key UK Business Delegation to China
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker will lead a UK business delegation to China next month to boost trade and investment, amid concerns over national security and improving UK-China relations.
HSBC Chairman Leads UK Delegation to China
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker will lead a pivotal British business delegation to China next month, marking the first significant visit since 2018. The trip aims to enhance Chinese investment in the UK, guided by Chancellor Rachel Reeves. Tucker, a seasoned financier with extensive Asia experience, is regarded as essential in resetting UK-China relations.
Reviving Economic Dialogue
Tucker will accompany senior bankers in seeking to rejuvenate trade, specifically focusing on financial services. Although there are apprehensions among some UK lawmakers regarding national security threats posed by closer ties to Beijing, the UK Treasury spokesperson confirmed Chancellor Reeves’ upcoming discussions on economic cooperation in Beijing.
A Shift in UK-China Relations
Since suspending most dialogues following China’s imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong, UK-China relations have soured. Nevertheless, the Labour government is prioritizing improved ties with China, emphasizing investment opportunities. Reeves asserts the necessity of a pragmatic approach to benefitting national interests amid ongoing concerns voiced by some lawmakers about security risks.
Source : HSBC Chairman to lead pivotal UK business delegation to China
China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.