China
China and India and the transition of regional power
Author: Peter Drysdale, ANU Through 2005 to 2007, diplomatic flirtation with the idea that a new quadrilateral alliance in Asia and the Pacific centred on India’s anchor role, with the United States , Japan and Australia, in a soft, ‘values-based’ containment initiative (Quad Initiative) directed at its strategic encirclement of China blossomed briefly and faded from public view. As Sourabh Gupta reminds us in his thoughtful essay reviewing the state of the China-India relationship this week, in the northern summer of 2007, joint naval exercises conducted ostentatiously in the Bay of Bengal by the four Quad powers plus Singapore, allegedly under NATO operational procedures and with facilitated access (for India) to the American military satellite system, added to irritation in the relationship between Asia’s two great emerging powers. Beijing’s frustration with developments at the time derived more from Washington’s willingness to bend international non-proliferation norms and reinstate India as a country in good standing in the international nuclear regime, Gupta suggests. That the US-India civil nuclear agreement materialised barely a couple of weeks after Premier Wen’s departure from New Delhi in 2005 added to the feeling that China had been caught diplomatically flat-footed as well as betrayed by India’s transactional approach to US ties. Beijing chose to respond, significantly, by putting pressure on questions over territory to signal its disaffection. In a pattern, Gupta notes, that has seen China calibrate its stance on outstanding territorial issues to the tenor of its overall bilateral relationship and perceptions of friendliness or hostility — it was swift to pursue its claims inflexibly on the ground and at the negotiating table. The next few years saw retreat from the Quad idea. Abe lost power in Japan. The new Hatoyama government in Japan sought a different course with China. The Obama administration in Washington and the Rudd government in Australia were inclined to a more nuanced approach to how India might counter-balance the growing power of China and its particular characteristics. But underneath the surface, the Quad idea was not dead — in hibernation perhaps, but not dead. In pol-mil circles, it offered the promise of continuity for the established order of regional power, a comfortable reassuring retreat to an augmented familiar security framework. It also offered, however thinly, the moral fig leaf that rationalised a strategy of Chinese containment, whatever that might mean. Come the troubles with China of 2010, mutations of Quad-type thinking came out of the closet once more, not in public diplomacy but privately, pushing the idea at the margins of circles of influence in India and in the putative Quad constituency . It remains, active, purposeful, but below the radar. But India, and China, not unexpectedly, have moved on. To those in Washington, Tokyo or Canberra, who incline to the Quad strategy, not as a contingency but as some kind of in-your-face alternative to Chinese engagement, politically and militarily, as well as economically, it is well to reflect upon the independent evolution and challenges of India’s relationship with China. These are two powers, with common borders, each their own vulnerabilities, inexorably growing economic complementary, shared interests and objectives in global governance and the need to deal with each other’s growing power in its own Asian space. Engaging with China bilaterally is an imperative for India, not an option. The challenge for New Delhi is – and it has always been – to factor calculation of national self-interest (and security) into dealings with China without foreclosing the potential of a resurgent Asia with China and India at its core. Third-country strategic partners are a useful adjunct in this process … but an adjunct at best, and relegated in most part to narrow aspects of the security realm. India’s self-image as an aspiring great power and a peer of China demand that the burden (and instruments) for managing and engaging China will rest primarily on its own capabilities. And it will have to discharge this self-imposed obligation in its own time frame, not at the whim of others. Gupta’s careful analysis of China-India affairs reminds us once again, should we need reminding, that as India and China face these realities, whatever the baggage in the history of their relationship, India can afford to be nobody’s pawn in dealing with China or rely on the dream of appeal to distant American power to solve its problems with its neighbour. And China will have every reason to treat India with increasing care and appropriate respect . No related posts.
Through 2005 to 2007, diplomatic flirtation with the idea that a new quadrilateral alliance in Asia and the Pacific centred on India’s anchor role, with the United States, Japan and Australia, in a soft, ‘values-based’ containment initiative (Quad Initiative) directed at its strategic encirclement of China blossomed briefly and faded from public view.
