China
Drawing lines in the South China Sea: what Beijing’s new claims over a disputed coral reef mean
China recently declared new baselines around Scarborough Reef, asserting sovereignty amid ongoing disputes with the Philippines, raising tensions and potential risk of conflict in the South China Sea.
Earlier this month, China declared new “baselines” around Scarborough Reef, a large coral atoll topped by a handful of rocks barely above sea level in the South China Sea.
By doing so, China reaffirmed its sovereignty claim over what has become a global flashpoint in the disputed waters.
This was a pre-calculated response to the Philippines’ enactment of new maritime laws two days earlier that aimed to safeguard its own claims over the reef and other contested parts of the sea.
This legal tit-for-tat is a continuation of the ongoing sovereignty and maritime dispute between China and the Philippines (and others) in a vital ocean area through which one-third of global trade travels.
The Philippines rejected China’s declaration as a violation of its “long-established sovereignty over the shoal”. Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said:
What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area.
As the tensions continue to worsen over these claims, there is an ever-increasing risk of an at-sea conflict between the two countries.
What is the Scarborough Reef?
Scarborough Reef is called Huangyan Dao in Chinese and Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines. It is located in the northeast of the South China Sea, about 116 nautical miles (215km) west of the Philippine island of Luzon and 448 nautical miles (830km) south of the Chinese mainland.
Disputed claims in the South China Sea.
Author provided
At high tide it is reduced to a few tiny islets, the tallest of which is just 3 metres above the water. However, at low tide, it is the largest coral atoll in the South China Sea.
China asserts sovereignty over all of the waters, islands, rocks and other features in the South China Sea, as well as unspecified “historic rights” within its claimed nine-dash line. This includes Scarborough Reef.
In recent years, the reef has been the scene of repeated clashes between China and the Philippines. Since 2012, China has blocked Filipino fishing vessels from accessing the valuable lagoon here. This prompted the Philippines to take China to international arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013.
Three years later, an arbitration tribunal ruled that China has no historic rights to maritime areas where this would conflict with UNCLOS. The tribunal also concluded China had “unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal.”
China refused to participate in the arbitration case and has strongly rejected its ruling as being “null and void” and having “no binding force”.
What did China do this month?
China declared the exact location of the base points of its territorial claim around Scarborough Reef with geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude), joined up by straight lines.
China’s new baselines claims at the Scarborough Reef.
Author provided
The declaration of so-called “baselines” is standard practice for countries that want to claim maritime zones along their coasts. Baselines provide the starting point for measuring these zones.
A country’s “territorial sea” is measured from this baseline outward to as far as 12 nautical miles (22km). Under the UNCLOS treaty, a country then has full sovereignty rights over this zone, covering the seabed, water, airspace and any resources located there.
Countries want their baselines to be as far out to sea as possible so they can maximise the ocean areas over which they can reap economic benefits and enforce their own laws.
China is no exception. Along with other countries (especially in Asia), it draws the most generous baselines of all – straight baselines. These can connect distant headlands or other coastal outcrops with a simple straight line, or even enclose nearshore islands.
China is especially fond of straight baselines. In 1996, it drew them along most of its mainland coast and around the Paracel Islands, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. China defined additional straight baselines this March in the Gulf of Tonkin up to its land border with Vietnam.
China says these actions comply with UNCLOS. However, its use of straight baselines around Scarborough Reef conflicts with international law. This is because UNCLOS provides a specific rule for baselines around reefs, which China did not follow.
Based on our review of satellite imagery, however, China has only advanced the outer limit of its territorial sea by a few hundred metres in two directions. This is because its straight baselines largely hug the edge of the reef.
These new baselines around Scarborough Reef are therefore fairly conservative and enclose a dramatically smaller area than the US had feared.
China’s declaration signals that it may have abandoned its much larger “offshore archipelago” claim to what it calls the Zhongsha Islands.
China has long asserted that Scarborough Reef is part of this larger island group, which includes the Macclesfield Bank, a totally underwater feature 180 nautical miles (333 km) to the west. This led to concern that Beijing might draw a baseline around this entire island group, claiming all the waters within exclusively for its use.
The South China Sea arbitration tribunal ruled that international law prohibits such claims. There will be a collective sigh of relief among many countries that China decided to make a much smaller claim over Scarborough Reef.
Significance and future steps?
However, China’s clarification of its baselines around the reef signals it may be more assertive in its law enforcement here.
The China Coast Guard has said it will step up patrols in the South China Sea to “firmly uphold order, protect the local ecosystem and biological resources and safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights”.
Given the long history of clashes related to fishing access around Scarborough Reef, this sets the scene for more confrontation.
And what about the biggest prize of all in the South China Sea – the Spratly Islands?
We can now expect China will continue its long straight baselines march to this island group to the south. The Spratlys are an archipelago of more than 150 small islands, reefs and atolls spread out over around 240,000 square kilometres of lucrative fishing grounds. They are claimed by China, as well as the Philippines and several other countries.
