China
China says AUKUS is ‘driven by Cold War thinking’. Here are 3 reasons it is so threatened by the pact
China opposes AUKUS, viewing it as a Cold War relic that threatens its nuclear strategy. The pact complicates China’s geopolitical landscape and could shift regional military balance, posing significant challenges.
Ever since AUKUS’ public announcement three years ago, China has been staunchly opposed to the partnership.
Beijing has blasted AUKUS diplomatically and mounted a concerted campaign to challenge its legality.
China has said AUKUS is “driven by Cold War thinking,” “fuelling military confrontation,” and creating “additional nuclear proliferation risks”.
The aim of AUKUS is for the Australian navy to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, with Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States also collaborating on other advanced military technologies.
As AUKUS sceptics have argued, it’s entirely possible Australia will never get its planned nuclear-powered attack submarines. Any number of factors — from the mercurial whims of a future US president to American shipbuilding constraints — could see the partnership fall over.
However, if the plan succeeds, even in a modified form, it’ll pose a serious military challenge to China. As Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister and current ambassador to the US, said in recent days, it’s probably already complicating China’s future geopolitical calculations.
When Chinese military analysts look at the geopolitical picture, they see it more clouded and cluttered than they did before.
Here are three reasons why China finds the pact so threatening.
1. Complicating China’s nuclear strategy
AUKUS submarines will not be armed with nuclear warheads. But these boats could be used to endanger China’s sea-based nuclear weapons.
China currently operates six submarines that are both nuclear-powered and capable of launching nuclear weapons. These are based on Hainan Island, where they enjoy the protection of hardened bases. They can quickly reach the deep waters of the South China Sea to reduce the likelihood of detection.
Monitoring China’s nuclear weapons-capable submarines as they leave Hainan Island is likely to be among the most important of the many missions for the AUKUS boats.
The increased speed, stealth and endurance of AUKUS submarines mean they’d be able to reach the South China Sea quicker. Once there, they can stay “on station” undetected for much longer.
This peacetime monitoring of China’s nuclear weapons-capable submarines would help build a better understanding of their hydro-acoustic signatures and thereby make these Chinese boats more vulnerable to detection.
Combined with the intelligence gathered by Australia’s regular South China Sea maritime air patrols, AUKUS submarines could eventually enhance the ability of the Australian and allied militaries to track and, in conflict scenarios, attack China’s sea-borne nuclear deterrent.
A Chinese nuclear submarine participates in a naval parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of China’s PLA Navy in 2019.
Mark Schiefelbein/AP Pool
2. A direct military threat to China
Foreign Minister Penny Wong has said in connection to AUKUS that Australia needs to be able to “hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance”.
She might not have mentioned China in the same breath. But like many Australians, military planners in Beijing would imagine China is the most probable target.
Likely armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking land, AUKUS submarines could be used to target Chinese military bases and infrastructure in the South China Sea and along the country’s east coast.
A frame grab from a video provided by the Philippine Coast Guard shows structures on the Chinese-occupied Subi reef in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
Philippine Coast Guard/AP
AUKUS submarines could also constrict China’s access to the economic inputs essential for warfighting. China remains acutely dependent on Indian Ocean and East Asian shipping lanes for imports of oil and other resources. The ability of AUKUS submarines to travel vast distances without surfacing or refuelling could allow them to threaten China’s vital maritime supply routes in conflict scenarios.
Beijing might even imagine that AUKUS submarines could be used to directly attack Chinese cities in an all-out war. This might seem far-fetched for now, but with military planning often dealing with worst-case scenarios, Chinese defence strategists are probably considering this possibility.
3. Further tipping the regional military balance
Australia is expected to buy at least three – and possibly as many as five – Virginia-class submarines from the United States in the next decade and a half.
These boats might have otherwise gone into the US fleet, meaning that until 2040 and perhaps even beyond, the size of the American nuclear-powered submarine force could be smaller than it would have been without AUKUS. And there is still much uncertainty surrounding the political and industrial feasibility of both the planned sale of Virginia-class submarines and the construction of a new AUKUS class of boat.
But assuming it’s successful, AUKUS will substantially increase the total number of nuclear-powered submarines operated by the US and its allies from around the 2040s onwards, potentially giving them a long-term undersea military advantage over China.
In the near term, AUKUS could also enable the deployment of additional high-end US and allied military platforms to the region.
