China
China’s crackdown on flamboyant billionaires
Author: Martin Miszerak, SolBridge International School of Business
In March 2023, China’s National People’s Congress announced the establishment of a Central Finance Commission, a ‘super-regulator’ tasked with the supervision and overhaul of the entire financial sector. The new body is to be chaired by none other than Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Commission’s first ‘unofficial’ financial restructuring may well have been the mid-February disappearance of billionaire investment banker Bao Fan.
Bao is the founder and chairman of China Renaissance, the country’s top investment bank. The disappearance of Bao Fan remains a mystery, although a rumour later circulated that he was ‘cooperating’ with an investigation by ‘certain authorities’.
Bao Fan is not the first Chinese billionaire to vanish. He follows in the footsteps of Jack Ma, founder of the e-commerce giant Alibaba and former controlling shareholder of Ant Group. Ant Group was a financial services powerhouse scheduled to go public in Hong Kong in November 2020 in the biggest initial public offering (IPO) ever. Jack Ma disappeared shortly after he delivered a speech in Shanghai which was highly critical of the Chinese banking sector and its regulators.
The IPO was put on hold and Ant Group has been subjected to extensive restructuring. Jack Ma unexpectedly reappeared in mainland China in late March 2023, presumably as a part of the government’s initiative to improve sentiment among the private sector. It is not clear how long the government will allow him to stay on the mainland, but any executive role in Ant Group is over for him.
Bao Fan’s business philosophy sheds some light on the possible circumstances of his disappearance. Bao was an unabashedly global citizen but doing business in an environment of intensifying nationalism and authoritarianism under Xi Jinping. The son of Chinese diplomats, he lived a privileged youth, with the ability to travel internationally and attend high school in the United States. Armed with a Master of Business Administration, he spent several years working for investment banks Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley. Bao was a titan of China’s technology and finance industries and his fame lay in his unceasing focus on networking and deal-making.
While Bao’s company China Renaissance operates a wealth management division, the company’s core business was investment banking, accounting for 44 per cent of its total revenue in 2021. Given his focus on deal-making, it is hard to imagine Bao Fan spending much time on the study of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, which may have been a fatal error.
Bao operated on the model of a flamboyant ‘master banker’ and ‘rainmaker’, reminiscent of the late US investment banker Bruce Wasserstein, who also bolted out of First Boston (today Credit Suisse) to set up his boutique investment bank and later led the buyout and IPO of Lazard Freres. China Renaissance’s business model eerily resembles that of Lazard Freres, which is generally thought to be home to ‘swashbuckling’ star bankers.
Bao Fan’s flamboyance and aggressive deal-making as ‘king’ of the platform tech industry were incompatible with Xi Jinping’s Marxist vision for the financial sector. Under Xi’s vision, the financial sector should be limited to supporting China’s manufacturing sectors, particularly those prioritised in Made in China 2025. While Xi Jinping is not against the private sector and Premier Li Qiang has repeatedly affirmed China’s commitment to the private sector, their imperative is for the private sector to be under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control and promote party objectives.
There is no room for someone like Bao Fan within such a private sector model. For Xi, an ideal entrepreneur is someone like Ren Zhengfei, founder and Chief Executive Officer of Huawei. Ren blends unquestionable entrepreneurial talents with a dedication to communism and Mao Zedong, after whom he ‘fashions himself’ and the company. He reads the Selected Works of Mao Zedong in his spare time.
It is difficult to be optimistic about the future of either Bao Fan or China Renaissance. The ‘reappearance’ of Bao Fan as if nothing had happened is highly unlikely. He is much more likely to follow in the footsteps of Jack Ma, either remaining incommunicado under house arrest or being forced into exile.
China Renaissance is likely to follow in the path of Ant Group by ‘inviting’ a major state-owned shareholder and demoting Bao Fan to…
China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.
Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position
A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.
President Prabowo’s State Visit
During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Economic Incentives at Play
China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.
Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance