China
China sent who to the UN?
Chinese Vice President Han Zheng told the U.N. General Assembly on Thursday that the world should resist U.S. hegemonism, reject the use of human rights as a “political tool” and never doubt Beijing’s plans to reunite China’s mainland with the democratic island of Taiwan.
The mostly anodyne speech hewed closely to standard lines often repeated by China’s leaders and, in the end, was less notable for its contents than for who delivered them: a little-known figure on the world stage promoted to vice president only six months ago.
Han was left to deliver China’s remarks after both President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi opted to stay away from New York.
But the former Shanghai mayor showed he was well versed.
In a thinly veiled dig at the United States, Han said China “opposes hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and Cold War mentality” and that “legitimate security concerns of all countries” had to be addressed, in apparent defense of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The vice president attacked what he said was “double standards” in international criticism of its human rights abuses. He said Beijing opposed, “in particular, the use of human rights and democracy as a political tool to interfere in the affairs of other countries.”
Almost like clockwork, Han then reiterated Beijing’s stance that the democratic island of Taiwan is a renegade Chinese province.
“Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China’s territory since ancient times,” he said, adding no one in the world “should ever underestimate the firm resolve, strong will and the power of the Chinese people to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Moscow trip
Xi was not the only leader to snub the assembly, with French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin, also staying away from New York.
Xi’s decision to not even send Wang, though, was all the more conspicuous due to where the foreign minister was instead: Moscow, on a four-day trip to meet with Putin, inviting him to visit Xi next month for a high-profile Belt and Road conference in Beijing.
In the weeks leading up to the U.N. General Assembly, there had been speculation that Wang might use a trip to New York to also meet with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who visited Beijing in June and extended an open invitation to Wang to make a return U.S. visit.
But a senior Russian official said on Tuesday that Wang’s trip to Moscow was important for the new Russia-China axis opposing the Western world, according to a report in the Associated Press.
“Amid the campaign unleashed by the collective West that is aimed at the double containment of Russia and China,” said Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, “it’s particularly important to further deepen Russian-Chinese coordination and interaction on the international arena.”
Instead of meeting Wang, Blinken met with Han on Monday. The Chinese vice president seemed to tell reporters before the meeting that Beijing thought the United States could do more to thaw ties.
“We sincerely hope that the U.S. would take more concrete action to deliver on the common understanding between our leaders for the sound and steady growth in China-U.S. relations,” Han said.
Blinken, in diplomatic terms, called for more in-person meetings.
“From the perspective of the United States,” he said, “face-to-face diplomacy is the best way to deal with areas where we disagree, and also the best way to explore areas of potential cooperation between us. The world expects us to responsibly manage our relationship.”
No facetime
Blinken is one of four Biden administration cabinet members – along with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, climate envoy John Kerry and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo – to have visited Beijing since June, with no Chinese officials making the return visit so far.
Meetings between Biden and Xi – who have not met since last year’s G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, where they pledged to “responsibly manage” ties to avoid conflict – have also been postponed.
The pair were also expected to meet at this year’s G-20 summit in New Delhi earlier this month, but Xi chose not to attend. Biden said he was “disappointed,” but added that he was still “going to get to see him.”
Speculation has now shifted to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in San Francisco in November, where the two leaders could meet on the sidelines if the Chinese president, who has so far this year only left China for trips to Russia and South Africa, decides to attend.
Earlier this month, China’s spy agency hinted that a Biden-Xi meeting depended on the United States “showing sufficient sincerity.”
But there remains hope. Over the weekend, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met with Wang in Malta while Wang was en route to Russia, reportedly to lay groundwork for a meeting.
The White House called the meeting “candid, substantive and constructive,” said that it built off Biden and Xi’s meeting in Bali and added that it hoped for “additional high-level engagement” soon.
Edited by Malcolm Foster.
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China
China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
In November 2024, China’s economy exhibited mixed results: industrial production rose by 5.4%, while retail sales grew only 3%, below forecasts. Fixed asset investment also faltered. Policymakers are anticipated to introduce measures to stimulate domestic demand and combat deflation.
China’s economy showed mixed performance in November 2024, with industrial production and exports showing resilience, while retail sales and fixed asset investment underperformed, amid ongoing challenges in the property sector. Policymakers are expected to implement targeted fiscal and monetary measures to boost domestic demand and address deflationary pressures.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has released China’s economy data for November 2024, revealing a mixed performance across key indicators. Retail sales grew by 3 percent year-on-year, a significant slowdown from October’s 4.8 percent growth and well below the 4.6 percent forecast. Industrial production, however, showed resilience, rising by 5.4 percent and exceeding expectations of 5.3 percent growth.
The property sector continued to drag on the broader economy, with real estate investment contracting by 10.4 percent for the January-to-November period, further highlighting the challenges in stabilizing the sector. Fixed asset investment also fell short of expectations, growing by 3.3 percent year-to-date, down from 3.4 percent in October.
In November, China’s industrial value added (IVA) grew by 5.4 percent year-on-year (YoY), slightly accelerating from the 5.3 percent recorded in October. This modest improvement reflects continued recovery in key industries, supported by recent stimulus measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.
The manufacturing sector led the growth, expanding by 6.0 percent YoY, while the power, heat, gas, and water production and supply sector grew by 1.6 percent. The mining industry posted a 4.2 percent YoY increase. Notably, advanced industries outpaced overall growth, with equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing rising by 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent YoY, respectively, underscoring the resilience of China’s innovation-driven sectors.
