China
Why China now wants to put some limits on its ‘no limits’ friendship with Russia
China’s “no-limits friendship” with Russia is evolving amid war scrutiny. Growing skepticism about Russia’s stability, economic dependencies, and differing international outlooks prompt China to reconsider its alignment with Moscow.
Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China announced to much fanfare a “no-limits friendship” with Russia, suggesting a future of close collaboration in trade, energy and, perhaps most importantly, security.
Now, more than two years into the war, the meaning and interpretation of this “no-limits” commitment has evolved.
There has been much debate in Chinese society in recent months about Beijing’s alignment with Moscow. While some have advocated for a more formal alliance with Russia, others have taken a more cautious stance.
In sharp contrast to 2022, China’s growing wariness is increasingly being discussed in the open, even among those who were previously censored. In early 2022, for instance, a joint letter by six Chinese emeritus historians opposing Russia’s invasion was censored by the government. The scholars were also warned.
Now, however, it appears the government is seeking to balance its relationships with both Russia and the West. Beijing may not want to be seen as a “decisive enabler” of the war.
For example, the once-prominent “no-limits” friendship language quietly vanished from a Sino-Russian joint statement in May.
And Beijing’s response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit that month was notably subdued. Putin ingratiated himself with Xi, saying they were “as close as brothers”. Xi’s response was more perfunctory – he called Putin a “good friend and a good neighbour”.
When they met in May, Xi was less effusive towards Putin than he has been in the past.
Sergei Bobylev/Pool Sputnik Kremlin/AP
Scholars are also articulating their concerns about China’s political and economic investments in Russia, both publicly and privately.
Shen Dingli, a leading scholar of Chinese security strategy at Fudan University in Shanghai, said China doesn’t want to be seen as collaborating with Russia against Ukraine or any other country.
He also quoted Fu Cong, China’s former ambassador to the European Union, who said last year the “no-limits” [friendship] is “nothing but rhetoric”.
And in August, after Putin referred to China as an “ally” during a visit to far-eastern Russia, Chinese scholars promptly sought to clarify this statement to prevent any misunderstanding China wants a formal alliance with Russia.
These statements carry weight. In many respects, leading Chinese scholars at the government-affiliated universities act as propagandists to convey and justify the government’s stance on issues. As a result, subtle shifts in their commentary provide insights into the strategic mindset in Beijing.
Why China is rethinking its ‘no-limits’ friendship?
There are three elements driving this re-evaluation of the Russia-China alignment.
First, there is growing scepticism of Russia’s state capacities. The mutiny by the Wagner Group last year and Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region have prompted critical reassessments in Beijing of Russia’s political stability and military preparedness, as well as the growing anti-war sentiment in Russia.
As Feng Yujun, director of Fudan University’s Russia and Central Asia Study Centre, argued, the Wagner rebellion was a reflection of Russia’s internal conflicts and domestic security challenges. He noted every time Russia has faced both internal and external crises in history, its regimes have become less stable.
More recently, Feng has been even bolder, predicting Russian defeat in Ukraine. He argued China should keep its distance from Moscow and resume a policy of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-partisanship”.
Second, China’s sluggish economy and its underwhelming trade with Russia have further exposed how dependent both countries are on the West.
While Russia-China trade reached a record US$240 billion (A$360 billion) in 2023, it has slowed so far this year, as Chinese financial institutions have sought to limit connections with Russia.
The relationship still heavily favours Beijing. Russia accounts for only 4% of China’s trade, while China accounts for nearly 22% of Russia’s trade.
Many Chinese experts are now warning against an over-dependence on Russia, instead calling for more cooperation with neighbouring countries. This echoes a recent concern Russia has been using its natural resources as a bargaining chip to extract greater benefits from China.
Russia’s value as a military ally
Finally, there are rising Chinese concerns its international outlook does not align with Russia’s.
Zhao Long, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations, says there is an important difference in how they view the world:
Russia wants to destroy the current international system to build a new one. China wants to transform the current system by taking a more prominent place in it.
Shi Yinhong, a strategist at Renmin University in Beijing, has highlighted an unbridgeable gap preventing a stronger China-Russia alliance. He says there’s a deep mutual mistrust on regional security. Russia has never promised support for China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, just as China has avoided involvement in the war in Ukraine.
As Russia’s war in Ukraine reaches a stalemate, its value as a military ally is increasingly being questioned in China.
Recently, Feng Yujun warned China risks being led by the nose by Russia, despite being the stronger economic partner. He says every time China has attempted an alliance with Russia in history, it has had negative consequences for China.
Consequently, it is crucial for China to maintain its long-term partnership with Russia without undermining its constructive relationship with the West.
Russia has arguably benefited from the current competition between the US and China, as it has sought to exploit the rivalry for its own benefit. But this has also led to uncertainty in the China-Russia relationship.
As another analyst, Ji Zhiye, argues, relying too heavily on Russia will leave China isolated and vulnerable. And this is not a position China wants to be in.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
Wegovy: The Popular Weight-Loss Drug Now Available in China
Novo Nordisk launched Wegovy in China after approval, competing with Eli Lilly’s upcoming weight-loss drug. The treatment, costing 1,400 yuan, targets obesity but has potential side effects and isn’t covered by healthcare.
