China
Teapot drama targeting British Museum sparks nationalist fervor in China
Chinese state media and netizens have piled onto social media in recent days to sing the praises of a homegrown web drama about a jade teapot that escapes from the British Museum and tries to get home to China.
The three-part drama, “Escape from the British Museum,” shows the green-clad “teapot” personified as a young woman accost a Chinese man in the street, asking for help.
“I’ve been wandering around out here for ages, cousin,” she tells him. “I’m lost, and can’t find my way home.”
The nationalistic drama has proved a hit with the online army of nationalist “little pinks,” and was released around the same time as a Global Times editorial calling for the return of Chinese artifacts from the scandal-hit British Museum, which fired a staff member last month after some of its collection was found for sale on eBay.
Never mind that the explanatory text about the teapot referenced in the film states it was actually made in 2011 by Suzhou master jade carver Yu Ting, who sent it to be displayed in the museum.
“While the British Museum proudly displays over 23,000 Chinese artifacts, most of which were obtained through improper channels, even dirty and sinful means, questions loom over their acquisition history and the larger issue of repatriation,” Global Times said in an infographic on Sept. 4.
‘Bloody, ugly and shameful’
Earlier, the paper published an editorial calling the museum “the world’s largest receiver of stolen goods.”
“The UK, which has a bloody, ugly, and shameful colonial history, has always had a strong sense of moral superiority over others,” it said. “We really do not know where their sense of moral superiority comes from.”
In the web drama, the young man takes the eccentric teapot woman home to his elegant apartment, sleeping on the sofa and taking her on a whistle-stop tour of U.K. tourist spots including the white cliffs of Dover, before eventually telling her “Come on, we’re going back to China.”
The couple then take in a military parade complete with goose-stepping soldiers on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.
“Thank you, Yong An,” she tells the young man, whose character takes his name from a ceramic pillow emblazoned with the words “eternal peace for family and country” on display in the British Museum. “This has been the happiest and brightest time in my tiny world.”
‘No. 1 robber’
The young producers, who also act in the film, told ruling Chinese Communist Party newspaper, The People’s Daily, in an audio interview posted to Weibo on Sept. 8 that they decided to release the show early after seeing the news last month that the British Museum had sacked a member of staff and reported around 2,000 cultural relics missing to Scotland Yard.
“This is about the emotions we felt after a visit to the British Museum,” one co-actor and producer who gave only the pseudonym Xiatian Meimei told the paper.
“While we were filming at the British Museum, we ran into a lot of foreigners [sic] who didn’t understand much about our cultural artifacts,” director Zhang Jiajun, a Douyin blogger and film school graduate said. “They are Chinese treasures that carry a lot of Chinese culture.”
“When they are overseas, people don’t really understand them, because they lack the cultural genes to do so,” he said, using a buzzword that has become popular under Chinese leader Xi Jinping. “We hope people will pay more attention to the issue of cultural artifacts overseas.”
The drama drew a large number of nationalistic comments, with one comment saying “I’m going to cry myself to death,” and another saying: “We must take back what belongs to China.”
“The British Museum is the world’s No. 1 robber,” said another.
Returning relics?
Another article in the Global Times called on Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Secretary James Cleverly, who was visiting China at the time, to change the law preventing the return of artifacts in the museum.
The British Museum was established by an Act of Parliament in 1753 and is currently governed by the British Museum Act 1963.
It has so far refused to return the Elgin Marbles from the temple of Athena to Greece, ceremonial items and other artifacts taken during 19th century military action to Ethiopia, the 900 Benin Bronzes to Nigeria or gold items belonging to the Asante people of Ghana, according to the BBC.
U.K.-based commentator Chen Liangshi said much of the anger over Chinese artifacts ignores the mass destruction of cultural items during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, and that many of the items now in overseas museums could have been destroyed if they had stayed in China.
He added that many of the artifacts in the British museum were bought rather than looted, or donated by collectors after changing hands several times.
U.K.-based Hong Kong historian Hans Yeung agreed, also citing the widespread destruction of the Cultural Revolution and the whipping up of nationalistic sentiment online.
