China
Is Taiwan a country or not?
The UK referred to Taiwan as an “independent country” in a report, despite not officially recognizing Taiwan as a country.
Defining what is and isn’t a country is a lot more complicated than many people would realize. Take the case of Taiwan.
On Aug. 30, 2023, a committee of the U.K. Parliament referred to Taiwan as an “independent country” in a report. This is the first time any part of the British political system has used that phrasing.
Officially, the U.K. “does not recognise Taiwan” as a country, nor does it “maintain formal diplomatic relations with the island,” which is one way states recognize each other as equals on the international stage.
Like the U.K., the U.S. also “does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan,” although there is a “robust unofficial relationship,” according to the State Department. Many other countries are in a similar boat.
So where does that leave Taiwan? Is it, or is it not, a country?
From my perspective as a political scientist, here’s how I would approach this question.
A country by declaration
According to what’s known as the “declarative theory of statehood,” a country – which is often referred to as a “state” in political science and international relations terminology – must possess the following qualities: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”
These four qualities were agreed upon in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which is an international treaty registered with the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations.
Article 3 of that treaty says that the existence of a “state is independent of recognition by the other states.” In other words, as long as the four qualities above are met, an area qualifies as a country even if other countries choose not to recognize it.
One criticism of this framework is that it opens the door for many areas to be considered countries, even though they may seem outlandish.
For example, in the 1960s, Italian engineer Giorgio Rosa built a 4,000-square-foot (400-square-meter) platform 7 miles (11 kilometers) off the coast of Italy. On June 24, 1968, Rosa – whose last name means “rose” in English – declared that his platform was an independent country named the Republic of Rose Island. This artificial island had a restaurant, bar, souvenir shop and post office. Its official language was Esperanto.
It could be argued that Rose Island met the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, as there was a permanent population because Rosa lived there; his humanmade platform had a defined territory; there was a government because Rosa declared himself president; and Rose Island’s post office gave it the capacity to communicate with, and thus enter into relations with, other countries.
Although several countries, including the U.S., have ratified the Montevideo Convention, Italy has not. So, 55 days after Rose Island declared independence, the Italian military destroyed the platform.
A country by recognition
In contrast to the declarative theory of statehood, what’s called the “constitutive theory of statehood” considers a country to be a country only if it is recognized by other already recognized countries.
There is no magic number for how many countries one must be recognized by. Rather, those that aspire to be regarded by the world as an independent country must join the United Nations as a full member.
In order to join the United Nations, applicants must be recommended by the Security Council, which comprises 15 members. Five of those members are permanent and have a veto. Applicants must have the support of nine of the 15 members, including each of the permanent members.
If the Security Council recommends admission, the application is presented to the General Assembly, where each full member of the United Nations has a single vote. A two-thirds majority is necessary before a country can join.
U.S. Rep. Rob Wittman, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, met with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, right, at the presidential office in Taipei, Taiwan, in September 2023.
Taiwan Presidential Office via AP
One China or two?
Today, most of the world’s countries officially adhere to some variation of the idea that there is only one China, whose capital is Beijing, and which encompasses both the mainland territory and the island of Taiwan.
There is a government there, but there is also a government on Taiwan, based in its capital, Taipei. That government calls itself the Republic of China and traces its history to the early 20th century, when a revolution overthrew the emperor of China.
Notably, at that time, nobody’s definition of China included the island of Taiwan, which was then commonly called Formosa. Japan had seized the island in a war in the late 19th century.
In 1927, an uprising by the Chinese Communist Party attacked the Republic of China government. That kicked off a bloody civil war that lasted until 1949.
In that year, the government of the Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan. That same year, Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing.
But Mao still sought control over his enemy’s territory, declaring, “Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs.”
To this day, the government of the People’s Republic of China, whose capital is Beijing, considers Taiwan part of its “sacred territory.” The constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that “(i)t is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.” Its foreign affairs ministry says, “Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory.” On Oct. 2, 2023, the Beijing government celebrated its national day by releasing a video signifying its focus on unity with the people of Taiwan.
In contrast, the Republic of China refers to the area under its control as “the Taiwan area,” or “the free area.” It refers to the rest of China as “the mainland area,” which the Taiwanese government has described as being under a “Period of Communist Rebellion.”
Other countries are similarly delicate. For example, in 1972, the U.S. “acknowledge(d) that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” In 1979, the U.S. again “acknowledge(d) the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”
Taipei’s Mid-Autumn Festival drew crowds to the Night Market.
AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying
Taiwan’s place in the world
Taiwan argues that it meets the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for being considered a country under the declarative theory of statehood. However, Taiwan has not yet formally declared itself to be a new, independent country. According to President Tsai Ing-wen, “(w)e don’t have a need to,” because “(w)e are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China.”
But recall that, according to the constitutive theory of statehood, a country is only a country if it’s recognized by other already recognized countries, and the ultimate manifestation of such recognition is full membership in the United Nations.
Interestingly, the Republic of China was actually a founding member of the United Nations. However, in 1971, the United Nations voted “to expel” the Republic of China, and instead recognized the Communist government “as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” Subsequent attempts by Taiwan to join the United Nations have been unsuccessful.
Today, only a dozen or so countries continue to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, most of which are small island developing states such as Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu.
Each of these countries recognizes Taiwan as “the Republic of China,” and none of them simultaneously maintains offical ties with the People’s Republic of China.
Until Taiwan formally declares itself independent of the rest of China – or until Taiwan is recognized by the international community as being independent of the rest of China – Taiwan’s status as a country will continue to be questioned.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
China
U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.
China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”
China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.
Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.
As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.
The stronghold of the U.S. dollar
The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).
In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.
The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.
Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.
U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.
However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”
There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.
Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.
On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.
Unsustainable debt
The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.
The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.
That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.
With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.
Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.
This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.
An opportunity for China
This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.
However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.
It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.
This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.
China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy
China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.
At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.
China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.
As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.