China
Vietnam steps up South China Sea land reclamation
Vietnam has accelerated its island building in the South China Sea where China has fully militarized three of its artificial islands, with Hanoi reclaiming about 80% of new land in the last year, a new study found.
The report “Vietnam’s major Spratly expansion”, released by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said however that Vietnam’s total reclamation area to date is still less than 20% of China’s.
“Vietnam has created 520 acres [210 hectares] of new land in the Spratlys in the last ten years while China built 3,200 acres [1,295 hectares],” Greg Poling, AMTI’s director, told RFA.
Six parties – Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam – hold conflicting claims over the South China Sea and the islands in the sea but China’s claims are by far the most expansive.
Only China, the Philippines and Vietnam are known to have been reclaiming land for further construction on their occupied islands and reefs. Beijing is believed to have finished the construction and militarization of three of its artificial islands – Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reef – all within the Spratly archipelago.
China has also fully developed Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago and uses it as the military and administrative capital for all of its claims in the South China Sea.
Vietnam and Taiwan also claim sovereignty over some islands in the Paracels but China occupies all of them.
‘Defensive reclamation’
AMTI’s report said Vietnam has expanded dredging and landfill work at several of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, creating roughly 420 acres (170 hectares) of new land in 2020 alone and bringing its total in the last ten years to 540 acres (219 hectares).
Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, Sand Cay, and Tennent Reef, which are called respectively Nam Yet, Phan Vinh, Son Ca and Tien Nu in Vietnamese, are identified as the most significantly developed outposts.
The expansion allows the outposts to host larger vessels, including military ships, the report said.
It said that new dredging and landfill work has also begun at another five features in the Spratlys which up to now only host small rigs and platforms.
Vietnam has 49 or 51 outposts spread across 27 features, AMTI said, adding that there is evidence of reclamation at ten of the features.
The development process “involves the use of clamshell dredgers and construction equipment to scoop up sections of shallow reef and deposit the sediment on the area targeted for landfill,” according to the report.
“This is a more time consuming and less arbitrarily destructive process than the cutter suction dredging that China used to build its artificial islands,” it said.
AMTI’s Poling said that in his opinion, Vietnam’s methods are “considerably less damaging to the wider environment, though of course destroying 520 acres of coral reef is still quite bad for the environment and fisheries.”
“I wouldn’t describe this as nearly as destabilizing as what China did as what matters most is what they’re used for,” said the analyst, adding that “China uses its islands to harass and coerce Southeast Asian countries.”
“If Vietnam’s buildup remains defensive, then it really isn’t the same,” he said.
For its part, Beijing accused Hanoi of reinforcing “illegally-held features” by land reclamation and military deployment, as well as “setting up defenses and operating on these islands and reefs.”
A Chinese think-tank, the South China Sea Probing Initiative, said in a report that as Vietnam tries” to trumpet that the islands and reefs of the Spratly Islands held by it are for civilian uses, they actually have a strong military dimension.”
“As the Vietnamese troops and civilians have become increasingly active in the Vietnamese-held islands and reefs as well as the surrounding waters, the risk of any friction and conflict couldn’t be belittled,” the report said.
PCA opens in Hanoi
Vietnam and China, haven’t responded to the new findings in the report but previously, Vietnamese official channels insisted that Hanoi adhere strictly to the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, as well as agreements with China and other regional countries.
Hanoi also repeatedly claimed its “indisputable sovereignty” over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, as well as challenging Beijing’s maritime claims.
In July 2016, a U.N. arbitral tribunal ruled against China’s historic rights claims within its so-called “nine-dash line” that encircles almost 90% of the South China Sea.
The tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague issued this arbitral award in response to a legal challenge brought against China in 2013 by the Philippines. China refused to participate in the arbitration, rejected the PCA’s ruling, and has continued to defend its claims.
In the latest development, the PCA has just formally opened an office in Hanoi, its second office in Asia after Singapore and the fifth outside of its headquarters in The Hague, according to a Dec. 1 press release.
Vietnam has said it did not rule out a possibility of bringing Beijing before an international tribunal similar to the Philippines’ 2013 lawsuit.
Read the rest of this article here >>> Vietnam steps up South China Sea land reclamation
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
China
U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.
China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”
China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.
Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.
As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.
The stronghold of the U.S. dollar
The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).
In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.
The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.
Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.
U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.
However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”
There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.
Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.
On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.
Unsustainable debt
The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.
The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.
That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.
With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.
Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.
This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.
An opportunity for China
This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.
However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.
It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.
This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.
China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy
China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.
At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.
China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.
As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.