China
Putin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner
The recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing saw decreased attendance from world leaders, highlighting geopolitical tensions. Vladimir Putin emphasized Sino-Russian cooperation, but trade imbalances reveal Russia’s subordinate role.
The third Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing recently attracted fewer heads of state or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three.
This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.
One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa.
While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.
He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”.
Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale.
For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.
Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.
Holding back?
The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction.
China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom.
Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called section “D”, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.
While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west.
Beijing making its move
Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.
In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “raw materials appendage” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now become a reality. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.
But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “Global Security Initiative” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “Global Development Initiative” and, nested within these, a “Global Civilisation initiative”. Taken together these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy.
China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
Fosun in Negotiations to Sell Club Med Stake to CapitaLand of Singapore
CapitaLand Investment is negotiating to acquire a 20-30% stake in Club Med from Fosun International, outbidding competitors. Ongoing talks have resulted in stock price increases for both firms.
CapitaLand Investment in Talks to Acquire Stake in Club Med
Singapore’s CapitaLand Investment is reportedly in advanced negotiations to purchase a minority stake in luxury resort chain Club Med from its Chinese parent company, Fosun International. Sources familiar with the matter indicate that CapitaLand is looking to acquire between 20 to 30 percent of the hotelier, with the anticipated investment amounting to several hundred million euros.
Competitive Bidding and Market Reactions
CapitaLand has emerged as a leading contender for the stake, successfully outbidding various private equity rivals. Following news of these discussions, shares of CapitaLand Investment rose by 2.4 percent, reaching their highest point since early February. Meanwhile, Fosun Tourism’s stock also saw a notable increase, jumping as much as 9.3 percent during the trading session.
Fosun’s Strategic Asset Management
Fosun International has been actively working to reduce its debt through asset sales and limited borrowing. These strategic moves have contributed to a renewed global investor confidence, distinguishing Fosun as one of the few Chinese conglomerates to successfully navigate recent economic challenges.
Source : China’s Fosun in talks to sell stake in Club Med to Singapore’s CapitaLand
China
China Demonstrates Expertise in Influencing Global AI Governance
The World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai (July 2024) advanced global AI governance, featuring the ‘Shanghai Declaration’ which emphasizes AI safety, ethics, international cooperation, and China’s unique governance approach and initiatives.
World Artificial Intelligence Conference 2024
The World Artificial Intelligence Conference, held in July 2024 in Shanghai, was pivotal in redefining global AI governance. During this gathering, the Shanghai Declaration on Global AI Governance was presented, aimed at advancing principles from China’s Global AI Governance Initiative. This Declaration prioritizes AI safety and ethics, laying out strategies for multilateral cooperation among diverse stakeholders.
China’s commitment to AI governance is further illustrated through its position papers, which delve into specific areas such as ethical governance and military applications of AI. These documents not only present a comprehensive framework for AI regulation but also demonstrate China’s approach to merging broad governance principles with targeted policies. This integration captures both overarching and niche aspects of AI governance, particularly in relation to autonomous weapons.
In the global landscape, China seeks to balance its role as both a rule developer and solution provider in AI governance. By actively engaging in UN-led initiatives and proposing resolutions that enhance international cooperation, China aims to create a cohesive framework. Their Global AI Governance Initiative proposes tailored solutions, including a risk-level testing system and agile governance, underscoring the benefits of AI for societal advancement.
Source : China shows deep learning in shaping global AI governance
China
View from The Hill: China-Australia relations head back to room temperature, with Albanese’s November visit
Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will visit China from November 4-7, engaging in discussions with Xi Jinping to mend relations and address trade issues, particularly wine export restrictions.
The defrost in China-Australia relations started cautiously after the change of federal government last year. It then sped up, with developments culminating in the formal announcement at the weekend of the date for the much-anticipated visit by Anthony Albanese.
The bilateral relationship is fast heading back to room temperature.
The PM will visit from November 4 to 7. He’ll have talks with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang, and he’ll also attend the China International Import Expo in Shanghai.