Key product categories showed robust output gains in November:
From January to November, IVA increased by 5.8 percent YoY, maintaining steady growth over the year despite headwinds from a slowing property market and external uncertainties.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, some Chinese citizens express dissent through potential boycotts of Russian goods, reflecting a complex relationship despite government support for Russia.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government has been criticised for its refusal to condemn the war. In 2024, the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two nations appears stronger than ever.
Because of strict censorship and repression imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is difficult to know the extent to which the general public shares their government’s support of Putin’s regime. But a newly published study I carried out with colleagues found that more than 10% of Chinese people surveyed were willing to boycott Russian goods over the war in Ukraine.
This is a surprisingly large figure, especially since existing surveys indicate that Chinese people hold a broadly positive view of their neighbour. We used a representative sample of 3,029 Chinese citizens for this research, to dig into public attitudes to Russia. The survey was done in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion.
We were aware that due to widespread censorship, our participants might not be willing to give honest answers to questions about Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They might also not feel safe to do that in a regime where disagreement with the CCP’s position is often met with harsh punishment. This is why we asked them to tell us if they would be willing to boycott Russian products currently sold in China.
We felt this question was a good indicator of how much the participants disapproved of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. More importantly, we were also curious to find out whether Chinese citizens would be willing to take direct political action to punish Russia economically for its aggressive behaviour.
In our study, we split respondents into the three different ideological groups in China: “liberals”, who support the free market and oppose authoritarianism; “the new left”, who sympathise with the policies pursued in China under Mao Zedong; and “neo-authoritarians”, who believe the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an extension of the rivalry between authoritarian China and the liberal United States. These groups were based on the main political beliefs in China.
We found that liberals were most likely to say they were willing to boycott Russian products. Liberals believe that China should work with, rather than against, western democracies. They also place a high value on human rights and democratic freedoms. Because of their beliefs, they are likely to think that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were unprovoked, aggressive and disproportional.
Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic relations seem closer than ever in 2024.
American Photo Archive/Alamy
The new left and neo-authoritarians we surveyed were more supportive of Russian products. The new left see Russia as a close ally and believe that Nato’s expansion in eastern Europe was a form of aggression. Neo-authoritarians, on the other hand, believe that supporting Russia, an allied autocracy, is in China’s best interest.
Boycotting Russian goods
Asking Chinese participants if they are willing to boycott Russian products might seem like a simple matter of consumer preferences. However, our study reveals a great deal about the way in which regular citizens can express controversial political beliefs in a repressive authoritarian regime.
Boycotting products of certain companies has long been studied in the west as a form of unconventional political action that helps people express their beliefs. However, in the west, boycotting certain products is simply one of many ways people are able to take political action. In a country such as China, boycotting a Russian product might often be the only safe way to express disagreement with the country’s actions.
This is because citizens do not have to tell others they chose not to buy a product, and their actions are unlikely to attract the attention of the authorities.
Since Russian goods are readily available to Chinese consumers and China is encouraging more Russian exports to reach its market, the Russian economy could be significantly affected by an organised boycott campaign in China. The considerable level of support for a boycott expressed by some of our participants, as well as previous acts of solidarity with Ukraine in China, suggest that such a campaign could already be taking place in the country.
This could harm Russia because it regularly exports a number of different products such as meat, chocolate, tea and wine to China. These goods made up 5.1% of China’s total imports in 2023 – and this figure is likely to increase if Russia becomes more isolated from the west, and therefore more dependent on China for its trade.
While 5.1% of the Chinese market might seem like a low figure, China is home to over 1.4 billion people. In this context, even a small boycott could result in a serious loss to Russian companies.
Our research shows that Chinese citizens don’t always support the official position of the communist party. It also shows that many people there will express even the most unpopular political opinions – if they can find a safe way to do it.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China sought to join the CPTPP, potentially offering modest economic benefits to Australia. Key reforms include limiting state-owned enterprise subsidies, enhancing data flows, and banning forced labor.
China’s Interest in the CPTPP
In early 2024, China expressed a keen interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement involving eleven Pacific Rim economies and the United Kingdom. This move is anticipated to yield modest economic benefits for Australia. However, it also opens the door for vital reforms in areas such as the control of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, allowing free cross-border data flows, and prohibiting forced labor practices.
Economic Implications for Australia
A May 2024 report from the Australian Productivity Commission indicated that China’s accession to the CPTPP might raise Australia’s GDP by only 0.01%. This modest gain isn’t surprising, given Australia’s existing preferential trade arrangement with China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Nonetheless, the CPTPP encompasses more than just tariff reductions, focusing on broader trade principles and standards.
Reform Commitments Required from China
For China to become a CPTPP member, it must demonstrate adherence to high-standard rules initially developed with the country in mind. This commitment will help alleviate concerns among member nations like Japan and Canada, particularly regarding China’s economic practices and geopolitical tensions, such as those with Taiwan. Membership would necessitate reforms, including limiting SOE subsidies, enabling freer data flows, and banning forced labor, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
Source : Australia can encourage China’s credibility in the CPTPP
- China’s November 2024 Economy: Navigating Mixed Signals and Ongoing Challenges
- Ukraine war: 10% of Chinese people are willing to boycott Russian goods over invasion – new study
- Australia Can Enhance China’s Credibility in the CPTPP
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- China Dismantles Prominent Uyghur Business Landmark in Xinjiang – Shia Waves
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