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Vietnam hedges its bets on the BRI

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Students walk along a road building site in Hanoi, Vietnam, 17 May 2011 (Photo: Reuters/Nguyen Huy Kham).

Authors: Viet Dung Trinh, University of Queensland and Huy Hai Do, Hanoi University

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, is considered an ambitious long-term strategy to promote the expansion of Chinese influence by providing countries in the region with aid and infrastructure investment. But in contrast with some Southeast Asian states which have largely embraced the BRI with open arms, Vietnam has adopted a hedging approach.

Hedging is characterised by three contradicting yet complementary features — avoiding opposition against and dependence on a rising power, engaging in both deference and defiance with a threatening power, and diversifying relations with other major powers.

Vietnam’s strategy towards China’s BRI displays all three of these features of hedging. While Vietnam’s endorsement of the BRI shows its desire to avoid confrontation with China, Hanoi is cognisant of the risk of economic dependence on Beijing and the opacity of BRI projects. Vietnam has proactively constrained its engagement in this initiative.

The only BRI project implemented in Vietnam has been Chinese investment in the Cat Linh–Ha Dong tramline, which encountered condemnation due to its ballooning cost and stagnating progress. The project was signed in 2008 and was due to be completed in 2016. But it was not completed until the end of 2021 and the cost of the project suddenly rose from US$552.86 million to nearly US$11 billion in 2018.

Vietnam has also started distancing itself from China out of fear of falling into a Chinese ‘debt trap’ and because of intensifying tensions in the South China Sea. For example, Hanoi denied Chinese funding for the Van Don–Mong Cai highway due to national security concerns. The highway connects Van Don, which was set to be a specialised economic zone in 2018 with Mong Cai, a city near the border with China.

Similarly, the cancellation of the North–South railway, which would have connected Vietnam’s two largest cities, and the Hanoi–Lao Cai highway, which would have run from the capital to a province near China, were both due to fear that Chinese capital provision would be interrupted. And Vietnam has opted out of Huawei involvement in developing 5G telecommunications infrastructure due to concerns about threats from Chinese intelligence agencies, and has instead endeavoured to develop its own 5G model.

In its hedging approach to the BRI, Hanoi has also diversified its relations with other powerful states. Sovereignty disputes with China in the South China Sea have fostered a closer relationship between Hanoi and Tokyo, which was highlighted in 2014 by the two sides’ efforts to upgrade their relationship to an extensive strategic partnership, grounded on shared goals of peace and prosperity. Vietnam has welcomed Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure Investment more warmly than the BRI and has received substantial infrastructure investment from Tokyo.

Vietnam has even enhanced its relations with its previous foe, the United States, to restrict China’s attempts at broadening its influence in the region. Vietnam and the United States have boosted their bilateral economic ties and improved defence cooperation. Vietnam has also supported the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy by welcoming US contribution to regional peace and stability. During the Trump administration, two US aircraft carriers visited Vietnam.

Vietnam’s hedging strategy towards the BRI could provide valuable lessons for other ASEAN states when dealing with a rising and more ambitious China. Vietnam has partially succeeded in fostering cooperation with other major powers instead of depending on an unreliable neighbour. Less developed countries like Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar which have actively engaged in the BRI should consider adopting such a strategy in order to avoid falling into a Chinese ‘debt trap’ or becoming ‘chess pieces’ in China’s geopolitical game.

Restricting economic dependence on China could also help to forge closer bonds among ASEAN members. China has weaponised its economic power to break ASEAN’s unity and ability to form consensus. This is exemplified by the increasing aid and investment that China provided to Cambodia after Phnom Penh blocked ASEAN’s joint statement on tensions in the South China Sea. Cambodia seems to be accepting political dependence on Beijing in return for economic development. During the time that it has undermined ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea problem, Cambodia has…

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China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors

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In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.


China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.

According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.

By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.

A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.

(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)

 


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

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Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows

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The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.

Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.

The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.

This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.

The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.

As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.

Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?

Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

China’s ascent changes the global landscape

China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.

In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.

Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.

Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.

Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.

Nations respond

The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.

Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.

Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.

Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.

Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.

Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.

Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images

Openness waning

Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.

Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.

The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea

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A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.


Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position

A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.

President Prabowo’s State Visit

During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Economic Incentives at Play

China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.

Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance

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