China
Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals
China plans to deepen its relationship with Africa, pledging $51 billion in loans and investments, aiming for increased diplomatic ties, economic growth, and expanded influence amidst Western concerns about debt-trap diplomacy.
China’s relationship with Africa is set to deepen. At a summit in Beijing in early September, China’s president, Xi Jinping, pledged to deliver US$51 billion (£39 billion) in loans, investment and aid to the continent over the next three years, as well as upgrading diplomatic ties.
Beijing’s close engagement with Africa is not new. Since 1950, the first overseas trip of the year for Chinese foreign ministers has almost always been to one or more African countries. But Xi’s commitments are still sure to raise concerns in the US and other western countries, which are competing with China for global influence.
They may well also bring back fears of China using “debt-trap diplomacy” to push African countries into default and thereby gain leverage over them. Such is the strength of this narrative that South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, felt compelled to deny it at the summit.
The notion of Chinese debt traps, particularly the infamous case of Sri Lanka’s port of Hambantota that, in 2017, was leased by the Sri Lankan government to a Chinese company to raise liquidity, has been debunked several times.
But with African populations and economies growing, and China’s engagement with them continuing to deepen, it is important to understand what China hopes to achieve with its diplomacy.
China’s engagement with Africa is strategic as well as economic. Whether it’s gaining votes at the UN, better access to resources, or increasing the international use of its currency, China’s diplomatic relations with Africa play into its ambitions of being a major player in a multipolar world.
Chinese children hold national flags as they prepare for the arrival of Togo’s president, Faure Gnassingbe, at Beijing International Airport ahead of the summit.
Ken Ishii / Pool / EPA
The long game
From a purely economic perspective, Africa is a potentially lucrative market for China. With its under-served market and booming population, the scope for expansion into Africa offers huge potential for Chinese firms.
This is particularly true now that the African Continental Free Trade Area (which was established in 2018) opens up the possibility of cross-border value chains developing in Africa.
Most of the goods that China imports from Africa are natural resources. Many of these resources have strategic relevance, for example, in manufacturing batteries. In return, Chinese companies export a wide range of goods to Africa, including manufactured products, industrial and agricultural machinery, and vehicles.
In terms of foreign direct investment, Chinese companies are still only the fifth-largest investors in Africa after their Dutch, French, US and UK counterparts. But their ascent has been relatively quick, and while western companies are focused on resources and the financial sector, Chinese ones also invest heavily in construction and manufacturing.
Chinese companies are major players in Africa’s construction sector, often working on projects funded by loans from Chinese banks to African governments. In 2019, for example, Chinese contractors accounted for about 60% of the total value of construction work in Africa.
Some of the infrastructure financed by China has done little to improve trade or economic development in Africa. And it has, admittedly, also contributed to the increased debt burden of several African countries.
The costly expressways that connect Nairobi in Kenya and Kampala in Uganda to the respective international airports, for instance, have made life easier for city elites and international travellers. But they have not led to economic growth.
So, China has moved to recalibrate its infrastructure finance in recent years. In 2021, Xi introduced the concept of “small and beautiful” projects better targeted at the partner country’s needs – a concept he repeated at the recent summit.
It is this alignment with the requests of African leaders that differentiates China’s engagement with Africa from that of the west. A key request of many African leaders is for investment in manufacturing value chains and imports of African processed goods rather than just raw resources.
Xi’s keynote speech addressed these two concerns. He promised more investment in key sectors and to allow more African goods to enter China without duties.
The construction of the Nairobi Expressway was supposed to decongest Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi.
Daniel Irungu / EPA
China’s support to African nations is political as well as economic. Its policy of non-interference in Africa’s internal affairs have been well received by African leaders – a sharp contrast to western nations who have often tied their support to the respect of certain social or economic conditions.
This has, in turn, bolstered China’s diplomatic influence on the continent. A good indicator of this influence is how many countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which the Chinese government sees as part of China’s territory. In Africa, only Eswatini has full relations with Taiwan and just a handful of other countries have representative offices.
Another Chinese goal is to expand the global reach of its currency, the renminbi. Its motive here is to challenge the dominance of the US dollar, which gives America control over transactions anywhere in the world.
Since the late 2000s, the People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to conduct transactions in renminbi. And China is aiming to increase the use of renminbi in official lending, both through domestic banks such as the China Development Bank and regional institutions such as the New Development Bank.
