China
Canada launches Indo-Pacific strategy that talks tough on China
U.S. ally Canada has launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy “to advance Canada’s regional peace and security interests” as a Pacific nation, with indications of a tougher stance against China.
Relations between the Canadian and Chinese governments have been strained after Canada arrested Meng Wanzhou, a senior executive at the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei in 2018 at the request of the U.S.
The bilateral tensions were exposed recently on the sidelines of the recent Group of 20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping appeared to be criticizing his Canadian counterpart Justin Trudeau over alleged media leaks.
The long-awaited 23-page document said “Canada’s evolving approach to China is a critical part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” clearly defining Beijing as “an increasingly disruptive global power.”
China has increasingly disregarded international rules and norms while having had “an enormous impact on the Indo-Pacific” and nurturing “ambitions to become the leading power in the region,” it said.
“Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is informed by its clear-eyed understanding of this global China, and Canada’s approach is aligned with those of our partners in the region and around the world,” the paper said.
The new strategy pledges to push back “against any form of foreign interference on Canadian soil” and strengthen Canada’s cyber security systems, while dedicating more resources to “enhance Canadian competencies on China.”
New investments will be made in order to deepen “our understanding of how China thinks, operates and plans, and how it exerts influence in the region and around the world.”
The document said Ottawa was reviewing all mechanisms and structures, such as Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Dialogues, across all federal departments “to ensure they advance Canada’s national interests.”
Economic interests
Canada began talks on a possible free trade deal with China in 2016 but abandoned plans four years later because Trudeau’s government faced increased domestic criticism for being too lenient and compromising towards Beijing.
The Indo-Pacific is Canada’s second-largest regional export market, after the United States, with annual two-way trade valued at CA$226 billion (U.S.$168 billion).
Over the next five years, Canada will invest nearly CA$2.3 billion (U.S.$1.7 billion) in different initiatives to boost its economic and strategic role in the region, according to the new strategy.
While protecting Canadian market access in China, the new Indo-Pacific Strategy acknowledged the importance of diversifying “within, and beyond, that market.”
The paper identified a number of “key partners” in the Indo-Pacific, including India, the North Pacific (Japan and South Korea), and the ten-nation Southeast Asian bloc ASEAN.
“India’s strategic importance and leadership – both across the region and globally – will only increase,” it said, adding that besides economic cooperation, Canada will seek to bolster ties with India in the fields of security, the promotion of democracy, pluralism and human rights.
Initiatives to foster economic ties with the region include establishing the Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia and Canada’s first agriculture office in the region.
Security ties
A major part of Ottawa’s new strategy in the Indo-Pacific is to promote Canada’s security interests in the region.
“The strategy will bolster our Canadian armed forces’ presence in the region, and will enhance Canada’s defense and security relationships with partners and allies,” said Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand.
Canada will put over CA$720 million (U.S.$535.8 million) into new security projects with more than a half of the investment going to “reinforce Canada’s Indo-Pacific naval presence and increase Canadian armed forces’ participation in regional military exercises.”
A third naval frigate will be deployed to the region, according to Canada’s department of national defense.
A new multi-department initiative will also be created “to help develop cyber security capacity in select regional partners.”
The new strategy also pledges to further promote Canada’s long-standing collaboration with, and contribution to, the Five Eyes – the intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Canadian government said it will continue to work with partners “to push back against any unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the East and South China Seas.”
Since 2021, Canadian warships have taken part in some U.S.-led Taiwan Strait transits that China denounced as “provocative.”
Beijing considers Taiwan a Chinese province and the Taiwan issue the “core of China’s core interests” and an “insurmountable” red line that should not be crossed.
China has yet to respond to the newly-launched strategy but Canada’s increased military presence will no doubt provoke criticism from Beijing and risk leading to confrontations, even conflicts.
Canadian aircraft taking part in U.N. missions in the region have been dangerously intercepted by Chinese warplanes on numerous occasions.
Since December last year Ottawa has reportedly lodged “multiple” diplomatic complaints with Beijing for what it called the “unsafe and unprofessional conduct” of the Chinese pilots who “buzzed” Canadian airplanes.
“Buzzing” means flying extremely close and fast, risking a mid-air collision.
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China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
- Gordonstoun Severs Connections with Business Led by Individual Accused of Espionage for China
- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
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