The last days of preparation have seen major steps. First came the release of Australian journalist Cheng Lei, detained in China for three years (but writer Yang Hengjun is still there). This was followed at the weekend by the expected breakthrough on China’s restrictions on Australian wine, which prompted Australia to commence action at the WTO in 2021.
China will review, over five months, its duties on the wine; Australia will suspend its WTO action. A statement from Albanese said that “if the duties are not removed at the end of the review, Australia will resume the dispute in the WTO. We are confident of a successful outcome.”
Breaking the impasse on wine is a big deal for producers. Before the duties, China was Australia’s largest wine export market.
The lack of access to China has been devastating for many in the industry, with exports to that country falling from $1.1 billion in 2019 to $16 million in 2022. Unlike some commodities that China hit, for which alternative markets were found, wine producers have had trouble selling elsewhere.
Overall, China is our largest trading partner, representing nearly a third of our total trade. At their height China’s trade restrictions on Australia amounted to some $20 billion. They are down to about $2 billion.
Albanese’s trip will come 50 years after then PM Gough’
Whitlam’s historic visit, which was the first by an Australian prime minister.
Whitlam told a banquet in Peking on October 31, 1973: “In China today we see a great modernising force, capable of exerting profound influence in the world. Close co-operation and association between our two peoples is both natural and beneficial.”
The Whitlam trip “laid the ground work for the diplomatic, economic and cultural ties that continue to benefit our countries today,” Albanese said on Sunday.
Over the decades the relationship has, for Australia, been enormously important economically, but at times very rocky. Albanese’s visit will be the first by an Australian prime minister since Malcolm Turnbull’s in 2016.
An already downward spiral in relations, driven by various issues, worsened dramatically when Australia led international pressure for an inquiry into the origins and early handling of COVID, which began in Wuhan.
The bilateral thaw has been considerably driven by China’s perception of its wider foreign policy interests, with last year’s change of government greatly facilitating the recalibration.
But Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have remained cautious, against the background of China-United States tensions, the Taiwan issue, China’s courting of small Pacific countries, and the speed with things can change. They are keen to say the government will disagree with China where it must and always act in Australia’s national interest.
Meanwhile Mike Burgess, head of ASIO, has called fresh attention to China’s unrelenting spying activities, last week revealing an attempt to “infiltrate a prestigious Australian research institution”.
Among the topics for discussion during Albanese’s visit will be co-operation in economic areas, climate change and people-to-people links.
Albanese will be accompanied by Trade Minister Don Farrell, who has done much of the detailed trade negotiations to unlock the restrictions.
Speaking to journalists before leaving on Sunday for his visit to the United States, Albanese said, “It is important that we stabilise our relationship with China. That is in the interests of Australia and China, and it is indeed in the interests of the world, that we have stable relations, and that is what this visit will represent.”
Asked whether he would hope Xi would visit Australia, Albanese said, “we’ll have discussions about that”, noting Xi has been here a number of times.
Albanese said that in Washington this week he would be having discussions about progressing the legislation needed under the AUKUS agreement.
He’ll also be canvassing the potential benefits for Australia from the US Inflation Reduction Act. Among its objectives, this act seeks to drive clean energy. “As we move to a clean energy global economy, Australia is in a strong position to benefit because of the critical minerals that we have,” Albanese said.
The Prime Minister will be given a state dinner. This is the ninth time he has met President Biden, formally or informally, since becoming PM.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- Fosun in Negotiations to Sell Club Med Stake to CapitaLand of Singapore
- China Demonstrates Expertise in Influencing Global AI Governance
- View from The Hill: China-Australia relations head back to room temperature, with Albanese’s November visit
- Exploring Opportunities for Foreign Companies in China’s Emerging and High-Tech Industries
- Understanding the Causes of China’s Economic Downturn and Its Implications for Australia – The Guardian
- Geopolitical chess game: Why India has no interest in serving as a western pawn
