China
Why the Saudi–Iran agreement doesn’t herald an active role for China in the Gulf
Author: Guy Burton, Brussels School of Governance
In March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations, with China playing a role as the host of the talks. This generated considerable discussion among policymakers and the scholarly community. Some believed this indicated a new change in China’s approach to the Middle East, which has primarily focused on commercial relations.
But the assumption that China is about to take on a more prominent and active role as a conflict mediator in the Gulf region is overstated. Although Beijing hosted the talks that led to the agreement, much of the substantive work had been done earlier, primarily by Iraq and Oman. China’s late involvement was also enabled because the United States does not have relations with Iran, making it difficult for the United States to broker a deal.
China’s participation was like its earlier efforts at regional conflict management. Between 2004–07 it tried to bridge the gap between the international community and the Sudanese regime during the Darfur crisis. Beijing then did something similar in 2013–15 between the West and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In both cases, Chinese involvement was helped by a pre-established framework of dialogue and the willingness of each side to involve Beijing.
Discussion since the Saudi–Iran agreement has moved on to how China might guarantee relations between the two rivals. This makes too much of the agreement, which was limited to restarting diplomatic ties. Even if China had the will, it lacks the capacity to impose itself on the two signatories, not least because several grievances persist between them. They include Iran’s creeping nuclear militarisation and their contrary stances over the civil war in Yemen — though there are signs that the two sides may be starting to find some common ground.
Even if China cannot ensure future stability, there are sufficient incentives from within the region that might make this possible. Iran and Saudi Arabia had good reasons to reach an agreement with each other. On the Saudi side, there is a sense that Washington has become less reliable. At the same time, Riyadh realises that diversifying relations is no bad thing — Saudi Arabia’s commercial ties have grown substantially with China over the past two decades. Between 2005 to 2022, Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia totalled US$12.78 billion compared to US$4.72 billion in Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran is struggling economically. Between 2012 and 2021 its GDP almost halved, from US$644 billion to US$360 billion, exacerbated by sanctions. It also faced widespread protests against the killing of Mahsa Amini in police custody in 2022, prompting it to crack down on protestors. Compared to the Saudis, Iran has fewer available alternatives. Although it signed an investment contract with China two years ago, there has been little sign that it has led to any substantial increase in resources. Having China host diplomatic talks with the Saudis may have been Iran’s way of staying in Beijing’s line of sight.
The agreement from both sides to involve China will potentially reduce part of the Gulf rivalry while also indicating that China may be becoming aware that its growing economic profile brings with it political implications. China has long sought to avoid becoming entangled in regional tensions and conflicts. But that is proving harder than it seems. Following the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit with China in December 2022, a joint declaration reiterated the GCC’s long-standing support for the United Arab Emirates’ claims over the Tunb and Abu Musa islands. Tehran also claims these islands and summoned the Chinese ambassador post-announcement.
The Chinese now appear more attentive towards tensions in the Gulf. On the eve of his visit to the Gulf in 2021, then foreign minister Wang Yi published China’s Five-Point Plan. It referred to the need for collective and regionally generated security in the Gulf. Wang pointed to the need for a ‘trust mechanism’ along with ‘safety for oil facilities and shipping lanes’.
While it is notable that China was involved in the final stages of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is important not to exaggerate either the nature of the agreement nor China’s role in the region. Other regional conflicts, like those in Syria, Israel–Palestine, Libya or Yemen are likely to remain beyond Chinese intervention.
So long as conflicting…
Business
Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24
Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.
Southern Sun Earnings Surge
Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.
China’s Property Market Recovery
In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.
Broader Economic Implications
The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.
Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24
China
Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle
Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.
Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy
Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Recent Developments and Implications
Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.
Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization
Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.
Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China
China
2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China
China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.
China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.
The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.
According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.
China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.
Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).
In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.
Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
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