China
China and India and the transition of regional power
Author: Peter Drysdale, ANU Through 2005 to 2007, diplomatic flirtation with the idea that a new quadrilateral alliance in Asia and the Pacific centred on India’s anchor role, with the United States , Japan and Australia, in a soft, ‘values-based’ containment initiative (Quad Initiative) directed at its strategic encirclement of China blossomed briefly and faded from public view. As Sourabh Gupta reminds us in his thoughtful essay reviewing the state of the China-India relationship this week, in the northern summer of 2007, joint naval exercises conducted ostentatiously in the Bay of Bengal by the four Quad powers plus Singapore, allegedly under NATO operational procedures and with facilitated access (for India) to the American military satellite system, added to irritation in the relationship between Asia’s two great emerging powers. Beijing’s frustration with developments at the time derived more from Washington’s willingness to bend international non-proliferation norms and reinstate India as a country in good standing in the international nuclear regime, Gupta suggests. That the US-India civil nuclear agreement materialised barely a couple of weeks after Premier Wen’s departure from New Delhi in 2005 added to the feeling that China had been caught diplomatically flat-footed as well as betrayed by India’s transactional approach to US ties. Beijing chose to respond, significantly, by putting pressure on questions over territory to signal its disaffection. In a pattern, Gupta notes, that has seen China calibrate its stance on outstanding territorial issues to the tenor of its overall bilateral relationship and perceptions of friendliness or hostility — it was swift to pursue its claims inflexibly on the ground and at the negotiating table. The next few years saw retreat from the Quad idea. Abe lost power in Japan. The new Hatoyama government in Japan sought a different course with China. The Obama administration in Washington and the Rudd government in Australia were inclined to a more nuanced approach to how India might counter-balance the growing power of China and its particular characteristics. But underneath the surface, the Quad idea was not dead — in hibernation perhaps, but not dead. In pol-mil circles, it offered the promise of continuity for the established order of regional power, a comfortable reassuring retreat to an augmented familiar security framework. It also offered, however thinly, the moral fig leaf that rationalised a strategy of Chinese containment, whatever that might mean. Come the troubles with China of 2010, mutations of Quad-type thinking came out of the closet once more, not in public diplomacy but privately, pushing the idea at the margins of circles of influence in India and in the putative Quad constituency . It remains, active, purposeful, but below the radar. But India, and China, not unexpectedly, have moved on. To those in Washington, Tokyo or Canberra, who incline to the Quad strategy, not as a contingency but as some kind of in-your-face alternative to Chinese engagement, politically and militarily, as well as economically, it is well to reflect upon the independent evolution and challenges of India’s relationship with China. These are two powers, with common borders, each their own vulnerabilities, inexorably growing economic complementary, shared interests and objectives in global governance and the need to deal with each other’s growing power in its own Asian space. Engaging with China bilaterally is an imperative for India, not an option. The challenge for New Delhi is – and it has always been – to factor calculation of national self-interest (and security) into dealings with China without foreclosing the potential of a resurgent Asia with China and India at its core. Third-country strategic partners are a useful adjunct in this process … but an adjunct at best, and relegated in most part to narrow aspects of the security realm. India’s self-image as an aspiring great power and a peer of China demand that the burden (and instruments) for managing and engaging China will rest primarily on its own capabilities. And it will have to discharge this self-imposed obligation in its own time frame, not at the whim of others. Gupta’s careful analysis of China-India affairs reminds us once again, should we need reminding, that as India and China face these realities, whatever the baggage in the history of their relationship, India can afford to be nobody’s pawn in dealing with China or rely on the dream of appeal to distant American power to solve its problems with its neighbour. And China will have every reason to treat India with increasing care and appropriate respect . No related posts.
Through 2005 to 2007, diplomatic flirtation with the idea that a new quadrilateral alliance in Asia and the Pacific centred on India’s anchor role, with the United States, Japan and Australia, in a soft, ‘values-based’ containment initiative (Quad Initiative) directed at its strategic encirclement of China blossomed briefly and faded from public view.
