China
Why China cares about the label of democracy
Author: Xunchao Zhang, University of Wisconsin-Madison
If you access any Chinese state media or pro-state social media published in late 2021, you will be bombarded with attacks on US President Joe Biden’s ‘Summit for Democracy’ and relentless insistence that China is the world’s largest democracy. Beyond the fear of geopolitical containment, it is puzzling why China cared about Biden’s democracy summit.
It is not initially clear why China would insist on being a democracy when claiming democratic status risks falling into a rhetorical trap.
While most Western media dismisses China’s claim to democracy as simply a cynical propaganda ploy, some ‘democratisation optimists’ in the West have suggested that China’s reaction to Biden’s summit shows China’s commitment to some vague notion of eventual democratisation. These observations miss the point. China’s reaction to the summit — clinging onto the concept of democracy — largely reflects a lack of a conceptual alternative, geopolitical fear and some genuine domestic perception that the country is democratic.
The most important problem facing China is a lack of alternative concepts to legitimise the state. Although contemporary China is the heir to a socialist revolution, beyond nostalgic leftist circles, orthodox Marxism cannot capture the public imagination as an alternative to liberal democracy.
Granted, there is growing intellectual interest in critiques of democracy such as meritocracy and the Schmittian notion of self-justifying authoritarian state power. Eric Li is perhaps the most eloquent critic of democracy in China offering universal critiques of liberal democracy, such as institutional vulnerability to being captured by elites and the tendency to be gridlocked in unhealthy partisanship and identity politics. Beyond critiques, there are also alternative visions being offered, such as by Daniel Bell who often characterises China as an examination-based meritocracy rather than electoral democracy.
Yet, so far, none of the alternative concepts of legitimisation have gained official endorsement. You will not find meritocracy or citation of Carl Schmitt in the plethora of documents produced by China Communist Party plenums. These alternative concepts are rare sights even in the less rigid Chinese media propaganda targeting foreign audiences.
There are also geopolitical concerns. Embracing any legitimisation concept other than democracy by China, even one that is not explicitly anti-democratic, may unite the Western world in a democratic alliance against China. There are anti-democratic leaders and anti-democratic movements all over the world, usually referred to as ‘populists’, who do not have a systematic anti-democratic ideology. Most of these populists also take up anti-China foreign policy positions. Some even treat China as a scapegoat for their domestic grievances. There is little chance for anti-democratic solidarity between China and the international populist right.
It is advantageous for Beijing to cling to the democratic label to avoid contributing to the formation of a united Western democratic coalition against China. Plenty of people in China genuinely believe their country is democratic. One historical reason behind this is the presence of so-called ‘people-oriented (minben)’ thought in traditional Chinese political culture, which emphasises governance ‘for the people’, rather than government ‘by the people’. Mencius outlined the classic Confucian ideal of state–society relations, under which ‘the people come first, the state comes second, [and] the ruler comes last’.
Yet a state that works for the benefit of the people is not necessarily democratic. People-oriented governance often means a paternalistic but responsive form of authoritarianism. Elites and the public in China often use performance metrics, rather than procedural and institutional criteria, to measure how legitimate or ‘democratic’ the state is. These performance metrics include economic growth and also Beijing’s ability to avenge China’s century of humiliation and reclaim China’s great power status.
The primacy of performance metrics over procedural ones is also reflected in survey data. Pollsters repeatedly find that a majority of Chinese respondents consider China a democracy. It would be self-deceiving for Western observers to dismiss these survey results as a simple reflection of public quiescence under state pressure. A more nuanced interpretation is that ‘democracy’ is simply what the public calls a state…
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.
Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position
A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.
President Prabowo’s State Visit
During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Economic Incentives at Play
China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.
Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
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