China
INTERVIEW: Politics is the same as selling insurance, says Taiwan heiress
Shin Kong heiress and Taiwan People’s Party vice-presidential nominee Cynthia Wu didn’t say much when she was announced as the running mate for transplant surgeon Ko Wen-je in next month’s election, putting down the microphone after a few brief words.
Yet during a recent interview with RFA Mandarin’s “Asia Wants to Talk” chat show, the U.S.-born Wu switched easily among Mandarin, Taiwanese and English to chat non-stop about her experiences on the campaign trail and her vision for Taiwan’s future.
Until she joined the presidential race in a decision that she says surprised even her, Wu was mostly known as an appointed member of the self-governing island’s Legislative Yuan and the granddaughter of Wu Ho-su, who founded the Wu family’s Shin Kong business empire.
From humble beginnings as a department store in Taiwan, Shin Kong grew into a conglomerate spanning the financial, security, manufacturing, consumer, medical and philanthropy sectors.
“Total surprise,” Wu told host Simon Tai, when asked for her reaction to her nomination, which came soon after talks between Ko’s “White Camp” Taiwan People’s Party and the “Blue Camp” opposition Kuomintang broke down with no agreement on Nov. 24.
“The Blue and White camps didn’t get together, so each party had to pick its own candidate for vice president,” Wu said. “I only heard about it on day 50 [of the campaign], on the Friday afternoon, like everybody else.”
Wu likened the surprise to that she felt when becoming a mother earlier this year at the age of 45.
She added: “You’ve just got to get on with it.”
Business princess
Wu once held dual U.S. and Taiwanese citizenships but renounced her U.S. citizenship in 2014, and has been considered a surprising choice by many in Taiwan, who saw her as more of a business heiress and “princess” unfit for the cut-and-thrust of political life.
Asked if she was a “princess,” Wu replied: “Why only label me as one thing? I’m also a mother, an insurance salesperson, I hold a financial analyst certificate issued in London, and I’m also a person who loves Taiwan.”
She said she accepts who she is calmly, despite what she termed “political manipulation” that she said seeks to make her seem out-of-place in politics and even spoiled.
Wu doesn’t just hold financial certifications — she graduated as a double major in international relations and art history from Wesleyan College in Connecticut, and holds a master’s degree in literature from the Courtauld Institute of Art in London.
Her resume includes stints as an investment analyst for a brokerage, and as assistant to former U.K. Conservative Party lawmaker Peter Lilley, now known as Lord Lilley.
Since returning to settle in Taiwan at the age of 25, she has also held a number of executive posts in Shin Kong subsidiaries, including vice president of its insurance division and executive director of its Shin Kong Life Foundation, experience she said is useful on the campaign trail.
Chinese influence claims
Wu says that trying to win votes is a lot like selling insurance.
“The process is the same — either you are trying to turn an opportunity into a sold policy, or you’re trying to turn it into a vote,” she said. “You have to leave no stone unturned.”
Slated by her critics as an amateur due to her many gaffes, including misnaming government ministries and describing herself as “Chinese,” Wu said Ko had told her that she should see the media as akin to sharks circling for a feed.
“He talks a lot, has a great sense of humor and won’t form a personal relationship with you,” Wu said. “But he told me that I should be myself … and even feed the sharks occasionally.”
She has also been warned by colleagues in the Legislative Yuan that being in politics means being forced to cope with the fact that people gossip about you.
More seriously, Wu has been accused of being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front outreach and influence operation, after being named among “China’s 100 Outstanding Women Entrepreneurs” in 2010.
Asked at the time if she was Chinese or Taiwanese, Wu told journalists that she was both.
“Chinese culture is in my DNA,” Wu told Radio Free Asia. “I am a citizen of the Republic of China, but my ancestors are also from China.”
The majority of Taiwan’s 23 million residents identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, and have no wish to give up their democratic way of life to be ruled by Beijing, according to opinion polls.
Nonetheless, Wu has appeared to strongly endorse the status quo, in which Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China, continues to govern itself as a democracy.
“I think Taiwan must maintain its peaceful and independent life,” Wu said. “If China is willing to make way for communication and discussion with us, then it’s likely we will talk to them.”
Beyond that, she referred voters to Ko’s maxim that peace across the Taiwan Strait is the best guarantee of the status quo.
“The status quo is being maintained, but what is up for negotiation is to restart talks,” Wu said.