“They went after the United States, then they went after Japan,” he said. “Now they’re done with Japan, they’re going after the U.K.“
U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has accused China of meddling in Britain’s democracy as he faces a government split at home over whether to formally designate China a threat to national security.
Meanwhile, a brief survey of publicly available information by Radio Free Asia found that more than 100 Chinese cultural artifacts came from the donated collection of Irish physician and naturalist Sir Hans Sloan, while thousands more were donated from the collection of antiquarian Sir Augustus W. Franks.
Many more were sold by Chinese aristocrats, officials and scholars for cash around the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
Against the flow
Not all Chinese media played along with the nationalistic angle.
The Guangzhou-based newspaper Southern Weekend published an article titled: “Is it really a good idea…
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Business
McKinsey Reduces Workforce by 500 in Overhaul of China Operations – WSJ
McKinsey plans to cut about 500 jobs in China, reducing its workforce by a third as part of a strategic revamp focused on minimizing security risks and decreasing government-linked clients.
McKinsey Job Cuts in China
McKinsey & Company, the renowned US consulting firm, is reportedly laying off approximately 500 employees as part of a significant restructuring in its Chinese operations. This decision reflects the company’s shift away from government-linked clientele, a strategy aimed at mitigating political and security risks in the region.
Workforce Reduction
The job cuts will result in a reduction of McKinsey’s workforce in China by roughly one-third. Over the past two years, the firm has been downsizing its personnel across Greater China, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan, affecting hundreds of positions. As of June 2023, McKinsey employed nearly 1,500 individuals in Greater China.
Strategic Separation
To address rising security concerns, McKinsey is separating its China unit from its global operations. This move aims to enhance operational security while navigating the complexities of the Chinese market. McKinsey has not yet commented on these developments following a request for information.
Source : McKinsey Cuts 500 Jobs Amid Revamp of China Business – WSJ
China
India’s Setback in Bangladesh May Not Equate to China’s Advantage
The fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is detrimental to India, as her regime fostered strong ties. China may gain influence but faces significant challenges in capitalizing on this opportunity.
Strategic Loss for India
The recent fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina marks a significant strategic setback for India. Hasina was an unusually pro-Indian leader, and her departure has created fears that China may capitalize on this political upheaval. However, while China’s influence in Bangladesh might grow, such assumptions about its immediate gains are overstated.
Challenges to Chinese Expansion
Beijing’s opportunity to bolster its presence in Bangladesh is hindered by significant challenges. The ongoing crisis in Bangladesh could slow China’s attempts to extend its influence in the region. Despite the current turmoil favoring China, the practicalities of political dynamics in Bangladesh may make it difficult for Beijing to fully seize this chance.
Impact on India-Bangladesh Relations
Sheikh Hasina’s government served as a crucial ally for India, fostering a stable relationship that addressed longstanding concerns regarding cross-border issues and support for minority groups. The partnership facilitated vital infrastructure projects, including railway connections that enhance regional integration under Indian leadership. With Hasina’s government now collapsed, the hard-won gains in India-Bangladesh relations are at risk.
Source : India’s loss in Bangladesh not necessarily China’s gain
China
Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals
China plans to deepen its relationship with Africa, pledging $51 billion in loans and investments, aiming for increased diplomatic ties, economic growth, and expanded influence amidst Western concerns about debt-trap diplomacy.
China’s relationship with Africa is set to deepen. At a summit in Beijing in early September, China’s president, Xi Jinping, pledged to deliver US$51 billion (£39 billion) in loans, investment and aid to the continent over the next three years, as well as upgrading diplomatic ties.
Beijing’s close engagement with Africa is not new. Since 1950, the first overseas trip of the year for Chinese foreign ministers has almost always been to one or more African countries. But Xi’s commitments are still sure to raise concerns in the US and other western countries, which are competing with China for global influence.
They may well also bring back fears of China using “debt-trap diplomacy” to push African countries into default and thereby gain leverage over them. Such is the strength of this narrative that South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, felt compelled to deny it at the summit.