Wegovy Launch in China
Novo Nordisk recently launched its weight-loss drug, Wegovy, in China after obtaining approval from local health authorities in June. The introduction of Wegovy is expected to increase competition with Eli Lilly, which has also received approval for its weight-loss treatment, although it has not yet been released in China’s significant pharmaceutical market.
Cost and Accessibility
In China, a set of four Wegovy injections will be priced at 1,400 yuan (approximately $194), significantly lower than the drug’s U.S. price. However, patients will need to pay the full amount out of pocket since Wegovy is not yet covered by the national healthcare insurance plan.
Benefits and Side Effects
Research indicates that Wegovy can help users lose over 10% of their body weight. The drug contains semaglutide, which assists with appetite control and satiety. While Wegovy has been gaining traction globally, it may cause side effects like nausea. Concerns have emerged about its misuse among individuals who are not obese, prompting medical professionals to remain vigilant.
Source : Popular weight-loss drug Wegovy goes on sale in China
China
China Implements New Measures to Increase Foreign Investment in A-Share Market
China’s 2024 updates to strategic investment rules simplify A-share market access for foreign investors by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and increasing investment options, reflecting a commitment to greater market openness and participation in economic reform.
The 2024 updates to China’s strategic investment rules simplify entry for foreign investors in the A-share market by lowering shareholding thresholds, reducing lock-up periods, and expanding investment options, signaling a commitment to increased market openness and flexibility through these new measures.
China’s capital markets are undergoing a significant transformation as part of the nation’s ongoing commitment to economic reform and openness. The recent update to the Administrative Measures for Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (hereinafter, the “new measures”) reflects this commitment, targeting an increase in foreign investor participation in China’s A-share market. For nearly two decades, China’s “strategic investment” pathway provided foreign investors with access to shares in A-share listed companies, but strict requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and prolonged lock-up periods—made it accessible only to select large investors.
The new measures, effective December 2, 2024, relax many of these restrictions to attract a broader and more diverse range of foreign investors. Key changes include lowering the minimum shareholding threshold from 10 percent to 5 percent, reducing the asset requirements from US$100 million to US$50 million in assets, and shortening the lock-up period from three years to one. Additionally, foreign investors can now use equity from unlisted overseas companies as consideration, while new investment routes, like tender offers, enhance flexibility.
In 2005, China introduced the Strategic Investment Regime as part of its broader efforts to open up its financial markets to foreign capital while retaining a level of control over sensitive industries. This framework allowed qualified foreign investors to acquire strategic stakes in Chinese A-share listed companies, aiming to promote foreign participation in the domestic market.
However, the stringent requirements—such as high minimum investment thresholds and extended lock-up periods—restricted this pathway to a limited pool of large, multinational investors. The regime reflected China’s cautious approach at the time, seeking to balance openness with economic stability and control over critical sectors.
A decade later, in 2015, China implemented its first significant revisions to the Strategic Investment Regime. These amendments sought to make the investment process more accessible by easing certain restrictions, aiming to encourage foreign capital inflow as China continued its gradual integration into global markets.
While some requirements were relaxed, the fundamental limitations—such as high entry thresholds and complex approval processes—remained in place, meaning that access to China’s A-share market was still primarily confined to major institutional investors with substantial capital.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
Rising concerns over China’s industrial overcapacity have led countries to impose higher tariffs, including Indonesia’s planned 200% tariffs on Chinese goods, risking Indonesia’s competitiveness and economic security.
Tariffs Escalate Amid Concerns of Overcapacity
Concerns regarding China’s industrial overcapacity have prompted countries to increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Indonesia, following the U.S. example, plans to impose tariffs as high as 200 percent on various Chinese imports, including textiles and ceramics. This response aims to safeguard local jobs from the influx of inexpensive Chinese products.
Economic Impact of Tariffs
These tariffs are designed as safeguards and anti-dumping measures against potential job losses in Indonesia. However, the ongoing investigations have not definitively shown that China’s practices are the root cause of these issues. The political appeal of broad tariffs might lead to unintended consequences, such as reducing the overall competitiveness of Indonesian exports and risking retaliatory measures from affected countries.
Dependency on Chinese Goods
Indonesia heavily relies on Chinese manufacturing inputs, which constituted over 26 percent of its intermediary goods imports in 2021. With competitive pricing, these inputs have enhanced Indonesia’s export capabilities, particularly to markets like the U.S., where the trade surplus increased from $8.58 billion in 2019 to $11.96 billion in 2023. Reducing trade openness may ultimately undermine the Indonesian economy’s resilience against geopolitical challenges.
- Wegovy: The Popular Weight-Loss Drug Now Available in China
- China Implements New Measures to Increase Foreign Investment in A-Share Market
- Less is More: Rethinking Indonesia’s Tariffs on China
- What does China want from the next US president?
- China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival Kicks Off in Xiamen – Thailand Business News
- Italy and China New DTA Set to Take Effect in 2025: Important Changes and Implications