Much like Africa’s western partners, China pursues both political and economic interests in its dealings with the continent. But, with western leaders paying little attention to Africa, China doesn’t need to pursue debt-trap diplomacy to increase its influence there. It just needs to put forward a better partnership offer to gain ground.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
Italy ratified an upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA) with China, effective in 2025, to reduce tax burdens, prevent evasion, and enhance investment. The DTA introduces modern provisions aligned with international standards, targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution for Italian businesses.
Italy recently ratified the upgraded Double Tax Agreement (DTA), which will finally take effect in 2025. This agreement was signed in 2019 and was designed to reduce tax burdens, prevent tax evasion, and promote Italian investment in China.
On November 5, 2024, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the ratification of the 2019 Double Tax Agreement (DTA) between Italy and China (hereinafter, referred to as the “new DTA”).
Set to take effect in 2025, the new DTA is aimed at eliminating double taxation on income, preventing tax evasion, and creating a more favorable environment for Italian businesses operating in China.
The ratification bill for the new DTA consists of four articles, with Article 3 detailing the financial provisions. Starting in 2025, the implementation costs of the agreement are estimated at €10.86 million (US$11.49 million) annually. These costs will be covered by a reduction in the special current expenditure fund allocated in the Italian Ministry of Economy’s 2024 budget, partially drawing from the reserve for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the parliamentary debate, Deputy Foreign Minister Edmondo Cirielli emphasized the new DTA’s strategic importance, noting that the agreement redefines Italy’s economic and financial framework with China. Cirielli highlighted that the DTA not only strengthens relations with the Chinese government but also supports Italian businesses, which face increasing competition as other European countries have already established double taxation agreements with China. This ratification, therefore, is part of a broader series of diplomatic and economic engagements, leading up to a forthcoming visit by the President of the Italian Republic to China, underscoring Italy’s commitment to fostering bilateral relations and supporting its businesses in China’s complex market landscape.
The newly signed DTA between Italy and China, introduces several modernized provisions aligned with international tax frameworks. Replacing the 1986 DTA, the agreement adopts measures from the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the OECD Multilateral Instrument (MLI), targeting tax avoidance and improving dispute resolution.
The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) clause, inspired by BEPS, is one of the central updates in the new DTA, working to prevent treaty abuse. This clause allows tax benefits to be denied if one of the primary purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to gain a tax advantage, a move to counter tax evasion through treaty-shopping.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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Business
China’s New Home Prices Stabilize After 17-Month Decline Following Support Measures
China’s new home prices fell for the 17th month in October, declining 0.5% from September, but slowing, indicating potential market stabilization amid supportive measures. Second-hand home prices showed mixed trends.
Decline in China’s Home Prices Stabilizes
China’s new home prices continued to decline in October for the 17th consecutive month, although the drop showed signs of slowing. Recent support measures from Beijing appear to be inching the market toward stabilization, as evidenced by a lighter decline compared to earlier months.
Monthly and Yearly Comparisons
According to the latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics, new home prices across 70 mainland cities fell by 0.5% from September, marking the smallest decrease in seven months. Year-on-year, prices dropped by 6.2%, slightly worse than the September decline of 6.1%. In tier-1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai, prices decreased by 0.2%, a smaller fall than 0.5% in the previous month.
Second-Hand Home Market Trends
Second-hand home prices in tier-1 cities experienced a 0.4% increase in October, reversing a 13-month downward trend. Conversely, tier-2 cities observed a 0.4% drop in second-hand prices, while tier-3 cities faced a similar 0.5% decline. Overall, recent trends indicate a potential stabilization in China’s property market.
Source : China’s new home prices slow 17-month decline after support measures kick in
China
U.S. national debt is its Achilles’ heel, but China sees it as an opportunity
China is emerging as a dominant force in the Global South, challenging U.S. dollar hegemony by increasing gold reserves and reducing U.S. debt holdings, aiming for a multipolar economic landscape.
China is gradually establishing itself as a major player in what has recently been called the Global South, previously known as the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s biggest creditor of developing countries. That has prompted many to fear that it will subjugate partners through the “debt trap” and use this to establish a “hegemonic sphere of influence.”
China’s economic position is so strong that it is now considered the main threat to the U.S. dollar. It is an influential member of the BRICS+ group (which also includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa). This group is working to establish a multipolar world that challenges the hegemony of the West, specifically the leadership of the United States. I analyzed this issue in a previous article.
Without using the term “threat,” the U.S. administration now sees China as the “most serious long-term challenge” to the international order. It’s easy to understand why, since China’s strategic objective is to put an end to the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, the keystone of U.S. hegemony.
As a researcher in international political economy at the Université Laval, I am looking at the role China is playing in the dedollarization of the world.