These countries can be expected to protest any attempted encirclement of the Spratly Islands by new Chinese baselines.
Editor’s note: one of the original authors of this article has been removed at their request.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
China Considers Selling TikTok US Operations to Musk as a Viable Option – Bloomberg
China is considering the sale of TikTok’s U.S. operations to Elon Musk as a potential option, according to a report by Bloomberg.
Potential Sale of TikTok to Elon Musk
Reports suggest that China is considering the sale of TikTok’s U.S. operations to Elon Musk as a viable option. This development follows ongoing scrutiny over the app’s data privacy practices and its links to the Chinese government. Officials believe that a sale could alleviate international concerns and preserve the platform’s presence in the U.S. market.
Strategic Implications
The potential transaction raises numerous strategic implications, not only for TikTok but also for Musk’s other ventures. If Musk were to acquire TikTok, it could enhance his digital footprint and provide new avenues for advertising and user engagement. Conversely, it could pose challenges in managing regulatory compliance and addressing data security issues.
Regulatory Hurdles Ahead
Despite the intriguing prospect of a sale, significant regulatory hurdles remain. Any acquisition would require approval from U.S. authorities, who continue to assess the risks associated with foreign ownership of tech companies. The outcome of these discussions could have widespread ramifications for both TikTok and the broader social media landscape.
Source : China Weighs Sale of TikTok US to Musk as a Possible Option – Bloomberg
China
Essential Insights into NGO Accounting and Compliance in China
China will implement an updated accounting system for non-profit organizations starting January 1, 2026, to standardize financial reporting and enhance management practices. The changes address evolving challenges in the NGO sector, ensuring regulatory compliance and effective donor fund management.
China has recently amended its accounting system for non-governmental non-profit organizations, with the new provisions set to take effect on January 1, 2026. As the number of NGOs continues to grow in the country, understanding the existing and updated requirements is crucial for organizations seeking to maintain regulatory compliance and effectively manage donor funds.
On December 20, 2024, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) unveiled the updated Accounting System for Non-governmental Non-profit Organizations (hereinafter, the “NGO Accounting System”), set to take effect on January 1, 2026.
Among others, the revision of the NGO Accounting System is designed to standardize financial reporting, enhance management practices, and provide a regulatory framework to support the high-quality development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As the sector expands and diversifies, new challenges have arisen, such as increasingly varied donation methods, rising foreign investments, and the growing number of NGOs being established. In response to these developments, the updated system aims to address emerging accounting issues and reflect the evolving nature of the sector.
In this article, we provide an overview of the current accounting and compliance landscape for NGOs in China, explore the key provisions of the new NGO Accounting System, and highlight the significant changes introduced in the revision.
In China, NGOs encompass a wide range of organizations, including social service agencies, foundations, nonprofit schools, medical institutions, religious organizations (e.g., Taoist temples, mosques, churches), and various other social service providers. Much like their counterparts globally, NGOs play a crucial role in addressing social, environmental, and economic challenges. These entities, typically nonprofit, are dedicated to causes such as education, healthcare, environmental protection, and humanitarian aid.
China’s legal framework for NGOs is multifaceted, governed by several key laws and regulations:
Accounting for NGOs requires meticulous tracking of funds and compliance with specific regulations and reporting standards to ensure transparency and accountability to donors, stakeholders, and the public. Unlike the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE, commonly referred to as CAS), the Accounting System for NGOs imposes unique requirements for handling various types of donations, including asset and labor donations, as well as the management of entrusted agency business, where the NGO acts as an intermediary to transfer assets to a designated beneficiary. The system also differentiates between restricted and unrestricted net assets, outlines specific classifications for the costs associated with business activities, and includes additional disclosure requirements in the financial notes. As more NGOs establish a presence in China, these standards have gained increased attention in recent years.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
The year ahead in the Middle East: A weakened Iran has big implications for China
Iran’s influence in the Middle East has significantly diminished post-Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, impacting its alliances and prompting China to reconsider its relationship with Iran and strengthen ties with other regional powers.
The wheels of history have been turning rapidly in the Middle East over the last year.
For a significant period of time, Iran’s status as a rising power within the region has been regarded as a consistent reality in assessing Middle Eastern geopolitics. But events since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel have seen Iran’s position in the region erode substantially. The balance of power in the Middle East has consequently been irreversibly altered.
A key pillar supporting Iran’s previously powerful status in the Middle East has been its cultivation of the “Axis of Resistance,” a group of Iranian allies across the region that acted together against Israeli and American interests.
The members of the axis, in addition to Iran itself, include Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Houthis and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.
Read more:
Assad’s fall in Syria will further weaken Hezbollah and curtails Tehran’s ‘Iranization’ of region
Axis decimation
Israel’s relentless war in retaliation for the Oct. 7 attack has seen several of the most important members of the axis severely diminished, if not entirely decimated.