As Sourabh Gupta reminds us in his thoughtful essay reviewing the state of the China-India relationship this week, in the northern summer of 2007, joint naval exercises conducted ostentatiously in the Bay of Bengal by the four Quad powers plus Singapore, allegedly under NATO operational procedures and with facilitated access (for India) to the American military satellite system, added to irritation in the relationship between Asia’s two great emerging powers.
Beijing’s frustration with developments at the time derived more from Washington’s willingness to bend international non-proliferation norms and reinstate India as a country in good standing in the international nuclear regime, Gupta suggests. That the US-India civil nuclear agreement materialised barely a couple of weeks after Premier Wen’s departure from New Delhi in 2005 added to the feeling that China had been caught diplomatically flat-footed as well as betrayed by India’s transactional approach to US ties. Beijing chose to respond, significantly, by putting pressure on questions over territory to signal its disaffection. In a pattern, Gupta notes, that has seen China calibrate its stance on outstanding territorial issues to the tenor of its overall bilateral relationship and perceptions of friendliness or hostility — it was swift to pursue its claims inflexibly on the ground and at the negotiating table.
The next few years saw retreat from the Quad idea. Abe lost power in Japan. The new Hatoyama government in Japan sought a different course with China. The Obama administration in Washington and the Rudd government in Australia were inclined to a more nuanced approach to how India might counter-balance the growing power of China and its particular characteristics. But underneath the surface, the Quad idea was not dead — in hibernation perhaps, but not dead. In pol-mil circles, it offered the promise of continuity for the established order of regional power, a comfortable reassuring retreat to an augmented familiar security framework. It also offered, however thinly, the moral fig leaf that rationalised a strategy of Chinese containment, whatever that might mean. Come the troubles with China of 2010, mutations of Quad-type thinking came out of the closet once more, not in public diplomacy but privately, pushing the idea at the margins of circles of influence in India and in the putative Quad constituency. It remains, active, purposeful, but below the radar. But India, and China, not unexpectedly, have moved on.
To those in Washington, Tokyo or Canberra, who incline to the Quad strategy, not as a contingency but as some kind of in-your-face alternative to Chinese engagement, politically and militarily, as well as economically, it is well to reflect upon the independent evolution and challenges of India’s relationship with China. These are two powers, with common borders, each their own vulnerabilities, inexorably growing economic complementary, shared interests and objectives in global governance and the need to deal with each other’s growing power in its own Asian space. Engaging with China bilaterally is an imperative for India, not an option. The challenge for New Delhi is – and it has always been – to factor calculation of national self-interest (and security) into dealings with China without foreclosing the potential of a resurgent Asia with China and India at its core. Third-country strategic partners are a useful adjunct in this process … but an adjunct at best, and relegated in most part to narrow aspects of the security realm. India’s self-image as an aspiring great power and a peer of China demand that the burden (and instruments) for managing and engaging China will rest primarily on its own capabilities. And it will have to discharge this self-imposed obligation in its own time frame, not at the whim of others.
Gupta’s careful analysis of China-India affairs reminds us once again, should we need reminding, that as India and China face these realities, whatever the baggage in the history of their relationship, India can afford to be nobody’s pawn in dealing with China or rely on the dream of appeal to distant American power to solve its problems with its neighbour. And China will have every reason to treat India with increasing care and appropriate respect.
Author: Peter Drysdale, ANU
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China and India and the transition of regional power
Business
Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24
Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.
Southern Sun Earnings Surge
Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.
China’s Property Market Recovery
In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.
Broader Economic Implications
The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.
Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24
China
Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle
Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.
Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy
Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Recent Developments and Implications
Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.
Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization
Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.
Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China
China
2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China
China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.
China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.
The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.
According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.
China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.
Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).
In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.
Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
- Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24
- Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle
- 2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China
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