As Sourabh Gupta reminds us in his thoughtful essay reviewing the state of the China-India relationship this week, in the northern summer of 2007, joint naval exercises conducted ostentatiously in the Bay of Bengal by the four Quad powers plus Singapore, allegedly under NATO operational procedures and with facilitated access (for India) to the American military satellite system, added to irritation in the relationship between Asia’s two great emerging powers.
Beijing’s frustration with developments at the time derived more from Washington’s willingness to bend international non-proliferation norms and reinstate India as a country in good standing in the international nuclear regime, Gupta suggests. That the US-India civil nuclear agreement materialised barely a couple of weeks after Premier Wen’s departure from New Delhi in 2005 added to the feeling that China had been caught diplomatically flat-footed as well as betrayed by India’s transactional approach to US ties. Beijing chose to respond, significantly, by putting pressure on questions over territory to signal its disaffection. In a pattern, Gupta notes, that has seen China calibrate its stance on outstanding territorial issues to the tenor of its overall bilateral relationship and perceptions of friendliness or hostility — it was swift to pursue its claims inflexibly on the ground and at the negotiating table.
The next few years saw retreat from the Quad idea. Abe lost power in Japan. The new Hatoyama government in Japan sought a different course with China. The Obama administration in Washington and the Rudd government in Australia were inclined to a more nuanced approach to how India might counter-balance the growing power of China and its particular characteristics. But underneath the surface, the Quad idea was not dead — in hibernation perhaps, but not dead. In pol-mil circles, it offered the promise of continuity for the established order of regional power, a comfortable reassuring retreat to an augmented familiar security framework. It also offered, however thinly, the moral fig leaf that rationalised a strategy of Chinese containment, whatever that might mean. Come the troubles with China of 2010, mutations of Quad-type thinking came out of the closet once more, not in public diplomacy but privately, pushing the idea at the margins of circles of influence in India and in the putative Quad constituency. It remains, active, purposeful, but below the radar. But India, and China, not unexpectedly, have moved on.
To those in Washington, Tokyo or Canberra, who incline to the Quad strategy, not as a contingency but as some kind of in-your-face alternative to Chinese engagement, politically and militarily, as well as economically, it is well to reflect upon the independent evolution and challenges of India’s relationship with China. These are two powers, with common borders, each their own vulnerabilities, inexorably growing economic complementary, shared interests and objectives in global governance and the need to deal with each other’s growing power in its own Asian space. Engaging with China bilaterally is an imperative for India, not an option. The challenge for New Delhi is – and it has always been – to factor calculation of national self-interest (and security) into dealings with China without foreclosing the potential of a resurgent Asia with China and India at its core. Third-country strategic partners are a useful adjunct in this process … but an adjunct at best, and relegated in most part to narrow aspects of the security realm. India’s self-image as an aspiring great power and a peer of China demand that the burden (and instruments) for managing and engaging China will rest primarily on its own capabilities. And it will have to discharge this self-imposed obligation in its own time frame, not at the whim of others.
Gupta’s careful analysis of China-India affairs reminds us once again, should we need reminding, that as India and China face these realities, whatever the baggage in the history of their relationship, India can afford to be nobody’s pawn in dealing with China or rely on the dream of appeal to distant American power to solve its problems with its neighbour. And China will have every reason to treat India with increasing care and appropriate respect.
Author: Peter Drysdale, ANU
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China and India and the transition of regional power
Business
China Reports Agreement on Ceasefire between Myanmar’s Factions
Myanmar’s conflicting parties have reached a ceasefire agreement, facilitated by China, aiming to reduce violence and promote peace in the region.
Myanmar Ceasefire Agreement
In a significant development, conflicting parties in Myanmar have reached an agreement for a ceasefire, with China facilitating discussions. This breakthrough is crucial for restoring peace in a nation that has been marred by violence and political strife in recent years. The ceasefire aims to pave the way for reconciliation efforts and improve the humanitarian situation in affected areas.
Role of China
China’s involvement as a mediator highlights its growing influence in resolving regional conflicts. The Chinese government has been working closely with both sides to promote dialogue and trust, crucial elements for a long-term peace solution. Increased stability in Myanmar can benefit regional security and economic development, making China’s mediation significant.