The notion of Chinese debt traps, particularly the infamous case of Sri Lanka’s port of Hambantota that, in 2017, was leased by the Sri Lankan government to a Chinese company to raise liquidity, has been debunked several times.
But with African populations and economies growing, and China’s engagement with them continuing to deepen, it is important to understand what China hopes to achieve with its diplomacy.
China’s engagement with Africa is strategic as well as economic. Whether it’s gaining votes at the UN, better access to resources, or increasing the international use of its currency, China’s diplomatic relations with Africa play into its ambitions of being a major player in a multipolar world.
Chinese children hold national flags as they prepare for the arrival of Togo’s president, Faure Gnassingbe, at Beijing International Airport ahead of the summit.
Ken Ishii / Pool / EPA
The long game
From a purely economic perspective, Africa is a potentially lucrative market for China. With its under-served market and booming population, the scope for expansion into Africa offers huge potential for Chinese firms.
This is particularly true now that the African Continental Free Trade Area (which was established in 2018) opens up the possibility of cross-border value chains developing in Africa.
Most of the goods that China imports from Africa are natural resources. Many of these resources have strategic relevance, for example, in manufacturing batteries. In return, Chinese companies export a wide range of goods to Africa, including manufactured products, industrial and agricultural machinery, and vehicles.
In terms of foreign direct investment, Chinese companies are still only the fifth-largest investors in Africa after their Dutch, French, US and UK counterparts. But their ascent has been relatively quick, and while western companies are focused on resources and the financial sector, Chinese ones also invest heavily in construction and manufacturing.
Chinese companies are major players in Africa’s construction sector, often working on projects funded by loans from Chinese banks to African governments. In 2019, for example, Chinese contractors accounted for about 60% of the total value of construction work in Africa.
Some of the infrastructure financed by China has done little to improve trade or economic development in Africa. And it has, admittedly, also contributed to the increased debt burden of several African countries.
The costly expressways that connect Nairobi in Kenya and Kampala in Uganda to the respective international airports, for instance, have made life easier for city elites and international travellers. But they have not led to economic growth.
So, China has moved to recalibrate its infrastructure finance in recent years. In 2021, Xi introduced the concept of “small and beautiful” projects better targeted at the partner country’s needs – a concept he repeated at the recent summit.
It is this alignment with the requests of African leaders that differentiates China’s engagement with Africa from that of the west. A key request of many African leaders is for investment in manufacturing value chains and imports of African processed goods rather than just raw resources.
Xi’s keynote speech addressed these two concerns. He promised more investment in key sectors and to allow more African goods to enter China without duties.
The construction of the Nairobi Expressway was supposed to decongest Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi.
Daniel Irungu / EPA
China’s support to African nations is political as well as economic. Its policy of non-interference in Africa’s internal affairs have been well received by African leaders – a sharp contrast to western nations who have often tied their support to the respect of certain social or economic conditions.
This has, in turn, bolstered China’s diplomatic influence on the continent. A good indicator of this influence is how many countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which the Chinese government sees as part of China’s territory. In Africa, only Eswatini has full relations with Taiwan and just a handful of other countries have representative offices.
Another Chinese goal is to expand the global reach of its currency, the renminbi. Its motive here is to challenge the dominance of the US dollar, which gives America control over transactions anywhere in the world.
Since the late 2000s, the People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to conduct transactions in renminbi. And China is aiming to increase the use of renminbi in official lending, both through domestic banks such as the China Development Bank and regional institutions such as the New Development Bank.
Much like Africa’s western partners, China pursues both political and economic interests in its dealings with the continent. But, with western leaders paying little attention to Africa, China doesn’t need to pursue debt-trap diplomacy to increase its influence there. It just needs to put forward a better partnership offer to gain ground.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- McKinsey Reduces Workforce by 500 in Overhaul of China Operations – WSJ
- India’s Setback in Bangladesh May Not Equate to China’s Advantage
- Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals
- Trends in China’s Outbound Investment: Key Sources, Destinations, and Sectors
- This Chinese EV Manufacturer is Ready to Compete with Elon Musk in China
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