China
Why there are no grand alliances in Asia
Author: Evan Laksmana, NUS
The outlines of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy are emerging. Public comments from administration figures indicate that the US is seeking to build more bespoke or ad hoc regional coalitions – such as the Quad and AUKUS – to balance China’s military power and buttress the ‘rules-based order’.
At the heart of the US–China contest in the Indo-Pacific region is a competition for influence in Southeast Asia. But beating the drum of the ‘rules-based order’ or sounding the alarm on Chinese military and economic coercion has less resonance among south-east Asian post-colonial elites than Washington thinks. Regional countries don’t want to subscribe to some exclusive vision of regional order, regardless of whether it is from Washington or Beijing.
Some Southeast Asian countries view ‘rules-based order’ talk as a necessary diplomatic veneer for defending shared principles but most see it as hollow chatter. And some privately assess it as just a snipe against China.
China’s behaviour is certainly detrimental to the region. But the United States must reckon with its own responsibility for the fraying of regional order. This did not begin and end with the Trump presidency. Many regional elites still remember how the US trampled on the order in the name of the global war on terror.
At best, the ‘rules-based order’ narrative is under-defined and unappealing. At a time of economic flux, how many regional policymakers would make decisions based on an abstract and broken ‘rules-based order’ rather than on concrete interests such as economic recovery and ‘collective welfare’?
Nor should Washington assume that regional states will coalesce to prevent Chinese dominance and create a European-style balance of power. In Asia, hierarchy, rather than power balance, has historically been the structure of regional order.
At the moment few Southeast Asian leaders view China as the primary threat – militarily or otherwise. There is no regional concurrence over a ‘China challenge’, nor that any one power is ideologically or morally superior.
A European-style power arrangement would only be likely to arise after the region is effectively polarised and China is excluded from all regional policy arenas. The cost of getting there would be high.
For a true balancing coalition to emerge in the region China would have to become significantly more threatening to every Southeast Asian state. Why would China become so threatening? Probably only if it saw ‘core interests’ such as Taiwan being threatened or if it felt excluded from the region. Either way, the cost of ‘getting China angry’ so that a balancing coalition emerges would be too costly for everyone involved.
Regional states are, of course, more likely to buy in to a regional order they deem legitimate. But there is no evidence that all Indo-Pacific states have ever perceived a single unifying source of regional legitimacy. There is no single actor with a preponderant legitimacy, let alone a full-blown Pax Americana or Pax Sinica. The absence of a universally accepted ‘operating system’ is a feature, not a bug, of regional order.
Regional states are accustomed to living without a grand legitimate order and to working through different organising principles for different policy ends. Their strategic histories attest to the selective enforcement and uneven implementation of international rules.
Regional order begins and ends with domestic legitimacy. Asking regional countries to ‘decouple″ from China is a tall order, for both practical and political reasons. They are increasingly and painfully aware of their supply chain vulnerabilities, but simply cutting off ties with China without a viable alternative would be strategic malpractice.
Regional countries will continue circumnavigating regional hierarchies rather than allow themselves to be pushed into some European-style balancing coalition. They won’t accept Chinese hegemony willy-nilly, although some seem to be behaving like vassal states. Rather, they will continue engaging both sides and hedging their bets. They will choose the options that enhance their domestic legitimacy and strategic autonomy.
This leaves the more difficult question of, if not the United States or China, then who? Middle powers such as Japan, India and Australia are already taking sides in the US-China strategic competition. Indonesia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are unlikely to offer a concrete alternative that workably accommodates all…
Business
China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival began in Xiamen on Nov 13, featuring awards, cultural projects worth 31.63 billion yuan, and fostering international film collaborations.
2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival Opens
The 2024 China Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival commenced in Xiamen, Fujian province, on November 13. This prestigious event showcases the top film awards in China and spans four days, concluding with the China Golden Rooster Awards ceremony on November 16.
The festival features various film exhibitions, including the Golden Rooster Mainland Film Section and the Golden Rooster International Film Section. These showcases aim to highlight the achievements of Chinese-language films and foster global cultural exchanges within the film industry.
On the festival’s opening day, a significant milestone was reached with the signing of 175 cultural and film projects, valued at 31.63 billion yuan ($4.36 billion). Additionally, the International Film and Television Copyright Service Platform was launched, furthering the globalization of Chinese film and television properties.
Source : China’s Golden Rooster film festival opens in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
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- China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
- U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
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