Both Hezbollah and Hamas have been humiliated through the destruction of their respective leaderships, and their operational capacities have been reduced significantly.
The largest blow to Iran’s proxy network was arguably the recent ousting of Syria’s Assad, ending a decades-long regime that was regarded by top Iranian strategists as Iran’s most important regional ally.
Syrians celebrate during a demonstration following the first Friday prayers since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in Damascus’s central square on Dec. 13, 2024.
(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)
The adverse consequences of these developments for Iran’s grand strategy raises questions of how a significantly weakened Iran will affect the world at large, especially in terms of its impact on great power politics in the Middle East.
This undoubtedly represents a welcome development in the United States given the long-standing animosity towards post-1979 Iran among the American foreign policy establishment. But China is likely to have a more nuanced outlook predicated upon its commitment to pragmatic foreign policy maneuvering in accomplishing its top global objectives.
China’s engagement with Iran
As China has grown richer and more powerful in recent decades, it’s turned its attention to increasing its diplomatic clout and economic presence throughout the world. Every region of the planet has been affected by this development, but the Middle East achieved a spot of particular importance for China.
The Chinese government’s motivation to deeply engage in the Middle East has been — and continues to be — driven by several key considerations: the Middle East’s status as a powerhouse of oil production, its strategic geographic location bridging east and west, and its status as a long-standing pillar of American foreign policy.
China has fostered bilateral partnerships across the entire Middle East, but one of its longest regional relationships has been with Iran. In Iran, Chinese authorities saw a country that provided it with an opportunity to help it achieve China’s main objectives in the region.
Liu Zhenmin, China climate envoy, left, and Saudi Arabia Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman, right, arrive for a plenary session at the COP29 UN Climate Summit in November in Baku, Azerbaijan.
(AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)
Post-1979, Iran was inherently anti-American, which meant that China was more likely to be warmly received by Tehran, especially when compared to other regional powers like Saudi Arabia that had relatively warm relations with the U.S.
Perhaps most importantly, Iran could be depended on — to an extent — to stymie American interests in the Middle East given its status as a rising regional power.
This is not to say that Iran became a Chinese client state, but rather that China could provide diplomatic and economic support to Iran as the Iranians used their power to act disruptively in a region of great strategic importance to the U.S.
China’s future moves
Given the motivations underlying deep Chinese-Iranian ties historically, it’s clear that the evaporation of Iran’s clout will likely greatly alter the character of their relationship moving forward.
In a nutshell, a significant portion of Iran’s appeal to Chinese policymakers has disappeared with the near annihilation of its regional network. This will likely encourage China to seek deeper ties with other Middle Eastern heavyweights, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in accomplishing its goals in the Middle East — chief among them, increasing its regional influence at the expense of the U.S.
But it’s also unlikely China will entirely abandon Iran. While it may focus its most concerted efforts on developing deeper ties with other Middle Eastern countries instead of Iran, China would likely be hesitant to see Iran become even further isolated and therefore more predisposed to behaving aggressively.
China was one of the main behind-the-scenes mediators of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal because it wanted regional tensions to dissipate via Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear program.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, in May 2024.
(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)
Now that Iran is weakened, it has essentially been boxed into a corner, and has two main options moving forward: either it achieves a rapprochement with the West, or it reinvigorates its nuclear program and acts more aggressively.
While Iran’s ultra-conservative factions that control the levers of power in the country may be tempted to take a more aggressive path, it is very possible China will attempt to use its substantial economic leverage over Iran to encourage them to pursue the rapprochement option.
That’s because the Chinese need the Middle East as a source of petroleum to fuel their economy, and because China doesn’t want to be viewed by the West as an implicit accomplice to a bellicose and destabilizing Iran.
China a moderating influence?
On the contrary, China is currently attempting to repair relations with many western countries given the importance of the West’s markets to China’s ailing economy.
In fact, China may wish to play a role in inducing Iran to strike a deal with the West in the near future, given that it would show the incoming Donald Trump administration — which is notoriously hawkish on China — that it can be trusted and worked with constructively.
At the end of the day, China will seek the path that minimizes the likelihood of full-blown conflict in the Middle East given the importance of the region to the Chinese economy. The country has a strategic opportunity to signal trustworthiness and dependability to the West by working to prevent Iran from choosing a more aggressive path.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Considers Selling TikTok US Operations to Musk as a Viable Option – Bloomberg
- Essential Insights into NGO Accounting and Compliance in China
- The year ahead in the Middle East: A weakened Iran has big implications for China
- China and the UK Resume Economic and Financial Discussions After Six-Year Break
- Indonesia Needs to Take a Critical Stance on China’s Global Order Vision
- Cross-Border Data Transfers: New Draft Guidelines Clarify Certification for Personal Information Protection
