China
All Asia is saying is give economic peace a chance
Author: Editorial Board, ANU
As if the stakes in the ongoing US–China geopolitical competition weren’t high enough already, on 7 October the United States banned the transfer of key microchip technologies to Chinese entities.
With the chip ban the United States has signalled — despite the Biden administration’s denials — that it is committed to a strategy of containment not only in military, but now also in economic terms. This begins with thwarting China’s ambitions to dominate the development and production of high-end computing chips that will be central to strategically important industries like AI.
The chip ban may well achieve its intended effects in the short run: China’s chip manufacturing industry is still very dependent on US-developed hardware and software, and the local chip industry is in crisis as firms are cut off from key materials and personnel.
The longer-term effects of the policy are much less certain. China will continue to specialise where it can. Cutting China off from US technology gives Beijing extra incentive to keep throwing money at its own chip R&D, with a view to building an isolated tech supply chain that is even more geared towards state — and especially military — goals. What’s certain is that the chip ban will be disruptive far beyond the semiconductor industry, as global tech supply chains come to be driven less by the economics of comparative advantage than by the geopolitics of the world’s two biggest economies.
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has described these strategies as surrounding a small yard with a high fence. Extraterritorial unilateral sanctions that hurt American tech firms, allies and partner economies are locking others into a larger American yard that may not look so attractive.
In tech just as in other industries, it’s pointless to try and build supply chains delinked from China — most of the region’s critical production chains geared for manufactured exports destined for outside the region run through China, driven by the enduring competitive advantage China has as a manufacturing base, despite rising costs and the recent COVID-zero policy.
Indeed, the Asia Pacific economy is not bound by a distinction between the United States and China — it’s an interdependent system in which China is an integral part.
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made this point during a recent visit to Australia where he remarked that, notwithstanding the principle that certain economic exchange is subject to national security concerns, the chip ban could lead to ‘less economic cooperation, less interdependency, less trust, and possibly, ultimately a less stable world’.
At the very least, decoupling threatens to disturb a pan-regional system of trade and investment that is absolutely crucial to the prosperity not only of established, incumbent players — among them US allies like South Korea and Japan — but the development of relative newcomers to international tech production networks like Indonesia and Vietnam, important partners of the United States who would rather not be forced to choose between participation in rival US- and China-centric tech production chains that decoupling would inevitably create.
The chip ban is of a piece with an emergent US Indo-Pacific strategy that seeks to write China out of American attempts to shape multilateral rules and institutions across the region. That has obvious impacts on the interests of US allies across Asia, but more importantly, as Paul Heer warns in this week’s lead article, the impulse to premise US engagement and institution-building in the region on the goal of excluding China undermines US influence over the long run.
In US policy rhetoric, China is increasingly ‘framed in terms of the central threat it poses to openness, security and prosperity in the region. There appears to be little consideration of the possibility that Beijing might share some of its neighbours’ goals or other elements of Washington’s regional agenda.’ This inhibits cooperation between the two great powers on myriad issues in which the rest of the region has a stake — from climate change and energy to debt relief and rehabilitating the WTO.
Heer calls for a small-r realism about China that would open the door for such re-engagement beyond zero-sum geopolitical rivalry. ‘There is no doubt that cooperation would be complicated, given the inevitable rivalry and strategic mistrust between Beijing and Washington. But the alternative of a region divided between hostile camps would…
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.
Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position
A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.
President Prabowo’s State Visit
During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Economic Incentives at Play
China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.
Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
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