Looking Forward
The hope is that this ceasefire will lead to further negotiations addressing underlying issues in Myanmar. While challenges remain, both parties have expressed willingness to work towards a peaceful resolution. The international community will be watching closely to see if this ceasefire can be sustained and lead to enduring peace for the people of Myanmar.
China
2024 China Economic Review: GDP, Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment Analysis
In 2024, China’s economy grew 5%, supported by stimulus measures, strong exports, and high-tech investments, despite weak domestic demand and demographic challenges. Key sectors like manufacturing and digital economy thrived, necessitating structural reforms for sustained growth into 2025.
China’s economy grew 5% in 2024, driven by stimulus measures, strong exports, and high-tech investment, despite challenges like weak domestic demand and demographic pressures. Structural reforms and targeted policies are essential for sustaining growth into 2025.
China’s economic performance in 2024 saw a return to steady growth, achieving a 5 percent GDP expansion in line with the government’s target, as per the official data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on January 17, 2025. This outcome was largely bolstered by stimulus measures that helped drive a stronger-than-expected fourth-quarter recovery. While the country’s economy faced challenges such as declining population numbers and sluggish consumer demand, there were signs of optimism across key sectors, including industrial output and digital economy growth.
Additionally, China is beginning to pivot away from its dependence on the property sector, with the digital economy playing an increasingly significant role in economic expansion.
This article explores the major economic highlights from 2024 and examines the key trends, challenges, and opportunities that will shape China’s economy in the year ahead.
In 2024, China’s GDP reached RMB 134.91 trillion (US$18.80 trillion), maintaining its position as the second-largest economy in the world, behind only the United States, whose projected GDP for 2024 stands at approximately US$29 trillion. This reflects a year-on-year growth of 5.0 percent, in line with the government’s official target of “around 5 percent“ set during the 2024 Two Sessions. While slower than the 5.2 percent growth achieved in 2023, it highlights a stable recovery largely driven by strong export performance and targeted stimulus measures throughout the year.
The economy saw accelerated growth in the final quarter of 2024, with GDP expanding by 5.4 percent, surpassing expectations and making a substantial contribution to the overall 5.0 percent increase. Indeed, quarterly growth performance in 2024 showed steady improvement: the first quarter recorded a 5.3 percent increase, followed by 4.7 percent in Q2, and 4.6 percent in Q3.
Sectoral performance highlights revealed the manufacturing and service sectors as key drivers.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
How China’s appetite for salmon could reshape global seafood markets – new research
China’s salmon demand surged 46% in 2023, prompting global exporters to respond. Challenges in domestic salmon production highlight opportunities for rainbow trout, reshaping the seafood market towards sustainability and consumer preferences.
China’s demand for farmed salmon is growing at an unprecedented pace. In 2023, its imports grew by 46% year on year – with imports of fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon up 63%.
This remarkable growth is reshaping the global seafood trade. Exporters from Scotland, Norway, Chile, Australia, Faroe Islands, Canada and Iceland are racing to supply the needs of this vast and rapidly evolving market.
At the same time, China’s efforts to produce its own Atlantic salmon have faced significant challenges, highlighting the need for substitutes like rainbow trout to meet the country’s growing appetite for seafood delicacies.
An important shift occurred in 2018, when the Chinese government permitted rainbow trout to be labelled and sold as salmon. This decision blurred the distinction between imported Atlantic salmon and locally farmed rainbow trout, creating a more accessible option for cost-sensitive consumers.
Trout is comparable to salmon in appearance and size, with firm and oily meat that has a similar orange-pink colour. Nutritionally too, the species are alike, as are the ways in which they can be cooked and prepared.
In our new research which included taste tests, we found that many Chinese consumers could not distinguish between domestic rainbow trout and imported Atlantic salmon in blind testing. But when informed about the origin, testers’ preferences shifted strongly in favour of imported Atlantic salmon, highlighting the power of provenance in consumer tastes.
Although people’s willingness to pay did not vary initially in our blind tests, it became a decisive factor once the origin of the fish was revealed.
