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INTERVIEW: Politics is the same as selling insurance, says Taiwan heiress

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Shin Kong heiress and Taiwan People’s Party vice-presidential nominee Cynthia Wu didn’t say much when she was announced as the running mate for transplant surgeon Ko Wen-je in next month’s election, putting down the microphone after a few brief words.

Yet during a recent interview with RFA Mandarin’s “Asia Wants to Talk” chat show, the U.S.-born Wu switched easily among Mandarin, Taiwanese and English to chat non-stop about her experiences on the campaign trail and her vision for Taiwan’s future.

Until she joined the presidential race in a decision that she says surprised even her, Wu was mostly known as an appointed member of the self-governing island’s Legislative Yuan and the granddaughter of Wu Ho-su, who founded the Wu family’s Shin Kong business empire.

From humble beginnings as a department store in Taiwan, Shin Kong grew into a conglomerate spanning the financial, security, manufacturing, consumer, medical and philanthropy sectors.

Ko Wen-je [center, left], the Taiwan People’s Party’s presidential candidate, and his running mate Cynthia Wu wave after registering for the upcoming presidential elections in Taipei on Nov. 24, 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP)

“Total surprise,” Wu told host Simon Tai, when asked for her reaction to her nomination, which came soon after talks between Ko’s “White Camp” Taiwan People’s Party and the “Blue Camp” opposition Kuomintang broke down with no agreement on Nov. 24.

“The Blue and White camps didn’t get together, so each party had to pick its own candidate for vice president,” Wu said. “I only heard about it on day 50 [of the campaign], on the Friday afternoon, like everybody else.”

Wu likened the surprise to that she felt when becoming a mother earlier this year at the age of 45.

She added: “You’ve just got to get on with it.”

Business princess

Wu once held dual U.S. and Taiwanese citizenships but renounced her U.S. citizenship in 2014, and has been considered a surprising choice by many in Taiwan, who saw her as more of a business heiress and “princess” unfit for the cut-and-thrust of political life.

Asked if she was a “princess,” Wu replied: “Why only label me as one thing? I’m also a mother, an insurance salesperson, I hold a financial analyst certificate issued in London, and I’m also a person who loves Taiwan.”

She said she accepts who she is calmly, despite what she termed “political manipulation” that she said seeks to make her seem out-of-place in politics and even spoiled.

Wu doesn’t just hold financial certifications — she graduated as a double major in international relations and art history from Wesleyan College in Connecticut, and holds a master’s degree in literature from the Courtauld Institute of Art in London.

Her resume includes stints as an investment analyst for a brokerage, and as assistant to former U.K. Conservative Party lawmaker Peter Lilley, now known as Lord Lilley.

Since returning to settle in Taiwan at the age of 25, she has also held a number of executive posts in Shin Kong subsidiaries, including vice president of its insurance division and executive director of its Shin Kong Life Foundation, experience she said is useful on the campaign trail.

Chinese influence claims

Wu says that trying to win votes is a lot like selling insurance.

“The process is the same — either you are trying to turn an opportunity into a sold policy, or you’re trying to turn it into a vote,” she said. “You have to leave no stone unturned.”

Slated by her critics as an amateur due to her many gaffes, including misnaming government ministries and describing herself as “Chinese,” Wu said Ko had told her that she should see the media as akin to sharks circling for a feed.

“He talks a lot, has a great sense of humor and won’t form a personal relationship with you,” Wu said. “But he told me that I should be myself … and even feed the sharks occasionally.”

She has also been warned by colleagues in the Legislative Yuan that being in politics means being forced to cope with the fact that people gossip about you.

More seriously, Wu has been accused of being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front outreach and influence operation, after being named among “China’s 100 Outstanding Women Entrepreneurs” in 2010.

Asked at the time if she was Chinese or Taiwanese, Wu told journalists that she was both.

“Chinese culture is in my DNA,” Wu told Radio Free Asia. “I am a citizen of the Republic of China, but my ancestors are also from China.”

The majority of Taiwan’s 23 million residents identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, and have no wish to give up their democratic way of life to be ruled by Beijing, according to opinion polls.

ENG_CHN_INTERVIEWCynthiaWu_12292023.3.JPG
Cynthia Wu, vice president candidate for Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) makes a speech on stage during a campaign event ahead of the election in Hsinchu, Taiwan December 23, 2023. (Ann Wang/Reuters)

Nonetheless, Wu has appeared to strongly endorse the status quo, in which Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China, continues to govern itself as a democracy.

“I think Taiwan must maintain its peaceful and independent life,” Wu said. “If China is willing to make way for communication and discussion with us, then it’s likely we will talk to them.”

Beyond that, she referred voters to Ko’s maxim that peace across the Taiwan Strait is the best guarantee of the status quo.

“The status quo is being maintained, but what is up for negotiation is to restart talks,” Wu said.

Cross-strait relations

Like Ko, Wu described the “1992 Consensus” agreed by Taipei and Beijing as “vague.” 

Beijing has repeatedly castigated Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen for allegedly departing from the agreement by seeking a greater role for Taiwan on the world stage, and because she insists on government-to-government status as a prerequisite for talks with Beijing — something Chinese officials would never agree to.

The “Consensus” has been widely criticized as meaning different things to different people — for Beijing, it appears to mean that Taiwan’s 23 million people should stop insisting on a distinctly Taiwanese identity, something China views as “pro-independence.”

“If he gets into power, Chairman Ko would want to clarify the definitions [in the Consensus],” Wu said. 

But asked if she believed Chinese President Xi Jinping when he said there was no timetable for invading Taiwan by force, Wu replied: “Taiwan can’t put its…

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Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications

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Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.


Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.

On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).

Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.

The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.

The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.

The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

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China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures

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China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.


Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes

China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.

Monthly and Yearly Comparisons

According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.

Second-Hand Home Market Trends

Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.

Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in

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U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity

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China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.

China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”

China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.

Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.

As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.

The stronghold of the U.S. dollar

The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).

In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.

The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.

Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.

U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.

However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”

There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.

Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.

On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.

Unsustainable debt

The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.

The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.

That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.

With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.

Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.

This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.

An opportunity for China

This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.

However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.

It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.

This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.

China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy

China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.

At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.

China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.

As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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