The stronghold of the U.S. dollar
The supremacy of the U.S. dollar underpins American hegemony in the current international order, as French economist Denis Durand explains in his article Guerre monétaire internationale: l’hégémonie du dollar contestée? (International currency war: the dollar’s hegemony challenged?).
In addition to the fact that several currencies are linked to the dollar by a fixed link or band of fluctuation, American currency is also used in many Third World and Eastern European countries, where it enjoys a much higher level of public confidence than do local currencies. […] The United States is the only power that can incur foreign debt in its own currency.
The hegemony of the U.S. dollar over the world economy is reflected in its over-representation in the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks. The greenback still outstrips other currencies even though there has been some erosion in this.
Despite a fall of 12 percentage points between 1999 and 2021, the share of the U.S. dollar in the official assets of the world’s central banks remains fairly stable at around 58-59 per cent.
U.S. currency still enjoys widespread confidence around the world, reinforcing its status as the preeminent reserve currency. The U.S. dollar reserves of the world’s central banks are invested in U.S. Treasury bills on the U.S. capital market, helping to reduce the cost of financing both government debt and private investment in the United States.
However, the income generated for the U.S. economy by the hegemony of its dollar could also collapse like a house of cards. Durand makes this point when he writes that “the monetary hegemony of the United States […] is held together only by the confidence of economic agents around the world in the American dollar.”
There are two reasons that the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar could decrease.
Firstly, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen admitted in an interview in April 2023, the United States is unequivocally using its dollar as a tool to bend enemies — but also some recalcitrant allies — to its will. This could ultimately undermine the dollar’s hegemony.
On the other hand, the U.S. debt situation, particularly its unsustainability, is a source of concern that could affect the dollar’s attractiveness as a global reserve currency.
Unsustainable debt
The U.S. dollar has been at the heart of the international monetary system since 1944, and even more so since the Bretton Woods Agreement came into force in 1959.
The Bretton Woods system was based on both gold and the greenback, which was the only currency convertible into gold; this convertibility was fixed at the rate of $35 per ounce.
That changed on Aug. 15, 1971, when, because of inflation and the growing imbalances in the United States’ international economic relations, Richard Nixon announced the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold.
With the dollar pegged to gold, the United States’ ability to take on debt to meet public spending was limited. Under the gold-based system, where gold was the guarantor of the U.S. currency, the United States could only borrow according to the quantity of dollars in circulation and its gold reserves.
Abandoning the gold-based system gave the U.S. free rein over its debt. In 2023, the U.S. public debt reached more than $33.4 trillion, nine times the country’s debt in 1990.
This astronomical figure continues to raise concerns about its long-term sustainability. As U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has pointed out, U.S. debt is growing faster than the economy, making it unsustainable in the long term.
An opportunity for China
This is a reality to which China is clearly attuned, since it recently undertook a massive sell-off of the U.S. debt it owned. Between 2016 and 2023, China sold $600 billion worth of U.S. bonds.
However, in August 2017 China was the United States’ largest creditor, ahead of Japan. It held more than $1.146 billion in U.S. Treasuries, almost 20 per cent of the amount held by all foreign governments. Beijing is now the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, with a claim of around $816 billion.
It is certainly no coincidence that before divesting itself of U.S. bonds, Beijing first launched its own gold pricing system in yuan. In fact, on April 19, 2016, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, China’s operator for precious metals, unveiled on its website its first “fixed” daily benchmark for gold at 256.92 yuan per gram.
This policy is part of China’s strategy to make gold a tangible guarantee of its currency.
China’s “Gold for Dollars” strategy
China is also selling its U.S. bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, between March 2023 and March 2024, China sold off $100 billion in U.S. Treasuries, on top of the $300 billion it had already sold off over the past decade.
At the same time, the Middle Kingdom has replaced around a quarter of the U.S. Treasuries sold in 10 years with gold, of which it is now the leading producer and consumer. Like China’s central bank, other central banks in emerging countries continue to buy gold.
China’s appetite for gold was confirmed in 2010, when its gold reserves rose to 1,054 tonnes, from around 600 tonnes in 2005. Ten years later, in 2020, its stock of gold had almost doubled again, to nearly 2,000 tonnes. By the end of 2023, with a gold reserve of 2,235 tonnes, China will be the country with the sixth-largest gold reserve.
As a substitute for the dollar, gold enables China to store the gains from its large trade surpluses. With the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which offers gold trading contracts in Yuan, Beijing is seeking to strengthen the use of its currency abroad with the aim of establishing the yuan as the benchmark currency for the global economy.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.