Of course, this isn’t just an AUKUS story. Australia will welcome more US bombers and fighter aircraft in the coming years, and we’ll likely see larger US forces in Japan and the Philippines, among other locations.
Still, the establishment of Submarine Rotational Force – West under the AUKUS plan will see a big boost to US and allied military power in the region. It’s expected to involve the rotational presence of one UK and up to four US nuclear-powered submarines in Western Australia from 2027.
This might mean a weakening of China’s relative submarine strength in the region regardless of what happens with the eventual delivery and construction of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia.
This is not a complete account of all the reasons China might have for opposing AUKUS. But these three factors alone suggest the partnership has the potential to pose a significant and long-term military challenge to Beijing.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
Democrat Claims Musk is Undermining Spending Bill Due to China Restrictions – The Hill
A Democrat claims Elon Musk influenced the reduction of a spending bill due to its restrictions on China, suggesting his actions impacted the legislation’s progress and funding allocation.
Allegations Against Musk
A prominent Democrat has accused Elon Musk of deliberately sabotaging a significant spending bill in response to China-related restrictions. This accusation comes amid ongoing tensions between the U.S. and China, particularly regarding technology and trade policies. The claims suggest that Musk’s influence is affecting critical legislative processes, raising concerns among lawmakers about foreign influence in American politics.
Implications for Legislation
The potential ramifications of Musk’s alleged actions could be significant. As a major player in the tech industry, his decisions can sway public opinion and impact the economy. Lawmakers fear that if influential figures like Musk oppose necessary legislation, it might hinder efforts to address vital issues such as national security and economic stability.
Political Reactions
The controversy has sparked debates among both Democrats and Republicans, highlighting the intersection of technology and politics. Many are demanding greater transparency and accountability from tech giants. As the situation unfolds, lawmakers may need to reassess their strategies to ensure that essential legislation moves forward uninterrupted.
Source : Democrat accuses Musk of tanking spending bill over China restrictions – The Hill
China
Dissolving a Company in China: A Comparison of General Deregistration and Simplified Deregistration
China promotes simplified deregistration to enhance its business environment, offering a faster process requiring fewer documents than general deregistration. Companies must meet eligibility criteria, resolve issues, and can choose procedures based on their situation, ensuring compliance for both options.
In addition to the general deregistration procedures, China has been promoting simplified deregistration as one of the key measures to enhance its business environment. This article highlights the differences between the general and simplified procedures, explains the eligibility criteria, and clarifies common misunderstandings about these processes.
Foreign investors may decide to close their business for multiple reasons. To legally wind up a business, investors must complete a series of procedures involving multiple government agencies, such as market regulatory bureaus, foreign exchange administrations, customs, tax authorities, banking regulators, and others. In this article, we outline the company deregistration process overseen by the local Administration for Market Regulation (AMR), comparing the general and simplified procedures.
Before 2016, companies could only deregister through the general procedure. However, on December 26, 2016, the Guidance on Fully Promoting the Reform of Simplified Company Deregistration Procedures was released. Effective March 1, 2017, simplified deregistration procedures were implemented nationwide. Since then, there have been two options: general procedures and simplified procedures.
Companies must follow the general deregistration process if any of the following conditions apply (hereinafter referred to as “existing issues”):
Companies not facing the above issues may choose either the general or simplified deregistration process.
In summary, simplified deregistration is a faster process and requires fewer documents compared to general deregistration. Companies that meet the criteria typically would typically opt for simplified deregistration. Those that do not meet the criteria may choose this route after resolving outstanding issues. For companies with unresolved issues but seeking urgent closure, they can first publish a deregistration announcement. Once the announcement period ends and all issues are addressed, they can proceed with general deregistration. Some companies may question the legitimacy and compliance of simplified deregistration. This is a misconception. “Simplified” does not mean non-compliant, just as “general” does not imply greater legitimacy. Both processes are lawful and compliant. The AMR provides these options to enable companies ready for closure to complete the process efficiently while granting those with unsolved issues the necessary time to address them after publishing the deregistration announcement. Companies can select the most suitable process based on their specific circumstances.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
China’s influence grows at COP29 climate talks as US leadership fades
The 2024 U.N. climate talks in Baku yielded mixed results, agreeing to increase funding for developing nations. However, challenges remained in addressing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving sustainable progress.