Cross-strait relations
Like Ko, Wu described the “1992 Consensus” agreed by Taipei and Beijing as “vague.”
Beijing has repeatedly castigated Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen for allegedly departing from the agreement by seeking a greater role for Taiwan on the world stage, and because she insists on government-to-government status as a prerequisite for talks with Beijing — something Chinese officials would never agree to.
The “Consensus” has been widely criticized as meaning different things to different people — for Beijing, it appears to mean that Taiwan’s 23 million people should stop insisting on a distinctly Taiwanese identity, something China views as “pro-independence.”
“If he gets into power, Chairman Ko would want to clarify the definitions [in the Consensus],” Wu said.
But asked if she believed Chinese President Xi Jinping when he said there was no timetable for invading Taiwan by force, Wu replied: “Taiwan can’t put its…
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China
China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
In 2024, China’s GDP grew by 5.0%, meeting its annual target. The fourth quarter saw a 5.4% increase, driven by exports and stimulus measures. The secondary industry grew 5.3%, while the tertiary increased by 5.0%, totaling RMB 134.91 trillion.
China’s GDP grew by 5.0 percent in in 2024, meeting the government’s annual economic target set at the beginning of the year. Fourth-quarter GDP exceeded expectations, rising by 5.4 percent, driven by exports and a flurry of stimulus measures. This article provides a brief overview of the key statistics and the main drivers behind this growth.
According to official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion) in 2024, reflecting a 5.0 percent year-on-year growth at constant prices. During the 2024 Two Sessions, the government set the 2024 GDP growth target of “around 5 percent”.
By sector, the secondary industry expanded by 5.3 percent year-on-year to RMB 49.21 trillion (US$6.85 trillion), the fastest among the three sectors, while the tertiary industry grew by 5.0 percent, reaching RMB 76.56 trillion (US$10.63 trillion) and the primary industry contributed RMB 9.14 trillion (US$1.31 trillion), growing 3.5 percent.
A more detailed analysis of China’s economic performance in 2024 will be provided later.
(1USD = 7.1785 RMB)
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
The U.S.-China science agreement renewal narrows collaboration scopes amid security concerns, highlighting tensions. Nations fear espionage, hindering vital international partnerships essential for scientific progress. Openness risks declining.
Amid heightened tensions between the United States and China, the two countries signed a bilateral science and technology agreement on Dec. 13, 2024. The event was billed as a “renewal” of a 45-year-old pact to encourage cooperation, but that may be misleading.
The revised agreement drastically narrows the scope of the original agreement, limits the topics allowed to be jointly studied, closes opportunities for collaboration and inserts a new dispute resolution mechanism.
This shift is in line with growing global concern about research security. Governments are worried about international rivals gaining military or trade advantages or security secrets via cross-border scientific collaborations.
The European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States unveiled sweeping new measures within months of each other to protect sensitive research from foreign interference. But there’s a catch: Too much security could strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress.
As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public and foreign policy. I have tracked the increasingly close relationship in science and technology between the U.S. and China. The relationship evolved from one of knowledge transfer to genuine collaboration and competition.
Now, as security provisions change this formerly open relationship, a crucial question emerges: Can nations tighten research security without undermining the very openness that makes science work?
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping and American President Jimmy Carter sign the original agreement on cooperation in science and technology in 1979.
Dirck Halstead/Hulton Archive via Getty Images
China’s ascent changes the global landscape
China’s rise in scientific publishing marks a dramatic shift in global research. In 1980, Chinese authors produced less than 2% of research articles included in the Web of Science, a curated database of scholarly output. By my count, they claimed 25% of Web of Science articles by 2023, overtaking the United States and ending its 75-year reign at the top, which had begun in 1948 when it surpassed the United Kingdom.
In 1980, China had no patented inventions. By 2022, Chinese companies led in U.S. patents issued to foreign companies, receiving 40,000 patents compared with fewer than 2,000 for U.K. companies. In the many advanced fields of science and technology, China is at the world frontier, if not in the lead.
Since 2013, China has been the top collaborator in science with the United States. Thousands of Chinese students and scholars have conducted joint research with U.S. counterparts.
Most American policymakers who championed the signing of the 1979 bilateral agreement thought science would liberalize China. Instead, China has used technology to shore up autocratic controls and to build a strong military with an eye toward regional power and global influence.