But we found that origin alone was not enough. For our testers to be prepared to pay higher prices, they also had to like the look, smell and taste of the product more, or be persuaded by its ecolabel (indicating environmental standards).
Environmental costs
Transporting Atlantic salmon from Scottish lochs, Norwegian fjords or Chilean waters to Chinese markets involves complex logistics and significant environmental costs. The carbon footprint of this trade, combined with the resource-intensive nature of salmon aquaculture, raises critical concerns about sustainability.
These challenges are particularly pronounced in China, where consumers have a strong preference for freshness. This drives demand for quick delivery of imported salmon despite its environmental impact, and consumers are increasingly turning to online platforms to buy their seafood.
E-commerce has reshaped seafood retail in China, offering quick delivery and products that cater to consumer demand for quality and freshness. Salmon stands out in this market due to its perceived high value, premium quality and price point. Unlike other expensive seafood that often needs to be sold live to maintain its value, salmon retains its appeal when chilled or frozen.
This makes salmon particularly suited to modern retail models, where sophisticated cold-chain logistics ensure its freshness without the complexities of live transport. However, these innovations come at a cost.
The energy-intensive storage and rapid transportation required for imported salmon contribute significantly to environmental harm. As China’s seafood market continues to grow, addressing the sustainability challenges associated with this trade will be critical to balancing consumer demand with environmental responsibility. Current international certification schemes aiming to improve the sector’s sustainability have had limited impact in China so far.
A worker processing imported fresh salmon in a Beijing wholesale seafood market.
David Little, Author provided
China has made significant efforts to establish a domestic Atlantic salmon industry, but these attempts have largely been unsuccessful due to technical challenges and environmental constraints. This has left a gap that domestically farmed rainbow trout is poised to fill.
A trout farming raceway in Chengdu, China, supplied with fresh river water.
Zixuan Ma, Author provided
In 2022, China produced 37,000 tonnes of rainbow trout. This is a relatively small amount compared with international production levels, but still notable considering that rainbow trout is a new farmed species in China, unlike traditional species like carp.
However, rainbow trout farming in China is geographically constrained, as the species thrives in cooler freshwater temperatures found in higher-lying lakes and reservoirs, as well as in “raceways” (channels supplied continuously with fresh water diverted from rivers).
Advances in aquaculture systems offer a potential pathway to expand China’s production. Trout farming is a more sustainable, locally sourced alternative to Atlantic salmon that reduces the carbon footprint associated with imports and ensures fresher options for Chinese consumers. Developing a robust domestic trout industry could enhance food security, reduce dependence on imports, and create economic opportunities in rural areas.
China’s evolving seafood market offers valuable lessons for the global industry. Emphasising quality, freshness and sustainability will resonate with the increasingly sophisticated Chinese consumer.
At the same time, investment in eco-friendly aquaculture practices, both domestically and internationally, will be essential to balance the growing demand for premium seafood with environmental responsibility. These could include reducing feed waste and recirculating aquaculture systems (which filter and reuse water) to minimise water use. Recycling waste nutrients by using them elsewhere in food production could also be key.
As rainbow trout gains prominence in China’s seafood landscape, the relationship between consumer preferences, environmental concerns and economic opportunities could in turn shape the future of the global salmon trade.
If domestic fish captures a larger share of the Chinese market, salmon producers in Europe, Canada and other exporting regions may face significant challenges. This could ultimately force them to rethink their strategies in order to adapt to shifting market dynamics.
Although the goal of creating a domestic Atlantic salmon industry has proved difficult for China, trout farming presents a practical and sustainable solution for its luxury seafood sector.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China Reports Agreement on Ceasefire between Myanmar’s Factions
- 2024 China Economic Review: GDP, Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment Analysis
- How China’s appetite for salmon could reshape global seafood markets – new research
- China Limits Apple Operations as BYD Manufacturing Moves to India and Southeast Asia Amid Trade Frictions | International Business News – The Times of India
- China’s GDP Grows 5% in 2024: Key Insights and Main Factors
- Can science be both open and secure? Nations grapple with tightening research security as China’s dominance grows