The 2024 U.N. climate talks ended in Baku, Azerbaijan, on Nov. 24 after two weeks of arguments, agreements and side deals involving 106 heads of states and over 50,000 business leaders, activists and government representatives of almost every country.
Few say the conference was a resounding success. But neither was it a failure.
The central task of the conference, known as COP29, was to come up with funding to help developing countries become more resilient to the effects of climate change and to transition to more sustainable economic growth.
The biggest challenge was agreeing on who should pay, and the results say a lot about the shifting international dynamics and offer some insight into China’s role. As a political science professor who has worked on clean tech policy involving Asia, I followed the talks with interest.
Slow global progress
Over three decades of global climate talks, the world’s countries have agreed to cut their emissions, phase out fossil fuels, end inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies and stop deforestation, among many other landmark deals.
They have acknowledged since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, when they agreed to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, that greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels, would harm the climate and ecosystems, and that the governments of the world must work together to solve the crisis.
But progress has been slow.
Greenhouse gas emissions were at record highs in 2024. Governments are still subsidizing fossil fuels, encouraging their use. And the world is failing to keep warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial times – a target established under the 2015 Paris Agreement to avoid the worst effects of climate change.
Extreme weather, from lethal heat waves to devastating tropical cyclones and floods, has become more intense as temperatures have risen. And the poorest countries have faced some of the worst damage from climate change, while doing the least cause it.
Money for the poorest countries
Developing countries argue that they need US$1.3 trillion a year in financial support and investment by 2035 from the wealthiest nations – historically the largest greenhouse gas emitters – to adapt to climate change and develop sustainably as they grow.
That matters to countries everywhere because how these fast-growing populations build out energy systems and transportation in the coming decades will affect the future for the entire planet.
Negotiators at the COP29 climate talks. Less developed countries were unhappy with the outcome.
Kiara Worth/UN Climate Change via Flickr
At the Baku conference, member nations agreed to triple their existing pledge of $100 billion a year to at least $300 billion a year by 2035 to help developing countries. But that was far short of what economists have estimated those countries will need to develop clean energy economies.
The money can also come from a variety of sources. Developing countries wanted grants, rather than loans that would increase what for many is already crushing debt. Under the new agreement, countries can count funding that comes from private investments and loans from the World Bank and other development banks, as well as public funds.
Groups have proposed raising some of those funds with additional taxes on international shipping and aviation. A U.N. study projects that if levies were set somewhere between $150 and $300 for each ton of carbon pollution, the fund could generate as much as $127 billion per year. Other proposals have included taxing fossil fuels, cryptocurrencies and plastics, which all contribute to climate change, as well as financial transactions and carbon trading.
China’s expanding role
How much of a leadership role China takes in global climate efforts is an important question going forward, particularly with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump expected to throttle back U.S. support for climate policies and international funding.
China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the second-largest economy.
China also stands to gain as provider of the market majority of green technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles.
Whether or not China should be expected to contribute funding at a level comparable to the other major emitters was so hotly contested at COP29 that it almost shut down the entire conference.
Previously, only those countries listed by the U.N. as “developed countries” – a list that doesn’t include China – were expected to provide funds. The COP29 agreement expands that by calling on “all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing.”
In the end, a compromise was reached. The final agreement “encourages developing countries to make contributions on a voluntary basis,” excluding China from the heavier expectations placed on richer nations.
Side deals offer signs of progress
In a conference fraught with deep division and threatened with collapse, some bright spots of climate progress emerged from the side events.
In one declaration, 25 nations plus the European Union agreed to no new coal power developments. There were also agreements on ocean protection and deforestation. Other declarations marked efforts to reenergize hydrogen energy production and expanded ambitious plans to reduce methane emissions.
Future of UN climate talks
However, after two weeks of bickering and a final resolution that doesn’t go far enough, the U.N. climate talks process itself is in question.
In a letter on Nov. 15, 2024, former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and a group of global climate leaders called for “a fundamental overhaul to the COP” and a “shift from negotiation to implementation.”
After back-to-back climate conferences hosted by oil-producing states, where fossil-fuel companies used the gathering to make deals for more fossil fuels on the side, the letter also calls for strict eligibility requirements for conference hosts “to exclude countries who do not support the phase out/transition away from fossil energy.”
With Trump promising to again withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, it is possible the climate leadership will fall to China, which may bring a new style of climate solutions to the table.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.