Leadership in science and technology wins wars and builds successful economies. China’s growing strength, backed by a state-controlled government, is shifting global power. Unlike open societies where research is public and shared, China often keeps its researchers’ work secret while also taking Western technology through hacking, forced technology transfers and industrial espionage. These practices are why many governments are now implementing strict security measures.
Nations respond
The FBI claims China has stolen sensitive technologies and research data to build up its defense capabilities. The China Initiative under the Trump administration sought to root out thieves and spies. The Biden administration did not let up the pressure. The 2022 Chips and Science Act requires the National Science Foundation to establish SECURE – a center to aid universities and small businesses in helping the research community make security-informed decisions. I am working with SECURE to evaluate the effectiveness of its mission.
Other advanced nations are on alert, too. The European Union is advising member states to boost security measures. Japan joined the United States in unveiling sweeping new measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference and exploitation. European nations increasingly talk about technological sovereignty as a way to protect against exploitation by China. Similarly, Asian nations are wary of China’s intentions when it seeks to cooperate.
Australia has been especially vocal about the threat posed by China’s rise, but others, too, have issued warnings. The Netherlands issued a policy for secure international collaboration. Sweden raised the alarm after a study showed how spies had exploited its universities.
Canada has created the Research Security Centre for public safety and, like the U.S., has established regionally dispersed advisers to provide direct support to universities and researchers. Canada now requires mandatory risk assessment for research partnerships involving sensitive technologies. Similar approaches are underway in Australia and the U.K.
Germany’s 2023 provisions establish compliance units and ethics committees to oversee security-relevant research. They are tasked with advising researchers, mediating disputes and evaluating the ethical and security implications of research projects. The committees emphasize implementing safeguards, controlling access to sensitive data and assessing potential misuse.
Japan’s 2021 policy requires researchers to disclose and regularly update information regarding their affiliations, funding sources – both domestic and international – and potential conflicts of interest. A cross-ministerial R&D management system is unrolling seminars and briefings to educate researchers and institutions on emerging risks and best practices for maintaining research security.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development keeps a running database with more than 206 research security policy statements issued since 2022.
Emmanuelle Charpentier, left, from France, and Jennifer Doudna, from the U.S., shared the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 2020 for their joint research.
Miguel RiopaI/AFP via Getty Images
Openness waning
Emphasis on security can strangle the international collaboration that drives scientific progress. As much as 25% of all U.S. scientific articles result from international collaboration. Evidence shows that international engagement and openness produce higher-impact research. The most elite scientists work across national borders.
Even more critically, science depends on the free flow of ideas and talent across borders. After the Cold War, scientific advancement accelerated as borders opened. While national research output remained flat in recent years, international collaborations showed significant growth, revealing science’s increasingly global nature.
The challenge for research institutions will be implementing these new requirements without creating a climate of suspicion or isolation. Retrenchment to national borders could slow progress. Some degree of risk is inherent in scientific openness, but we may be coming to the end of a global, collaborative era in science.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
A China–Indonesia statement on “joint development in overlapping claims” marks a shift in Indonesia’s stance on the Natuna Islands, influenced by China’s economic diplomacy and domestic needs, impacting regional dynamics.
Shift in Indonesia’s Maritime Position
A recent China-Indonesia joint statement advocating for "joint development in areas of overlapping claims" marks a significant departure from Indonesia’s historical claim over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands. This change reflects Chinese diplomatic efforts, domestic economic pressures, and challenges within Indonesia’s presidential advisory system, pointing to broader implications for Southeast Asian nations as they navigate regional dynamics.
President Prabowo’s State Visit
During President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit to China in November 2024, Indonesia seemingly recognized the validity of Chinese territorial claims in maritime areas, particularly where China’s nine-dash line intersects with its EEZ. While the joint statement from the visit is not legally binding, it represents a notable shift from Indonesia’s traditional opposition to Chinese claims, which it previously argued were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Economic Incentives at Play
China’s appeal to Indonesia’s domestic economic priorities played a crucial role in this rapprochement. The joint statement included commitments from China regarding fisheries cooperation and significant investments, including US$10 billion across various sectors. Additionally, China pledged support for initiatives like a free lunch program for schoolchildren and affordable housing projects, highlighting how economic incentives can influence geopolitical stances in the South China Sea.
Source : China baits Indonesia to soften South China Sea stance
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
- China Lures Indonesia to Ease Its Position on the South China Sea
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